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 American folk music gatekeepers have been rightfully critiqued for positing 
problematic naturalizations of authenticity. Yet, there are underexplored thinkers and artists 
across the history of folk music whose relationship to media is more complicated. By 
drawing on the field of media archeology, this dissertation explores the various diagrams and 
models of communication that can be pulled from the long American folk revival. Media 
archeology as described by such thinkers as Jussi Parikka and Siegfried Zielinski is not a 
conventionally linear means of narrating media history; media archeology rather seeks to 
uncover forgotten and all-but-lost potentialities within our historical media ecologies. In this 
way, drawing also on the work of Friedrich Kittler, Marshall McLuhan, and Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari, I explore the subterranean but vivid discourse on technology offered by 
several key players in American folk music history.  
 I begin by closely reading the work, writings, and eclectic projects of Alan Lomax 
and Pete Seeger. Lomax’s anthropological and folkloristic research was grounded in a 
myriad of both analogue and digital media; he pioneered the use of sound-recording 
technology in the field, used IBM mainframes to analyze musicological data in the sixties, 
and even experimented with personal computers and multimedia software in the eighties and 
nineties. I probe Lomax’s writings to find an anomalous and productive conception of the 
digital. Second, I look at Pete Seeger’s complicated relationship to McLuhan; despite his 
problems with the Torontonian superstar, Seeger’s own thought works towards a similarly 
medium-specific understanding of resistance. Chapter 3 considers Steve Jobs’s and Apple’s 
mobilization of Bob Dylan’s work and star image. Although Apple’s effacement of the 
machine has roots in Dylan’s own artistic lineage (via Romanticism), we can also find a post-
humanist Dylan—one interested in noise, machines, and parasites. The final chapter explores 
through-lines between the “Hootenanny” parties held by Woody Guthrie and his friends in 
the early 1940s and more recent mobile, music-making iPhone apps, with a final stop at the 
Occupy movement’s “People’s Microphone.” These exploratory case studies bring to light a 
set of connections and convergences between digital history, folk music, and critical theory.  
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Chapter 1 – American Folk Music as Tactical Media 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 President Barack Obama invited Pete Seeger and Bruce Springsteen to sing 
Woody Guthrie’s “This Land is Your Land” at the Lincoln Memorial as part of his 
inauguration celebration in January of 2009. Despite the communist message of the song, 
Seeger’s rusty banjo and the group sing-along seemed to dissolve all of the nation’s 
tensions, both present and past, magically transforming it into an integrated and 
democratic community. A key feature of the performance was an apparent immediacy, a 
feature of “the folk” which dates back centuries. The microphones, cameras, and digital 
networks transmitting the source signals seemed to be transparently capturing the sincere 
expressions on offer (cf. Frith, 1981, 1986). 
 Images of “the folk” have long connoted a peaceful and pre-modern stasis; 
European folklore collectors in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries constructed the 
folk as a backwards-looking relic of a harmonious, yet imagined, social order (Bendix, 
1996; Filene, 2000; Storey, 2003). This nostalgia has persisted in American folk music 
discourse in complicated ways. Many have written about various political dimensions of 
the American folk revival (see Denisoff, 1971; Hampton, 1986; Lieberman, 1989; Reuss, 
2000), but absent from these discussions is a serious consideration of the revival’s 
relationship with technology. What did Alan Lomax, Pete Seeger, Woody Guthrie, and 
Bob Dylan actually have to say about the particular media they were relying on in their 
numerous political and literary projects? To what degree did these thinkers, who were 
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also practitioners, anticipate or parallel the work of Harold Adams Innis, Marshall 
McLuhan, or Friedrich Kittler, who variously charted the social, aesthetic, and 
ontological effects arising from emergent technologies? In the writings of certain folk 
revivalists one can find a much more complex engagement with media than the one on 
the surface of the Obama celebration. This dissertation explores connections cutting 
across the American folk revival, media theory, and tactical media discourse. By drawing 
on medium theory, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and a synthesis of the two—
tactical media—this dissertation seeks to find something useful in the folk revival: tools 
and concepts that might still have valence in our contemporary, digitalized media 
ecology. 
1.2 A Longue Durée of Tactical Media 
 According to Rita Raley (2009),  
 tactical media signifies the intervention and disruption of a dominant semiotic 
 regime, the temporary creation of a situation in which signs, messages, and 
 narratives are set into play and critical thinking becomes possible. Tactical media 
 operates [sic] in the field of the symbolic, the site of power in the postindustrial 
 society. (p. 6)  
Her thoughtful book goes on to explore examples of such works, including projects by 
the Critical Art Ensemble, Electronic Disturbance Theatre, and John Klima—all who 
have attempted to artfully effect, perhaps, what Marshall McLuhan (2003) referred to as 
“the reversal of the overheated medium” (p. 51), the medium here usually being the 
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digital networks across which global capital circulates.1 According to McLuhan (1969, 
2003), it was through synesthetic breakthroughs or “counter-blasts” that a fresh 
understanding of any shifts in our larger media ecology could be gained. Following 
McLuhan’s media materialism, however, and thus going a little further than Raley’s 
implication that they operate strictly on the symbolic realm, tactical media practitioners 
perhaps encourage “machinic subjectivities” and “a-signifying assemblages” to emerge 
from the media along which they play (whether via parody, prank, hoax or hacktivism).2 
The consequences can of course include semiotic disruptions, even if they do not end 
there; attention can be drawn, to cite only a few possibilities, to the liquidity and 
pervasiveness of capital’s power to de- and re-territorialize desire, to the marginalization 
of minority voices and views in mainstream media culture, or to the overbearing clutch 
the neoliberal regime has on the stuff of life itself (Dyer-Witheford & DePeuter, 2009; 
Galloway, 2004; Lovink, 2002; Thacker, 2004). As the military metaphor suggests, 
tactical media are intended to strike straight to the heart of hierarchical hegemons.3  
 Raley (2009) focuses on “new” media and digital art practices, and she suggests 
that there is indeed something new about tactical media, which have emerged specifically 
                                                
1 The Critical Art Ensemble (1994) draw a similar historical periodization: “The rules of cultural and 
political resistance have dramatically changed. The revolution in technology brought about by the rapid 
development of the computer and video has created a new geography of power relations in the first world 
that could only be imagined as little as twenty years ago” (p. 3). 
2 Below, I will explore in more depth the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, from whom I take 
“machinic subjectivities” and “a-signifying assemblages” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, 1987). For now, let 
me briefly define the former concept as a mode of subjectification that breaks apart a structure or 
structures, and the latter as a group or groups of connections which reach beyond language and “the 
signifier.”   
3 Von Clausewitz’s nineteenth-century treatise On War (2007) influentially distinguished between strategy 
and tactics: “tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for 
the object of the war” (p. 74). Michel de Certeau (1984) picked up some of these terms in his work on 




from the informational technologies of post-industrialization. Indeed, from the Electronic 
Disturbance Theatre’s online “sit-ins” in service of the Zapatista struggles of Mexico in 
the nineties, to Molleindustria’s critical computer games, tactical media practitioners 
have often operated within a high-tech playground of silicon-ready subversion. The 
apparently inherent digitality of the field was most pronounced in its early flowering as 
expressed, for instance, by the Critical Art Ensemble’s projects and publications of the 
early nineties, and here the virtual is abstracted, disembodied, hovering above the streets 
and alleyways now long “evacuated” by power. As they begin The Electronic 
Disturbance (1994): 
 The rules of cultural and political resistance have dramatically changed. The 
 revolution in technology brought about by the rapid development of the computer 
 and video has created a new geography of power relations in the first world that 
 could only be imagined as little as twenty years ago: people are reduced to data, 
 surveillance occurs on a global scale, minds are melded to screenal reality, and an 
 authoritarian power emerges that thrives on absence. The new geography is a 
 virtual geography, and the core of political and cultural resistance must assert 
 itself in this electronic space. (p. 3)  
Acoustic guitars, the collective and collaborative performance of traditional folk songs, 
live protest in general, would all seem to be obsolete. To challenge power structures in 
the digital age, one needs to do battle in cyberspace.  
 Tactical media theorist Geert Lovink (2011) and even the Critical Art Ensemble 
(2001) have softened on this point over the years.4 They have given more recognition to 
                                                
4 Indeed, as early as Garcia and Lovink’s “The ABC of Tactical Media” (2003), attention was paid to both 
new and old technologies, though the former were perhaps given priority.   
5 
 
“old,” “live” forms of dissent and recognized that we need now to look below the 
“screenal reality” of mainstream digital culture.5 For instance, in Digital Resistance, 
despite the title, the Critical Art Ensemble (2001) articulates a more layered and subtle 
conception of communication against power: “No cultural bunker is ever fully secure. 
We can trespass in them all, inventing molecular interventions and unleashing semiotic 
shocks” (p. 11; emphasis added). Elsewhere in the book they retreat from their earlier 
position: “Organic being in the world must be reestablished as the locus of reality, 
placing the virtual back in its proper place as simulacra” (p. 39). Still, despite the 
mounting challenges to postmodernism and to the first waves of cyberculture, as a 
historical object tactical media continues to be delimited as a specifically “new” 
paradigm of art and activism, as is evinced by Rayley’s guide to the field. One looks to 
performative hoaxes, to avant-garde media and net art, or to the aesthetic use of 
biotechnology. 
 A deep genealogy of tactical media theory might go back further than the rise of 
digital networks and personal computing; we might go back to thinkers and practitioners 
not often considered in histories of tactical media or digital culture, not in order to evade 
the digital or postmodernity, but as a way of expanding our conceptions of what might 
constitute digitality and even media as such. Alan Lomax, for instance, was a folklorist 
who began working in the 1930s in the United States. He might still be most famous for 
having discovered, in 1933, the singer and guitarist Huddie “Lead Belly” Leadbetter in a 
Louisiana penitentiary with his father, John Lomax, and for enthusiastically documenting 
                                                
5 Arthur Kroker and Michael A. Weinstein (1994) were perhaps among the first to express this hunch in 
their early, critical look at cyberculture’s forgetting of embodiment.  
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and promoting hundreds of other “folksingers” over his long career (see Szwed, 2010). 
But young Lomax was also to become a tactical media theorist of sorts. His writings 
glower with excitement about his new weaponry (he was very much an early adopter, 
from LPs to stereo to IBM’s mainframe System/360 to Apple’s Quicktime). Although he 
also expressed the belief that sound-recording technology is a transparent tool (Filene, 
2000)—as a folklorist he was equally concerned with content—his vivid prose often 
breaks down the boundaries between user, folk, and machine entirely. Like The Yes Men 
or the Critical Art Ensemble, and both anticipating and paralleling the thought of Gilles 
Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and Marshall McLuhan, Lomax sought resistance and rupture 
from within the circuits and channels of modernity. And, as we will see, Lomax was not 
alone. 
 The current introductory chapter will outline the issues this dissertation will 
address, as well as the means by which this will be accomplished. First, I will briefly 
delimit the research objectives of the project; second, I will offer a literature review 
pertaining to the cultural objects of my study; third, I will explain my theoretical and 
methodological orientations; finally, I will offer a chapter breakdown. 
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
 One objective of this dissertation is to trace continuities between three profoundly 
related but not often compared cultural fields. Raley (2009) does cite Situationism and 
the Yippies as precursors to tactical media, but she leaves this thread to the sixties 
underexplored in her study, and she does not even consider the field of American folk 
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music. Yet, there are several noteworthy connections joining the folk revival, Marshall 
McLuhan, Deleuze and Guattari, and tactical media.  
 First, “Electronic Civil Disobedience” is an articulation of tactical media offered 
by the Critical Art Ensemble (1996) that takes its name from the writings of Henry David 
Thoreau, the nineteenth-century American transcendentalist thinker who had a profound 
influence on conceptions of “the folk” in the United States, including Alan Lomax’s 
(Bluestein, 1972). Gregory Bateson, the cybernetic anthropologist who developed the 
concepts of “plateau” and “schismogenesis” which were later adopted by Deleuze and 
Guattari (Massumi, 1992)—and who was married to Alan Lomax’s mentor, Margaret 
Mead—certainly seems to have had an influence on Lomax, who would have met 
Bateson and been familiar with his work.6 Despite his resistance to certain aspects of the 
discipline, cybernetics also had an influence on McLuhan, who adopts “servomechanism” 
from Norbert Wiener. In turn, McLuhan’s War and Peace in the Global Village (1969) 
and his idea of “infowar” directly inspired the concept “tactical media” (see Richardson, 
2003). Pete Seeger’s journalistic writings reveal a familiarity with contemporary media 
scholarship as well; in addition to McLuhan, he discusses Jacques Ellul and Hans 
Magnus Enzensberger (see Seeger, 1972). In addition to the direct influences and 
conversations, these diverse artists and thinkers more generally tend to articulate similar 
anxieties and desires. By approaching them as parts of a broader phylum (cf. De Landa, 
1997), we will be able to glimpse the fascinating drift of concepts and machines across a 
new genealogy of tactical media interventions.  
                                                
6 Lomax also took courses with the cybernetic anthropologist Raymond Birdwhistell in the early sixties 
(Szwed, 2010), which increases the likelihood that he encountered Bateson’s theories.  
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 The second objective is to reconsider the significance of technology in American 
folk music culture by exploring Alan Lomax, Pete Seeger, Woody Guthrie, and Bob 
Dylan through the lens of media theory. We will be interested both in the traces left by 
media on these writers and the degree to which they were self-reflexive about this 
process. Although song collectors and folklorists since the Grimm Brothers in the 
nineteenth century have been sensitive to the differences between print and oral 
communication, studies in the discipline of folklore have tended to focus on the content 
of musical works and rituals and to neglect the media involved in their preservation and 
transmission (Brady, 1999; Filene, 2000). Many contemporary scholars of the American 
folk revival have inherited, it seems to me, this insistent focus on content over medium. 
Some have begun to consider extra-textual aspects of folk music culture, including 
technology (e.g. Brady, 1999; Cantwell, 1996; Filene, 2000; Narvaez, 1986), but much of 
this work has tended towards the descriptive. For instance, John Szwed’s (2010) recent 
biography of Lomax excellently foregrounds the folklorist’s lifelong interest in and use of 
technology, but Szwed does not pursue the theoretical implications of this relationship in 
his somewhat hagiographic work. The same goes for Benjamin Filene’s Romancing the 
Folk (2000), the main objective of which is to highlight how American roots music has 
been curated and constructed by intermediaries such as Lomax over the twentieth 
century. More theoretical questions deserve to be posed about these thinkers and artists. 
How can Alan Lomax and his fellow travellers be considered as tactical media theorists? 
What might this offer us in terms of an alternative history of digitalization? Although 
conventional cultural wisdom tends to place the folk revival within an older, social-realist 
paradigm of Marxist cultural theory, in what ways has the American folk revival 
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anticipated later post-structuralist and neo-Marxist thinkers such as Deleuze and 
Guattari?  
 Third, I hope to contribute to utopian studies and to the growing field of what we 
might call “authenticity studies” by further complicating the distinction between 
authenticity and inauthenticity in mediatized, utopian visions.7 Ours has been thought to 
be a “post-authentic” epoch, at least from the vantage point of academe (e.g. Baudrillard, 
1994; Grossberg, 1992; Sternberg, 2006), and tactical media artists might seem to be 
reveling strictly on the plane of the “simulacrum.” But how have folklorists, folksingers, 
and real-yet-virtual protestors all tackled the productively ambiguous connections 
between an alienating, allegedly inauthentic media network and the utopian goal of 
becoming “real” together? Authenticity is often thought to be a naïve concept, one that 
posits a pastoral world or a trans-historical subject (Shumway, 2007), but in what ways 
has authenticity been thought to be locatable or achievable within particular media 
ecologies? How has the emergence of new technologies (for instance, the IBM 
System/360) made possible, or coincided with, new conceptions of authenticity and 
utopia? Utopia has returned as a serious concept in cultural and political analysis (see, for 
instance, Cazdyn & Szeman, 2011; Gardiner 1992, 1995; Jameson, 2005), but a much 
smaller handful of scholars have recently encouraged us to reconsider the valence of the 
ideal of authenticity as well (e.g. Lindholm, 2008; Middleton, 2006). Charles Taylor 
(1992), for instance, provocatively defends the value of debating and working out what it 
                                                
7 My understanding of utopia is greatly informed by Bauman (1976), Bloch (1986), and Levitas (1990); and 
my understanding of authenticity is greatly informed by Guignon (2004) and Taylor (1992). These thinkers, 
and the concepts, are explored in more detail in chapter 6.  
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means to be or to become “authentic.” An archeology of tactical media via the America 
folk revival offers one way to answer Taylor’s call in a utopian register. 
 Finally, although I am interested primarily in the level of medial discourses—
assemblages of technologies, bodies, diagrams, performances, and texts—this dissertation 
also aims to consider questions of political economy. Following Vincent Mosco (1996), I 
understand political economy broadly as “the study of control and survival in social life” 
(p. 26). We will not be undertaking quantitative industry or policy analyses, then, but 
thinking more generally about the intersections of texts and technologies with socio-
economic power. The Romantic notion of transparent expressivity, for instance, covers 
over a global network of exploitation and immiseration; the familiar Marxist critique of 
possessive individualism (Lukács, 1971; Macpherson, 1962) is now more than ever 
applicable, particularly in digital consumer culture. As Matteo Pasquinelli (2008) puts it, 
“[t]he supposed ‘autonomy’ of the new cultural and technological commons is paid for 
by those who conduct the material work” (p. 44), and Apple’s iGadgets in particular 
embody a promotion of the irrepressible expressivity of creative monads—a motif which 
obscures the complex networks of collaborative production that make such devices 
possible.8 From another angle, we might think about how the folk revival’s vision of a 
community joined in song has been mobilized by mainstream media culture around the 
notion of the “prosumer.” Just as the audiences at the early “Hootenannies” (participatory 
                                                
8 Ry Taffel (2012) offers a fascinating analysis of the material costs of ICTs from a perspective that blends 
both political economy and media ecology. Drawing on Gregory Bateson’s systems theory, Taffel explores 
labour exploitation, e-waste, and other negative “externalities” of the digital media industries. On the 
networks of devastation (of both humans and non-humans) undergirding contemporary digital culture, see 
also Berardi (2009), Dyer-Witheford and De Peuter (2009), Gabrys (2011), Nest (2011), and Pasquinelli 
(2008).   
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folk concerts in New York City first held in the 1940s) were expected both to sing along 
and presumably to enjoy it, so are we all now expected to work for free, producing not 
only entertaining content but also metadata as we build our online presences, which are 
increasingly mined by corporations and states alike (Fuchs, 2010a, 2010b; Manzerolle, 
2010, 2013). Thus a slightly more political-economic lens in chapters 3 and 4 will help us 
to veer away from the celebratory tone of much late-sixties media activism (e.g. “the 
more media the better!”). It will also help us see the subtleties of the genealogy on the 
table. Is the Macintosh a tactical medium? Why not? Where else should we look when 
thinking of, for instance, Bob Dylan’s relationship to digital culture and media theory? 
1.4 Literature Review 
 I will now sketch out some of the key scholarly contributions in the several fields 
within which my objects of analysis can be situated. First, I will review the relevant 
scholarship on folk music and media (more specific literature reviews, relating to the 
particular case studies, will be offered in the chapters themselves). Next, I will explore 
the field of media theory. Third, I will sketch out the research on tactical media. Finally, I 
will offer an overview of relevant work on the history and aesthetics of digital media and 
culture.  
Folk Music and Media 
 Research on the subjects of Carnival and early articulations of “the people” has 
been a useful starting point, for questions concerning the mediation of “the folk” go back 
at least to the projects of the German thinkers Johann Gottfried Herder and the Grimm 
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Brothers in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As Peter Burke (2009) points 
out, Herder and the Grimms were among the first to imagine how the everyday life of 
“the people” could be expressive of a nation’s spirit. Their promotion of anti- 
Enlightenment irrationalism anticipates later song collectors and folk theorists: the folk 
are “natural, simple, illiterate, instinctive, irrational, rooted in tradition and in the soil of 
the region, lacking any sense of individuality” (Burke, 2009, p. 9). Though this Romantic 
anti-modernism exploded most notoriously with the rise of fascism in twentieth-century 
Europe, it has also done ideological work on a more subtle level. For example, as Ian 
McKay (1994) has demonstrated, images of wholesome pre-modern “folk” have also 
been mobilized over the course of the twentieth century in Canada’s Maritime Provinces. 
The discourse of the Maritimes as a place “out of time,” which was built and 
disseminated in part by the song collector Helen Creighton, both concealed and 
lubricated the pains of modernization in the region, and such images continue to be 
utilized by the tourism industry (McKay, 1994).  Although in some ways the anti-modern 
understanding of “the folk” has persisted into the twenty-first century, my dissertation is 
rather interested in provocative ruptures in the work of particular theorists and artists 
within this larger, centuries-old discourse. 
 Peter Stallybrass and Allon White (1986) offer a more theoretically informed 
reading of popular culture in early modern Europe than Burke. They extract a post-
structuralist poetics of Carnival from Mikhail Bakhtin’s allegedly “troublesome 
folkloristic approach” (p. 26). Stallybrass and White read Carnival not as an event 
through which hierarchical relationships are inverted, because such simple inversions 
necessarily retain oppressive power structures. Rather, they approach Carnival as both a 
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text and an interpretive practice through which binaries and categories are dissolved and 
deflated altogether. Thus the fair, for instance, mixes work and pleasure, thereby 
problematizing the categories’ binary opposition (Stallybrass & White, 1986). We will 
see a similar move being carried out by the likes of Lomax, Seeger, and Dylan with 
respect to the question of authenticity versus mediation. Even more germane is 
Stallybrass and White’s consideration of authorship in relation to Carnival. They argue 
that Bakhtin does not sufficiently distinguish between “diverse domains of symbolic 
action and discourse” (1986, p. 59). Pace Bakhtin, Stallybrass and White claim that the 
performative and the ritualistic cannot be transparently documented by a text. They 
consequently draw our attention to the media used to do such translating.  
 Stallybrass and White masterfully bring post-structuralist insights to bear on early 
modern, European “folk” culture, but the meaning of technology in American folk music 
discourse has gone underexplored, and thus so has the genre’s complicated articulation of 
authenticity.9 Much work in popular music studies that considers the folk revival has 
                                                
9 The basic story of the American folk revival has been told many times, so I will refrain aside from this 
footnote. Early song collectors in the late nineteenth century—Francis James Child of Harvard University, 
for instance—were more interested in chasing after old texts of British ballads than they were interested in 
listening to American “cowboys” or African American field workers (Filene, 2000; Storey, 2003). Even 
early song-collecting expeditions in the Appalachians were designed to hunt down remnants of “pure” 
English music; for instance, Cecil Sharp thought that Appalachia was so primitive and backwards that it 
had essentially preserved medieval English culture (Filene, 2000). John Lomax was one of the first to turn 
to the music of his fellow countrymen, as he tried to collect cowboy songs of the frontier and then African 
American songs on his trips through the Southern states (Filene, 2000; Porterfield, 1996). This more 
academic form of revivalism permutated in the thirties and forties into a performative-political music scene. 
Woody Guthrie, Aunt Molly Jackson, Pete Seeger, and Josh White blended vernacular American musical 
forms with socialist and communist political sentiments, and often played for unions and other political 
bodies (Denisoff, 1971; Reuss, 2000). The McCarthy scare forced this movement underground, for the 
most part, but the nation’s interest in roots music resurfaced in the mid fifties on a larger scale when groups 
like the Kingston Trio and the Weavers sold millions of recordings (Cantwell, 1996). By 1964 folk music 
was on network television, it was discussed in numerous magazines dedicated to the genre, and college 
students around the country were learning and singing old folk songs (see Cantwell, 1996; Cohen, 2002). 
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come at the genre from the point of view of rock culture. Simon Frith’s (1981) pioneering 
work on taste in popular music locates a naïve and undialectical understanding of 
mediation in the folk revival; the notion of pure and untainted folk music was wielded by 
gatekeepers and tastemakers in rock culture as a means of distinction: “The folk 
argument entered rock via the American folk ‘revival’ of the 1940s and 1950s. This too 
was bound up with rural romanticism, with a search for values and ways which could be 
opposed to urban commerce and corruption” (1981, p. 161). Theodore Gracyk’s (1996) 
study of the aesthetics of rock similarly positions folk music. Whereas rock has tended to 
explore the ontology of recorded sound as an inherent aspect of the genre, a modernist 
aesthetic strategy Gracyk terms “record consciousness” (p. 69), folk music culture has 
wanted to disappear the recorded-ness of sound. For example, acts like The Beatles 
explored sonic textures that could not be recreated live, whereas field recordings of old 
blues singers seemed to want to directly capture the grain of the live, embodied 
performance event (Gracyk, 1996). Keir Keightley (2001) has similarly explored how 
rock music culture has drawn from two diverging traditions of authenticity: Romantic and 
Modernist. Within the Romantic discourse of authenticity, which derives from the folk 
revival, value is attributed to a “sense of community, sincerity and directness, ‘liveness,’ 
‘natural’ sounds, hiding musical technology” (Keightley, 2001, p. 137). Modernist 
authenticity, on the other hand, derives from “experimentation and progress, status of 
artist, irony, elitism, celebrating technology” (Keightley, 2001, p. 137). Again, the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
The songs and political edge of the early revival were also carried forward by the Civil Rights and anti-war 
movements, and by environmentalism (see Ingram, 2008; Rodnitzky, 1976, 1999; Roy, 2010). 
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revival’s complex relationship to media is skirted over. Although they have rightfully 
identified the indebtedness of rock to Western folk music cultures, the popular music 
scholars cited above tend to erect folk as modern rock’s or pop’s simplistic other, 
oblivious to the powers of noise and machines.  
 Of course, scholars have written about the American folk revival and about the 
Lomaxes in more detail. Serge Denisoff’s (1971) landmark history of the folk revival in 
relation to American left-wing politics is a notoriously unsympathetic account of the 
“proletarian folksong movement” (a phrase that I will nonetheless appropriate; Denisoff 
uses it to distinguish between the earlier political movement of the thirties and forties and 
the later commercial “boom” of the fifties and sixties). Denisoff explores in detail how 
the work of Woody Guthrie and the Almanac Singers mirrored shifts in the cultural 
policies of the Soviet Union. He occasionally touches on the question of media, 
suggesting that, in contrast to the later commercial “boom,” the essential locus of 
folksong for the urban folksingers was in the live performance event. Drawing on 
McLuhan, Denisoff suggests that the protest song movement was a “cool,” participatory 
culture. The early sixties revival, on the other hand, is positioned by the author in a 
narrative of “selling out”:  
 The key variable here follows McLuhan’s argument of media; that is, the revival 
 artists used the medium of recordings predominantly, as opposed to the collective 
 mass meeting emphasis of the 1940s. Therefore, each long-playing record 
 required ten or more selections. Equally, the marketplace prescribes a given 
 frequency of record production which, in effect, saturates the mass culture with 
 issues and individual statements of protest. (1971, p. 186)  
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This story of folk music history leaves underemphasized Alan Lomax’s successful career 
as a network-radio broadcaster in the 1930s and his writings about media and 
communication; it leaves aside Seeger’s television series Rainbow Quest, which tried to 
“cool down” the revival by encouraging the viewer to participate and to learn the songs 
performed on the program. Further, Denisoff’s (1971) claim that “the proletarian 
renaissance did not depend on the media” (p. 186) is unsupportable. Leadbelly began to 
tour with the Lomaxes in 1935 as an already mass-mediated phenomenon (Filene, 2000).   
 Denisoff tends to simplify a complex, heterogenous movement as a mere 
appendage—first of communist ideology and then of commercialism. Robert Cantwell is 
more sympathetic in his When We Were Good (1996), which closely reads the rich layers 
of meaning that line key texts and events of the revival, including the rousing finale of 
Newport 1963, which involved Seeger and Dylan joining hands with others to sing “We 
Shall Overcome.” The winding, self-reflexive study (Cantwell was active as a performer 
during the revival’s heyday) deploys the concept of “ethnomimesis” which the author has 
also developed elsewhere (see Cantwell, 1993). Cantwell provocatively sidesteps the 
revival’s own debates about authenticity; he looks at the Romanticization of rural “folk” 
by educated urbanites as a ritualized, performative, and distinctly American negotiation:  
 The midcentury folksong movement, a tissue of impersonation, enactment, 
 spectacle, music, and narrative within a coterie, arose from the interplay of the 
 ethnomimetic culture of New York, through its intellectuals, artists, and  
 entrepreneurs, with the popular and provincial cultures that lay beyond it to the 
 south and west. … Like all things theatrical, its characters inspired imitation 
 and, through mobile and momentary performances of folksong, established a fluid 
 dramatis personae and a portable mise en scene on the social stage, coaxing 
17 
 
 susceptible young people out of their inherited identities and touching the social 
 background with hues of the past. (1996, p. 63) 
Cantwell’s dramaturgical approach allows him to highlight the performativity of 
authenticity. Moving away from the concept of ideology, Cantwell considers how these 
performances and sounds made meaning for a particular stratum of American society at a 
particular moment.   
 Cantwell also attempts to describe the media environment within which the 
revival emerged. He mentions McLuhan and cites Daniel Czitrom in his chapter on Harry 
Smith’s Anthology of American Folk Music. In the Anthology, Cantwell (1996) claims, 
“we can view the birth of a counterculture at the very moment that a new medium, 
television, was making a spectacle of American life and drawing us unwittingly into its 
audience” (p. 199). And he identifies the roles that LP technology and radio had in the 
availability and form of folk commodities into the fifties (Cantwell, 1996). Yet, Cantwell 
voices a simplistic critique of television as a degraded and low medium, one not suited to 
the dialogical essence of the folk movement: “Though the folk revival found limited 
exposure on television, its real milieu was extra- or sub-televisual, one of records, 
concerts, and clubs” (1996, p. 201). There is something to this claim, for the pages of 
Sing Out! and Broadside did tend to voice an anti-mass paranoia and a DIY ethos. Still, 
Cantwell’s position does not help us to understand Pete Seeger’s later television series, 
for instance, and he does not give any attention to the many connections between 
American folk music and digital culture. He admirably foregrounds the presence of 
technology and mass media in the mid-century revival, and I will draw on his 
descriptions particularly in chapter 5, but American folk music culture’s engagement with 
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the concept of media is more complicated than Cantwell’s somewhat impressionistic and 
occasionally journalistic account suggests.   
 More recent books by Americanists Benjamin Filene (2000) and Marybeth 
Hamilton (2007) have begun to explore in more detail the role of technology in American 
folk music. Filene traces American folk music from the genre’s overt concern with 
preservation (e.g. the British song collector Cecil Sharp, who scoured Appalachia for 
remnants of English ballads) to its more dynamic understanding of folklore as a living 
tradition as articulated by Alan Lomax, Charles Seeger, and Bob Dylan. The latter period 
of American folk, as Filene points out, was influenced by anthropological functionalism; 
for the functionalists, even pop songs could become folk songs, if they functioned as folk 
music (Filene, 2000). Thus Filene has begun to consider the modernist aspects of 
American folk music theory (i.e. authenticity is not to be preserved from the past but 
made in the present). As well, Filene’s attention to the construction of “the folk” leads 
him to consider the myriad media involved in folk preservation projects, from archives to 
federal institutions to recording technologies, though media as such are not the focus of 
his study. The American “folk” was not out there in “the field,” waiting to be discovered 
and promoted by song collectors like Alan Lomax and Benjamin A. Botkin. On the 
contrary, roots and folk music traditions have been actively invented through a rich and 
complex set of articulations and negotiations. Lead Belly, for instance, loved commercial 
hillbilly tunes, and yet the Lomaxes had him perform in his prison garb, which they 
believed to be the proper getup for the untutored, primal savage they were trying to 
present (Filene, 2000).   
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 Filene is one of the first to consider American song collectors’ engagement with 
various devices and media. He discusses Alan Lomax’s career as a radio broadcaster, 
even briefly his Cantometrics and Global Jukebox projects. In the chapter on Lead Belly, 
he foregrounds the paradox the Lomaxes were confronting: they were trying to find 
music outside of modernity, but they did so with the help of a Ford car and top-of-the-
line Dictaphone sound recorder, the latter which had been specially engineered for their 
particular needs (Filene, 2000). Still, there is much work left to do on the modernist and 
media-theoretical dimensions of American folk music culture. For instance, Filene (2000) 
points out that the Dictaphone was celebrated by the Lomaxes for its ability to precisely 
document performance. But is this all we can say about the Lomaxes’s engagement with 
technology? What if we also asked whether the folklorists also approached sound 
recording as a form of writing, as a technological re-territorialization of the voice’s so-
called “grain” (cf. Barthes, 1977)? Alan Lomax certainly did cling to a “metaphysics of 
presence” (Derrida, 1976) with respect to sound recording, as there are moments in his 
writings where he posits sound recording as the clear capturing of sonic truth. At the 
same time, however, his poetic inclinations as a writer and his clear fascination with the 
high-tech have led his work into some amazingly post-structuralist shadings. Barriers 
between active subject, passive object, and neutral tool break down as we glimpse a post-
humanist assemblage of a machinic and monstrous folk body. If we follow this thread, 
what kinds of utopia and authenticity do we begin to see articulated?  
 Marybeth Hamilton (2007) has also explored the aesthetics of the machine in the 
writings of John and Alan Lomax. Her account, which is situated in a larger study of race 
in blues music culture, focuses primarily on the field-recording expedition. She contends 
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that the Lomaxes were driven by an anti-modernist impulse yet were fascinated by 
technology, but she stops short at her observation that this is an embarrassing paradox. 
Again, Alan Lomax’s writings deserve closer scrutiny than this kind of critique affords; 
the produce of his digital period, in particular, warrants closer and more theoretical 
discussion. Thus in this dissertation I build on Hamilton’s and others’ research by 
drawing attention away from “the field” (I will also be interested, in the chapter on 
Lomax, in technologies of analysis and dissemination deployed after the initial recording 
event, such as the archive, the mainframe computer, and the personal computer) and 
towards a more generous and imaginative account of the complex ways American folk 
music culture has engaged with technology. 
 Ronald D. Cohen’s recent book Rainbow Quest: The Folk Music Revival and 
American Society, 1940-1970 (2002) also picks up on some of the themes followed by 
Filene and Hamilton, though he is more interested in the mainstream manifestations of 
American folk music. Cohen’s focus is the mid-century commercial boom of the revival; 
he explores the organizations, performers, magazines, record labels, festivals, and 
activists who impacted the various articulations of American folk music in popular 
culture. Of particular interest is his close attention to the vicious debates over the 
meaning of authenticity fought out at such sites as the Newport Folk Festival and the 
pages of Sing Out! magazine. The sheer breadth of Cohen’s positivist history, however, 
leads him away from the close reading of particular thinkers and practitioners that I hope 
to accomplish here. Cohen races from one anecdote to the next, offering an admittedly 
admirable and useful summation of the revival’s workings, yet he does not pause to 
meditate on the theoretical issues intersecting with his objects. Although Cohen does 
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highlight how “authenticity” and “the folk” have been constructed and imagined via 
various media and performance traditions, his method allows important questions to slip 
by. In this dissertation, we will be less interested in the total history of folk revivalism in 
the United States, less interested in the complete, linear narrative of all that was done and 
said, and more interested in the exceptions and the ruptures across this discourse, which 
takes slower reading to uncover.  
 The disciplines of folklore and ethnography have also recently awoken to the 
question of media. Erica Brady (1999) has examined the ways in which ethnographers at 
the turn of the twentieth century used the phonograph in their field expeditions. Brady is 
sensitive to the paradox of “pre-modern” preservation within the context of mass-
mediated societies. On one hand, the phonograph was at the center of the accelerations 
and dislocations of modernity; on the other, many ethnographers began to look to the 
phonograph as a tool with which they might preserve “disappearing remnants” (Brady, 
1999, p. 2).  Looking primarily at the discipline of ethnography, Brady describes how this 
paradox played out as various field workers came to use the phonograph in their efforts. 
Sound scholar Jonathan Sterne’s The Audible Past (2003) probes this history further by 
exploring the broader cultural context in which ethnography in the late nineteenth century 
developed. Sterne connects early efforts in the field of ethnography to embalming and 
canning practices and the larger Victorian cultures of death and preservation. However, 
neither Brady nor Sterne has given much attention to the Lomaxes or to the more activist 
and commercial sides of song collecting and folk revivalism, which will be my focus. 
 Other scholars in folklore studies have also begun to consider the place of 
technology in the discipline. Hermann Bausinger (1990) has reconsidered the stability 
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and distinctiveness of the categories of “folk” and “technology” in Germanic folklore: 
“technical requisites and motifs have entered all areas of folk culture and exist there as a 
matter of course” (p. 21). American studies scholar Gene Bluestein’s contributions follow 
a similar line of argumentation. His term “poplore” suggests that the ever-tenuous 
distinction between folk and pop is inapplicable to American cultural history, wherein 
distinctions between high and low, authentic and commercial, have tended to blur 
(Bluestein, 1972). As well, in her comparative study of the German and American 
folklore traditions, Regina Bendix’s In Search of Authenticity (1997) considers not just 
the content of folklore and music but the institutional interests and dispositions that have 
privileged particular understandings of authenticity and “the folk” over others.  
 However, what remains to be done is a theoretically sophisticated reading of 
American folk music’s engagement with media as such, which my study will attempt. 
From the point of view of American folk music’s most influential and prolific theorists, 
what kinds of communication were made possible by new media? How does one 
approach the system of mass media with an ear towards authentic performance? How do 
we plug the folk into the machine, and what are the implications of such an event? More 
than just producing a new piece in the historiography of American folk music culture, I 
aim to use Lomax, Seeger, and Dylan to think through issues of “infowar,” authenticity, 
and digitality. What does a late Texan folklorist have to teach contemporary media 
theorists and even artists? What does Bob Dylan have to teach computer programmers? 





 The tradition known as medium theory offers an excellent vantage point from 
which to reconsider the mediation of both folk music and resistance. Medium theory in 
particular is useful because the gatekeepers and tastemakers of the folk genre c. 1963 are 
thought to have longed for pure presence, for the absence of mediation. Medium theory, 
however, allows us to ask questions such as: How do particular media ecologies ground 
the production of particular enunciations of utopia or authenticity? How have 
permutations of both utopia and authenticity been related to the emergence of new media 
assemblages? To what degree are Lomax or Seeger actually sensitive to this process in 
their work? Medium theory allows us—with Lomax, Seeger, and Dylan—to formulate 
articulations of authenticity and utopia that are not necessarily nostalgic, but which are 
situated within dynamically mediatized cultures.  
 Medium theory is a body of interdisciplinary thought that has been fundamentally 
concerned with the myriad effects of particular media on societies. Plato, Karl Marx, 
Lewis Mumford, and Siegfried Giedion are often named as precursors or fellow 
travellers, but the Canadians Harold Adams Innis and Marshall McLuhan have perhaps 
been granted privileged status as disciplinary “founding fathers” (see, for instance, 
Meyrowitz, 1997; Qvortrup, 2006). Their central claim is that media are not mere 
translators of data, ideas, or experiences. Rather, particular media come to have 
particular, determinate effects on the very kinds of data, ideas, and experiences that can 
be had in the first place within any given historical moment. Thus in The Bias of 
Communication (1991) and Empire and Communications (1986), Innis explores the 
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degree to which media structure and delimit modes of economic and political 
organization, but also art, culture, and even subjectivity. According to Innis, media play a 
key role in a culture’s ability to record and to reproduce itself, and so the fate of 
civilizations can be traced back to the relative balance of their media ecologies: “Large-
scale political organizations such as empires must be considered from the standpoint of 
two dimensions, those of space and time, and persist by overcoming the bias of media 
which over-emphasize either dimension” (1986, p. 27). Although there is an inherent 
conservatism in Innis’s categories (balanced persistence is “good,” ephemerality is 
“bad”), he gives those interested in destroying or resisting a “civilization” via medial 
projectiles much to think about.  
 Although McLuhan’s analysis of the effects of media took him in different 
directions than Innis, his underlying theoretical framework is similar: media for McLuhan 
(2003) are not transparent channels but are themselves “messages,” which in and of 
themselves have political and aesthetic consequences. In other words, media as 
“extensions of man” must be viewed as part and parcel of our social being; the subject 
cannot be considered in isolation, but only as positioned in relation to larger social and 
technological systems. As Olivia Harvey (2010) puts it, “McLuhan’s analysis 
complicates the idea of radical exteriority generally found in arguments about the 
consequences of technological change by substituting instead an intertwined and 
inseparable organizational configuration between humans and technology” (p. 340). 
Anticipating Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the machine, McLuhan urges us to see the 
ways in which the self and the group are made in conjunction with technologies, 
technical as well as social. 
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 Both utopia and authenticity are discussed in McLuhan’s work. He is perhaps 
most famous for his utopian tendencies, in particular the oft-cited passages in 
Understanding Media where he describes the “global village” in mystical, religious 
language: “If the work of the city is the remaking or translating of man into a more 
suitable form than his nomadic ancestors achieved, then might not our current translation 
of our entire lives into the spiritual form of information seem to make of the entire globe, 
and of the human family, a single consciousness?” (2003, p. 90). And yet, the naivety of 
his utopianism has perhaps been over-emphasized by early critics such as James Carey 
(1967) and Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1974). He was ultimately ambiguous about the 
effects of “cool” and participatory media, and his later books, such as War and Peace in 
the Global Village (1968), give more emphasis to the more terrifying consequences of the 
electronic “Pentecost” he previously celebrated (Kroker, 1984).  
 McLuhan was also interested in authenticity, though his status as a postmodern 
prophet (see Genosko, 1999; Willmott, 1996) has perhaps obscured this aspect of his 
thought. He reminds us constantly in The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962) of his desire to grant 
humanity more “autonomy” within its wired situation. And his telling of the Narcissus 
myth in Understanding Media tacitly demonstrates the degree to which the Greek hero 
only needs “to become that which he really is,” which is just a machine within a media 
network:   
 The youth Narcissus mistook his own reflection in the water for another person. 
 This extension of himself by mirror numbed his perceptions until he became the 
 servomechanism of his own extended or repeated image. The nymph Echo tried to 
 win his love with fragments of his own speech, but in vain. He was numb. He had 
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 adapted to his extension of himself and had become a closed system. (2003, p. 
 63) 
Narcissus is alienated, not from his natural nature, but from his status as a media 
technology, itself plugged into a reflective surface. Thus McLuhan’s probing attempts to 
lead us to sensory awareness go beyond a nostalgic Romanticism, for he is sensitive to 
some of the revolutionary potentials of the new media of his time via a networked and 
post-human take on authenticity: “In the electric age we wear all mankind as our skin” 
(McLuhan & Fiore, 1968, p. 70).   
 Of course, some strands of medium theory have gone into Romantic and 
essentialist directions. McLuhan’s musings on the corporate wholesomeness of the 
“global village” constitute one famous example of this, and McLuhan’s student Walter J. 
Ong has also gone in this direction. Ong (1982) argues that oral culture is to be 
distinguished from chirographic and modern print culture in several respects; orality has a 
privileged position in the history of communication, as it is inherently “close to the 
human life world” (p. 42). Prior to the emergence of alienating, technological media, the 
spoken word allowed us to commune with ourselves and with our environment (Ong, 
1982). The spoken word allowed us to get closer to the heart of human existence as Ong 
sees it. On the other hand, “writing is completely artificial” (p. 81). Ong thus offers a 
nostalgic mythology of the voice, which parallels much of folk music discourse (at least 
as its history has thus far been written).10 This dissertation is more interested in the post-
humanist line running from Innis and McLuhan through to Friedrich Kittler—the latter 
                                                
10 See Jonathan Sterne (2003, 2011) for excellent critiques of the theological dimension of Ong’s thought, 
which he also finds evident in McLuhan’s writings.  
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will be discussed below in the methodology section—than in the orality debates (see also 
Goody, 1986; Havelock, 1963) that are also part of this tradition.   
 Media theory has been discussed and evaluated at length. McLuhan received 
much criticism in the wake of Understanding Media (e.g. Carey, 1967; Enzensberger, 
1974; Williams, 1974), but recent scholars have taken a more sober and sympathetic 
look. Judith Stamps (1995) places both Innis and McLuhan in conversation with 
Frankfurt School thinkers Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin; Glenn Willmott (1996) 
explores New Criticism’s influence on McLuhan, and McLuhan’s break with modernist 
aesthetics in his later postmodern writings and persona; and Richard Cavell (2002) 
reconsiders McLuhan as a theorist of space. Additionally, both Innis and McLuhan have 
left visible marks on critical theory, including Jean Baudrillard, Friedrich Kittler, and 
Paul Virilio, and the entire fields of “media ecology” and “media archeology” (the latter 
of which we will explore in more detail below). Despite all the evaluations and 
continuations of Innis’s and McLuhan’s projects, however, no one has yet included the 
American folk revival in the history of this theoretical discourse. As will be shown, 
certain song collectors, activists, and singer-songwriters are fascinating examples of 
media theory at work.  
Tactical Media 
  “Tactical media” describes a broad constellation of activist art and culture, 
including pranks, hoaxes, net art, video games, hacktivism, and pirate radio. The term 
surfaced in the nineties on the online forum Nettime, at the Next 5 Minutes conferences 
in Amsterdam, and in the writings of David Garcia and Geert Lovink (2003), who 
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documented some of these early discussions (Critical Art Ensemble, 2001). According to 
Lovink, “[t]actical media are post-1989 formations. They are a set of dirty little practices, 
digital micro-politics if you like. Tactical media inherit the legacy of “alternative” media 
without the counterculture label and ideological certainty of previous decades” (2002, p. 
254). Although various countercultural projects, alternative media, and “culture 
jamming” might constitute precursors or parallels, tactical media theorists try to 
emphasize the interiority of tactical resistance. Often informed by French post-
structuralist theory, the tactical media practitioner goes to work, almost like a Derridean 
deconstructionist, within the networks and systems of media culture, rather than trying to 
escape from them: “Tactical Media are never perfect, always in becoming, performative 
and pragmatic, involved in a continual process of questioning the premises of the 
channels they work with” (Garcia & Lovink, 2003, p. 108).  
 With its vibrant rhetoric about revolution, virtuality, and war, tactical media 
discourse contains fascinating reconsiderations of utopia. As Brian Holmes has poetically 
described the field: “With one hand you point back to an empty shell, a dead end, an 
abandoned future. And with the other you invite people to discover a territory that might 
be worth living in” (quoted in Boler, 2008, p. 435). The Critical Art Ensemble (2000) is 
also interested in the networks of virtuality set into motion by tactical media practices: 
“The digital model, like the analogic, contains both apocalypse and utopia, and the 
applications constructed now will in part determine the directions in which digital 
processes will flow” (p. 151). Across tactical media discourse, then, we see utopia move 
away from static impossibilities and towards potentiality, collaboration, and rhizomes. 
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Recalling the utopian spirit of Ernst Bloch (1986), tactical media artists look for the 
“Not-Yet” along the channels of the “Now.”   
 Tactical media as a larger phenomenon, and particular works themselves, have 
received attention both inside and outside of the academy (e.g. Critical Art Ensemble, 
2012; Dyer-Witheford & De Peuter, 2009; Galloway, 2004; Raley, 2009; Thacker, 2004). 
Some recent, fruitful discussions have questioned whether the concept of tactics remains 
useful on the current geo-political battlefield (see Dieter, 2011; Richardson, 2003; von 
Clauswitz, 2003; Wark, 2002). According to Geert Lovink and Ned Rossiter (2005), for 
instance, we need to think more seriously about the organization and durability of 
networks, which requires a more temporal perspective than the concept of tactics permits. 
Nonetheless, despite the growing and increasingly self-reflexive literature, tactical 
media’s connections to the American folksong movement have not been explored. The 
Electronic Disturbance Theatre attempted to lend a figurative microphone to Zapatista 
rebels in Mexico via their “FloodNet” application, recalling Alan Lomax’s efforts to 
amplify the voices of dispossessed folk. According to Pasquinelli, “Deleuze and Guattari 
took the machine out of the factory, now it is up to us to take it out of the network and 
imagine a post-internet generation” (2004), and perhaps this was the goal of Seeger and 
Guthrie all along. Looking at connections between the American folk revival and 
contemporary digital culture will bring to light new vibrations across the long histories of 
activism and technology. As we will see, Seeger and Lomax even anticipated some of the 




Digital Media and Culture 
  Journalists and scholars alike have often been swept away by their excitement 
about the possibilities of new (i.e. electronic and digital) media (e.g. Rheingold, 2000; 
Jenkins, 2008; Levy, 1997; Negroponte, 1995; Weinberger, 2002). A good portion of the 
critical scholarship on digital culture and technology has wanted to historically situate 
this temperament. For instance, Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron’s (1996) essay 
“The Californian Ideology” ties the libertarian ethos of Silicon Valley back to the 
counterculture of the sixties. Although the so-called hippies were understood—by 
themselves and by their opponents—as an oppositional social group, their ideals of 
technological determinism have more recently been married to an economic liberalism:  
 This new faith has emerged from a bizarre fusion of the cultural bohemianism of 
 San Francisco with the hi-tech industries of Silicon Valley. Promoted in 
 magazines, books, TV programmes, websites, newsgroups and Net conferences, 
 the Californian Ideology promiscuously combines the free-wheeling spirit of the 
 hippies and the entrepreneurial zeal of the yuppies. This amalgamation of 
 opposites has been achieved through a profound faith in the emancipatory 
 potential of the new information technologies. In the digital utopia, everybody 
 will be both hip and rich. (1996, n.p.)  
Barbrook and Cameron illustrate how the utopian dreams of the New Left and the 
counterculture have been put to work by capital in its most recent round of 
transformations. Ironically, though the New Left and the counterculture did express 
communitarian values, the “Californian Ideology” is a thoroughly libertarian discourse: 
“[E]ach member of the ‘virtual class’ is promised the opportunity to become a successful 
hi-tech entrepreneur. Information technologies, so the argument goes, empower the 
31 
 
individual, enhance personal freedom, and radically reduce the power of the nation-state” 
(1996).  
 Fred Turner’s From Counter-Culture to Cyberculture (2006) offers a similarly 
spirited critique, though it is more grounded in the methodologies of cultural studies. 
Focusing on Steward Brand, The Whole Earth Catalogue, and Wired magazine, Turner 
explains how the influential New Communalists of the sixties, though they took 
themselves to be critics of “bourgeois” culture and values, borrowed many of their ideals 
from the military-industrial research culture of the 1940s and 1950s. Turner’s careful 
reading of Brand and his networks is less polemical than “The Californian Ideology,” as 
he probes the complex layers of interdisciplinary collaboration and conversation that 
made it possible for certain concepts and goals to migrate from the cybernetics research 
of the postwar era to medium theorists and LSD-takers alike by the mid to late sixties. 
Still, like Barbrook and Cameron, Turner grounds the technological utopianism bound up 
with digitization as a socio-historical phenomenon.11 Digital utopianism is less a 
revolutionary cause than a socio-economic effect of Western capitalist society in the 
United States at a particular moment of social and technical development.  
 Vincent Mosco’s book The Digital Sublime (2004) also seeks to dismantle the 
shiny rhetorics of our contemporary digital consumer culture. Mosco subtly considers 
“myth” as both an obfuscation and a construction that has real, material effects; the 
pervasive myths of “sublime” technological determinism have functioned as a productive 
                                                
11 Exploring the history of the Internet and personal computing from a similar theoretical viewpoint, 
Thomas Streeter (2011) has followed some of the threads unraveled by Turner back to Romanticism. Alan 
Liu’s Laws of Cool (2004) also examines the convergences between bohemian counter-cultural ideas and 
postmodern informational work.  
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concealer of the deeper processes and contradictions at the heart of contemporary 
capitalist society (Mosco, 2004). Mosco focuses on the notion that time, space, and 
politics have all come to an end in the digital era.                                                             
Neo-Marxist thinkers who emphasize the autonomy of working-class subjectivity 
have been more ambiguous, productively so, in their reading of digital history.12 Nick 
Dyer-Witheford (1999) harshly critiques the liberal celebrations of post-industrialization, 
which have often touted the socially transformative potential of digital networks. 
Drawing on Antonio Negri, however, Dyer-Witheford sees a liberatory potential in new 
media, which at the same time that it extends capital’s grip on humanity’s productive 
capacities has also let loose new forms of communication and creativity. Franco “Bifo” 
Berardi (2009, 2011, 2012) has also explored our digital ecology from this perspective. 
Less optimistic than his comrades Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri—who have also 
outlined the emancipatory possibilities of wired work in the age of “Empire” (see Hardt 
& Negri, 2000, 2004, 2009)—Berardi considers the various ways in which the capturing 
of mass intellectuality by the networks of post-Fordist capitalism has degraded the 
territories of art, communication, and collective psychology. 
 Whereas the scholarship described above focuses on the institutional, political, 
and socio-economic contexts in which digital media have evolved, work in literary and 
cultural studies has been more interested in the meaning and aesthetics of digitality and 
information technologies. Lev Manovich’s pioneering The Language of New Media 
                                                
12 Sometimes labeled “Autonomist” Marxism, this tradition is conflicted and complicated, but it initially 
emerged from the Italian left of the 1960s and 1970s and emphasized the anteriority of the working class to 
capitalist structures. On the nuances and historical context of the broader tradition of Italian Autonomist 
Marxism, see Lotringer and Marazzi (2007) and Wright (2002). 
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(2001) seeks in McLuhanite fashion to understand the unique properties and aesthetics of 
digital media. Manovich finds a line of influence from avant-garde cinema through to 
new media, but the database and the manipulability of digital code are identified as 
unique facets of computational culture. Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin’s Remediation 
(1999) offers an aesthetic genealogy oriented by a similar methodology. Bolter and 
Grusin identify a double-edged logic at the heart of media change across modern history: 
new media tend towards either immediacy or hyper-mediacy. Sound recording, for 
instance, seemed to make it possible to get even closer to the grain of the voice, and 
photography similarly offered a new proximity to the referent (Bolter & Grusin, 1999). 
On the other hand, the World Wide Web, as they explain, tends to revel in the pleasures 
of mediation and to foreground its various layers of remediated content (Bolter & Grusin, 
1999). Building on one of McLuhan’s (2003) central claims, Bolter and Grusin rigorously 
expand on the point that the content of one medium is always another.      
 While Manovich and Bolter and Grusin pursue the ontologies and aesthetics of 
digital media, others have undertaken more winding and subterranean paths. N. Katherine 
Hayles (1999) traces the blending of the human-machine binary back to the pioneering 
cybernetics work of Norbert Wiener. Although Wiener challenged the distinction 
between nature and culture, he simultaneously clung to a liberal notion of individual 
autonomy (Hayles, 1999). Hayles goes on to explore more delirious and provocative 
post-human cultural artifacts, such as the writings of William Burroughs and Philip K. 
Dick. More recent studies of new media and digital art have undertaken similarly spirited 
projects. Frances Dyson (2009) explores thinkers and artists who pursue an affective or 
corporeal relationship to new media. Anna Munster (2006) offers a like-minded critique 
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of Cartesian (i.e. disembodied) understandings of perception and information via close 
readings of the work of several media artists. Although a range of discussions have been 
progressing in the broad field of “digitality studies”—everything from insects (Parikka, 
2010) to “evil” (Fuller and Goffey, 2012) to windows (Friedberg, 2006) have been 
covered in detail—this growing body of interdisciplinary work has universally ignored 
any connections between digital culture and the American folk revival.  
 In chapters 4 and 5 I find intellectual kinship with Turner, Mosco, and Barbrook 
(insofar as I try to ground one dimension of the utopian rhetoric joining the folk revival to 
mainstream digital culture), but I simultaneously try to straddle the more literary, 
aesthetic approaches of Hayles, Munster, Dyson, and others. Rather than just thinking 
about objective, “real” technologies and the veils obscuring their functioning, I aim to 
trace out techno-cultural artifacts and larger media diagrams in broad strokes. I will now 
explore in more detail the theoretical and methodological principles that will be guiding 
my own brush. 
1.5 Theoretical Orientation: Pragmatism  
 Pragmatism is the general theoretical vantage point from which this study begins. 
Concepts are neither true nor false; more important is the degree to which they can be 
said to work (Dewey, 1938; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). The pragmatist’s perspective 
seems to me ideal for a reconsideration of authenticity and utopia across an archeology of 
tactical media, for pragmatic concerns necessarily preoccupy the tactical media theorist 
or practitioner. Does it work? Should we turn it up? Should we switch channels? Should 
we discard our current understanding of the channel entirely? Thus ideas of “the folk” 
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will be considered, not insofar as they reflect or obscure the truth of humanity’s ability to 
know either the external world or itself, but insofar as they might make something 
happen. 
 More specifically, the theoretical lens that will be used in this project is a 
synthesis of French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1983, 1987, 1994) 
and medium theory as articulated by Marshall McLuhan (1962, 1969, 2003). Ultimately 
Deleuze and Guattari are privileged here, for their complex and joyously productive 
understanding of subjectivity seems excellently suited to a sympathetic genealogy of 
artists and folklorists whose primary objective is to “de-territorialize” the flows of 
“molar” media machines. Concepts like “de-territorialization,” “schizoanalysis,” 
“machine,” “Body without Organs,” “plateau,” and “rhizome”—many of which were 
irreverently borrowed from other disciplines and thinkers—offer an excellent arsenal 
with which we can explore uneasily containable assemblages of technology, revolution 
and desire.  
 There are two aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s work that I have found 
particularly appealing in this project. First, their insistence on the continued relevance of 
Marxism to the study of contemporary culture allows us to refrain from throwing out 
political economy entirely; social life in their view is marked by a multiplicitous and 
heterogenous set of forces and formations, including the axiomatic of capital. In Anti-
Oedipus (1983), however, they nonetheless seek to establish a new paradigm for the 
study of political economy. The familiar distinctions between production, distribution, 
and consumption are no longer useful, they claim, and they consider the totality of desire 
that undergirds larger social processes: “[E]verything is production: production of 
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productions, of actions and of passions; productions of recording processes, of 
distributions and of co-ordinates that serve as points of reference; productions of 
consumptions, of sensual pleasures, of anxieties, and of pain” (1983, p. 4). Deleuze and 
Guattari provocatively reorient our understanding of economic production as well as 
media, for rather than isolating or reifying individual agents or sectors, they seek to grasp 
a totality in motion. From this point of view, how do dreams—including dreams of 
technologies and “the folk”—go to work in contemporary digital culture?  
 I also import Deleuze and Guattari’s version of post-humanism. For Deleuze and 
Guattari there are no clear distinctions to be drawn between humans and non-humans. 
Rather, they approach existence as a deeply stratified and striated machinic organism, one 
constantly breaking down and thus in constant need of repair: 
 It does not suffice to attribute molar multiplicities and mass machines to the 
 preconscious, reserving another kind of machine or multiplicity for the 
 unconscious. … Keep everything in sight at the same time—that a social 
 machine or an organized mass has a molecular unconscious that marks not only 
 its tendency to decompose but also the current components of its very operation 
 and organization. (1983, p. 35) 
Deleuze and Guattari’s optic moves us to view the agency of all sorts of actors, to ponder 
the diverse intersections of disciplines and subjects, individuals and societies, even lovers 
and loved. The Deleuzian turn to affect and to “mixed semiotics” has influenced a wide 
range of work in cultural theory (e.g. Grosz, 1994; Braidotti, 1994). Manuel de Landa 
(1997) has also made use of Deleuze and Guattari’s post-humanist view of social and 
technical change, having written the history of military technologies from the point of 
view of a robot. I too find this post-representational post-humanism useful, as it allows us 
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to take concepts like “folk” and “authenticity” at the level of their functioning. We will 
not be critiquing Lomax’s or Seeger’s understandings of “the folk” but will rather be 
thinking about the folk (made up of abstract ideals, visual and linguistic representations, 
and intersections with other machinic phyla) insofar as they produce connections and 
virtualities.  
 With respect to Deleuze and Guattari’s post-humanism, the concepts of “abstract 
machine” and “faciality” in particular will be useful in my approach to the relationships 
between media and culture. Faces, bodies, and models of communication are sutured 
together by historical regimes of subjectivation; for Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987), 
however, the production of “docile subjects”—which Foucault (1995) also famously 
explored—is always on the verge of pushing further. The face of the discrete individual 
must be seen as a loose collection of shards hovering over the desiring-machine of the 
body and the other organs and machines with which it collaborates—and this desiring-
machine can be let loose by any number of tools. Deleuze and Guattari thus allow us to 
grasp simultaneously the efficiencies of power and its undoing, which would seem to be 
an indispensable variety of vision for the tactical media theorist.   
 There is a historically justifiable reason to work with a Guattarian-Deleuzian lens, 
which is that many radical and tactical media artists have found inspiration in their work. 
The Invisible Committee (2009) and the Critical Art Ensemble (1994) have tried to 
enunciate in their texts and practices the very concepts Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, 1987) and Guattari’s solo work (1995, 2011) have 
encouraged us to take up like hammers. By using this body of theory to look at the folk 
revival, then, we will be able to explore genealogical connections joining these distinct 
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fields. In the spirit of Deleuze and Guattari, however, this dissertation is not a pure 
application of their theory to the field of folk music (if such an application is even 
possible). I pick and I choose, from them and from others, as the particular case study 
suits me. Cybernetics and Kittler’s “discourse networks” come in handy in chapter 2, 
McLuhan’s medium-specificity and John Durham Peters’s “dissemination” in chapter 3, 
Guattari’s “faciality” and Kittler again in chapter 4, and “abstract machine” and even 
political economy in chapter 5.  
 Deleuze and Guattari’s expansive and open concept of the machine has also 
motivated the way in which I have delimited the case studies (which also has been mostly 
pragmatic). The edges of some of the assemblages I have studied follow old conventions 
in cultural and literary studies (chapters 2 and 3 look at the “oeuvres” of individual 
“authors”). In chapters 3 and 4, on the other hand, I chart deeper paths, following 
diagrams of communication as they weave in and out of particular oeuvres (e.g. Bob 
Dylan’s) but also larger histories (e.g. of sound recording and mobile media). Some 
events and actors make multiple appearances, as all machines are bound up with multiple 
others, though they can function differently in relation to each. I have tried to follow the 
trails wherever they might lead.  
1.6 Methodology: Media Archeology and Imaginary Media 
Research 
 I will now consider in more detail how the general theoretical orientation will be 
explored in the actual case studies. The methodological procedure that will help me to 
analyze my objects of study from the theoretical orientation described above is media 
39 
 
archeology. This can be defined as a combination of medium theory and Foucauldian 
discourse analysis that takes the media of discursive production also into account.13 
Michel Foucault’s influential studies of the conditions, limits, and productivities of 
knowledge, and his theoretical exegesis of the archive, offer a way of approaching the 
means by which epistemic regimes and discursive limits go to work (Foucault 1970, 
1972). As he explains in The Archeology of Knowledge, Foucault does not study 
discourses insofar as they point to an objective referent but rather as sets of possibilities 
and limits in and of themselves: “Archeology tries to define not the thoughts, 
representations, images, themes, preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in 
discourses; but those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obeying certain 
rules” (1972, p. 138). Foucault’s archeological method also brackets notions like 
authorship, evolution, and linear progress, thereby allowing the irreducible contingency 
of particular discursive formations to emerge. 
 With medium theory in the mix, however, we can also see how technologies 
function within historical configurations of power and knowledge (Parikka, 2012). 
Friedrich Kittler, although he has rejected the label “media archeologist,” has broken this 
ground; he draws on Foucault’s method but argues that “discourse analysis cannot be 
applied to sound archives or towers of film rolls” (1999, p. 5). Attempting to go beyond 
Foucault, Kittler (1990, 1999) ponders the relationship between historical formations of 
discourse production and the material media (e.g. pens, typewriters, phonographs, film, 
                                                
13 On the intellectual lineages of media archeology, see Parikka (2012) and Huhtamo and Parikka (2011). 
Parikka’s work (2007, 2010) has been particularly influential to me, as he too has tried to negotiate the 
insights of Deleuze, Foucault, Kittler, and the “Toronto School” of medium theory.  
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ISDN cables) and practices (e.g. humanist education in nineteenth-century Germany) that 
have established particular regimes of mediality. Taking literature as his object, Kittler 
hones in on the traces left by machines on texts. He argues, for instance, that the 
emergence of autonomous “technological media” blows apart the discourse of 
Romanticism, where orality and inner expression were foci of literary culture; the 
introduction of the phonograph made it possible to inscribe signals that the alphabet 
could not document, including the real of the body (Kittler, 1999). Although Kittler 
(1999) argues that digitalization has signaled the end of media as such, he continued to 
probe the ways in which literary writing (though it can no longer be called “literature”) 
has inscribed this fact of our condition.  
 Kittler’s academic persona has often been interpreted as apolitical or even 
reactionary (see Winthrop-Young, 2011). And his historical periodization often seems 
teleological: new media irrevocably sunder previous formations, rather than subtly or 
complexly “remediating” them as Bolter and Grusin (1999) would want to say. But Jussi 
Parikka (2012) has succinctly described the political stakes of this approach and found a 
subtler way into the method of media archeology pioneered by Kittler: “Media 
archeology should not only track the majoritarian understanding of the discourses and 
dispositifs of digital culture but also aim to follow the detours and experiments that 
remain virtual, yet real, in the shadows of the actuality of hegemonic understanding” (p. 
24). Parikka uploads a Deleuzian “becoming” into Kittler’s media-theoretical framework 
(Parikka, 2007). By tracing through statements, models, diagrams, and practices, one can 
study larger schematics of strategic vectors. And yet, media archeology also allows one 
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to chart the course of “minor” or “nomadic” counter-hegemonies such as those evoked by 
tactical media artists and their gadgets (Parikka, 2012).  
 The weight of Kittler’s legacy aside, as self-defined media archeologists 
themselves have pointed out, the field is not really a field, and insofar as it is a method it 
is a fairly loose collection of approaches (Huhtamo & Parikka, 2011; Parikka, 2012). I 
have found the adventurously interdisciplinary studies of Parikka to be particularly 
insightful with respect to the building of my own practice. For instance, Parikka’s 
archeology of computer viruses negotiates several layers of culture and technology; 
Parikka explores the discourse of viruses across a range of texts and artifacts, from 
newspapers to computer code to political economy to biology and immunology (Parikka, 
2007). As he explains his approach:  
 [M]edia archeology does not represent history, but instead works with materials 
 that are deemed historical to come up with a piece of writing that consists of 
 different but coalescing lines of materials and texts. It is a matter neither of giving 
 form to a corpus of sources nor of submitting oneself to the historical ‘facts,’ but 
 of following the tendencies inherent in the sources and summoning events from 
 them. (2007, p. 11)  
Thus media archeology is a form of “grounded” theory—one begins with the texts and 
diagrams on the table, allowing (insofar as it is possible) the agencies of things to speak 
for themselves.  
 Ziegfried Zielinksi is another media archeologist whose approach I have found 
useful here. Like Kittler, Zielinksi (2008) brings Foucauldian discourse analysis into 
questions of media history. But Zielinski is more interested in the impossible or forgotten 
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thinkers scattered across modernity. He explores the Jesuit Athanasius Kircher, for 
instance, and his universalist theories of knowledge and sound. Kircher thought that 
sound functioned like light and could thus be channeled and directed using physical tubes 
that would relay music and voice magically to areas surrounding a performance event 
(Zielinksi, 2008). Rather than taking issue with Kircher’s limited knowledge of the 
modern physics of sound, however, Zielinksi finds an “enthusiastic” polymath who 
fascinatingly melds the actual and the impossible in his writings and engravings 
throughout the seventeenth century. This kind of archeology—Zielinksi (2008) himself 
actually terms it anarcheology to emphasize his challenge to standard evolutionist 
histories of media—is the path that will be pursued here. Lomax, Seeger, and the 
Occupiers of Wall Street can certainly be critiqued for their “naïve” understandings of 
authenticity or community, but I have preferred rather to extract from their writings 
various and productive challenges to contemporary media culture.   
 But how will this method actually be deployed in my dissertation? Following 
Kittler and Zielinksi, my research terrain is primarily textual, though not exclusively so 
(we also consider some television shows, computer-aided anthropological methods, 
“dead” folk music databases, iPhone apps, etc.). I take, for instance, Lomax’s writings—
including letters written during his tenure at the Archive, the lectures he gave over his 
lifetime, and his numerous publications—as utopian media-machines. More specifically, 
it is the folkies’ fleeting but numerous descriptions and discussions of technology and 
communication that serve as my focus. As a preview, consider the following joking aside 
in Lomax’s letter to Oliver Strunk at the Library of Congress, written in 1941, four years 
before Vannevar Bush’s “Memex” saw the light of day:  
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 I hope that every note that is played in the United States during the next two 
 decades, in war or in peace, in whore-houses or for Henry Ford rolls across the  
 threshold of the music division, is catalogued, filed away in special self-
 liquidating cans which disappear until called for and demand constant attention 
 from a staff of three-thousand in a building that old John’s Blue Ox Babe could 
 turn around in without scratching her tender arse a single scratch. (2010, p. 221) 
Written at a time when he had become increasingly dissatisfied with the transmission 
capabilities of the Archive, Lomax seems to have begun to dream of a folkloristic 
cyberspace; he seems to envision not only a digital archive but also a Graphical User 
Interface. Elsewhere in his writings, Lomax emphasizes the overflowing sensuality of 
musical recordings:  
 The amplifier was hot. The needle was tracing a quiet spiral on the spinning 
 acetate. … A gravel voice melting at the edges, not talking, but spinning out a  
 life in something close to song … each sentence almost a stanza of slow blues 
 …, each stanza flowing out of the last like the eddies of a big sleepy Southern 
 river where the power hides below a quiet brown surface. (1993, p. xiii)  
The data he was compiling was not textual, not “meaningful,” it was rather beyond 
interpretation. Further, the machine is figured as the ground on which data in the field can 
be conceptualized (the voice spins like the record that records it). How does Lomax’s 
eventual foray into computer-aided research manage to hold onto his almost Kittlerian 
account of sound recording? How does Lomax’s digitality manage to retain a grounded, 
embodied conception of information vis-à-vis the other currents of digital utopianism of 
the 1980s and 1990s, which had swept many away in an enthusiasm for weightlessness? 
Like the Jesuit tinkerers studied by Zielinksi, Lomax and his imaginary media are 
forgotten possibilities buried under the history of digital culture. Woody Guthrie, Pete 
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Seeger, and Bob Dylan too have offered fascinating renderings of technology and 
communication, and these are the moments I will be considering in my excavation.  
 Finally, media archeology is a form of materialist historical research, but 
conventional or popular narratives of technological revolution or progress are not the 
purview of the media archeologist (Parikka, 2012). Thus this dissertation, though the 
chapters do follow a somewhat chronological order, does not explain the folk revival’s 
engagement with media as a coherent or linear series of events. To run with the 
metaphors of tools and excavation, my media archeology does not involve a single, 
ordered dig but rather a series of abrupt slices into the deep sedimentation of technology 
and culture. These slices will fall at different angles, sometimes crossing previous ones, 
and, again, they are made by several varieties of tools. When we finally stand back, some 
kind of hole will indeed have been dug. But it might not be the right shape for the 
placement of neat summaries or theses. This will be a rhizomatic burrow of 
interconnections and potentialities. 
1.7 Chapter Outlines 
 Chapter 2 reconsiders American folklorist and broadcaster Alan Lomax as a 
medium theorist. I examine how Lomax’s engagement first with the phonograph and then 
with digital computers came to inflect his understanding of “the folk” (or at least how this 
tendency is inscribed across his writings and projects). I also use Lomax’s engagement 
with media to critique aspects of German media theorist Friedrich Kittler’s work. I argue 
that Lomax’s “deep digitality” is not an abstract, sovereign world of code rendering 
particular media finally obsolete (as it is for Kittler); Lomax simply sought to plug Gilles 
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Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s “nomad”—which he just calls “the folk”—into the machine. 
Lomax thus points toward a fascinatingly utopian assemblage of always-embodied voices 
and digital systems. 
 Chapter 3 will closely read the work of Pete Seeger insofar as it engages with 
some of the claims and concerns of medium theory. Seeger was an influential thinker in 
the revival; bringing with him a deep pedigree (he had travelled with Woody Guthrie and 
performed in both the Almanac Singers and the Weavers), he was active at the Newport 
Folk Festival as a board member and performer, he wrote for both Sing Out! and 
Broadside, and he put out dozens of records in the fifties and sixties. Although Seeger 
took aim at McLuhan in particular in his Sing Out! column “Johnny Appleseed Jr.,” I will 
explore how Seeger’s theory of mediatized resistance is a subtle and sophisticated one 
which often parallels and even anticipates some of McLuhan’s claims (and thus also the 
claims of tactical media theorists like Lovink and the Critical Art Ensemble). Resistance 
for Seeger is figured as an act of broadcasting (cf. Peters, 1999). The tool itself thus 
productively contaminates that which it relays in a hybrid convergence of folksy counter-
blasting.  
 Chapter 4 picks up a slightly different thread. First, I comparatively analyze the 
meaning of technology in both Bob Dylan’s star text (focusing primarily on his sixties 
output) and that of Steve Jobs and Apple Inc. The popular discourses surrounding both 
Dylan and Apple share roots in Romanticism: both stars have been worshipped for their 
individualistic authenticity (Dylan for his own authenticity, Apple for the individualized 
expression it makes possible for the consumer, thanks primarily to its late “hippie-artist” 
co-founder). Drawing on both Kittler’s concept of “discourse networks” and Félix 
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Guattari’s notion of “faciality,” I consider the obfuscating power of this particular 
channelization of creativity. In the final section of the chapter, however, I return to some 
of Dylan’s songs and writings (including his novel Tarantula and some of his liner 
notes). I uncover a post-human Dylan who properly acknowledges his position as a mere 
relay within a larger circuit of discourse production.  
 Chapter 5 again tries a slightly different way in to the long histories of tactical 
media and American folk music culture. I pull up connections between the 
“Hootenanny”—initially a form of participatory concert held by the Almanac Singers in 
New York City in the early 1940s—and contemporary social media. In some ways, Web 
2.0 is a rearticulation of the media model of the Hootenanny (e.g. the participatory 
structure, the DIY rhetoric). However, by closely reading some of the writings of one of 
the Almanac Singers’ most prolific member, Woody Guthrie, I also follow another line 
from the folk revival to the more recent Occupy movement. Although mainstream digital 
culture’s incorporation of a folk aesthetic has been well suited to the dynamics of what 
Jodi Dean (2009) has called “communicative capitalism,” the Occupy movement’s 
“People’s Microphone” also constitutes a mediatized hybrid anticipated by the 
Hootenannies held in 1940s Greenwich Village.   
 In Chapter 6, I conclude and attempt to synthesize the preceding case studies. 
This final chapter has seemed an opportune moment to explore in more detail the 
concepts of authenticity and utopia, which have been at the background of much tactical 
media practice and folk revivalism. After explicating some recent theoretical work on 
these concepts, I explain why a close reading of American folk music culture offers a 
novel way into them as well.  
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Chapter 2 – Folk Media: Alan Lomax’s Deep Digitality 
 If any McLuhanites are listening, I challenge them to let me visit their mailbox 
 every morning for a month, and remove the contents of all their letters, presenting 
 them only with the empty envelopes. The envelope is not the message. Just a part 
 of it. (Pete Seeger, 1972, p. 296)  
 Record grooves capture the vibrations of real bodies whose stupidity, as is well 
 known, knows no boundaries. (Friedrich Kittler, 1997, p. 115) 
 The modern computer, with all its various gadgets, and all its wonderful 
 electronic facilities, now makes it possible to preserve and reinvigorate all the 
 cultural richness of mankind. (Alan Lomax in Naimark, 1993) 
2.1 Introduction 
 It is possible that the late German media theorist Friedrich Kittler was not the 
biggest fan of folk music. Interested as he was in the ability of “technological media” to 
write and record on their own, the music he cites tends to feature gadgets prominently. 
“Tap my head and mike my brain / Stick that needle in my vein,” goes a song from 
Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 (quoted in Kittler, 1999, p. xxxix). Jimmi 
Hendrix, the guitarist who specialized in distortion and who was the self-proclaimed 
founder of an “electric church,” appears in Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (Kittler, 
1999), and Pink Floyd’s coldly machinic recordings are touchstones across Kittler’s work 
on media (see Winthrop-Young, 2011). Indeed, the aspect of folk discourse that posits the 
possibility of sincere, unmediated communication (see Frith, 1981; Keightley, 2001) is 
precisely the kind of idealist notion that Kittler (1990, 1999) seeks to ground within the 
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material “discourse networks” that make historical ways of communicating possible in 
the first place.  
 Kittler was only a young man at the time, but one of the key players in the 
American folk revival of the fifties and sixties found one of German media theory’s 
theoretical progenitors to be scandalous. Pete Seeger, who had suffered through the 
McCarthy era (during most of which he was blacklisted), does not seem to have had 
much time for Marshall McLuhan’s work, which posits that media themselves have 
determinate effects on consciousness and politics. Seeger witnessed first-hand that some 
signals are allowed through the channels of mass media, and yet others can be obstructed 
or censored; his folksy form of “culture jamming” was not about media as such, but about 
transmitting as many “healthy” signals as possible. The mainstream media could either 
relay the messages or not: “If the radio, the press, and all the large channels of mass 
communication are closed to [folksingers’] songs of freedom, friendship, and peace, they 
must go from house to house” (Seeger, 1972, p. 155).  
 And yet, in the work and writings of one of Seeger’s friends and contemporaries, 
American folklorist Alan Lomax, it is possible to find a fascinating rapprochement 
between folk revivalism and medium theory. Lomax thought that technology constituted 
a key component in his quest to document and disseminate the voices of the marginalized 
folk he encountered on his field trips (Filene, 2000; Szwed, 2010). He figured the 
centralized, corporate mass-media system of his time as a monolithic and polluting force, 
but he tried to effect a hybrid reversal of this unidirectional flow by recording folk music 
with top-of-the-line technologies (which, like Kittler, he fascinatingly fetishizes in his 
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writings) and then relaying the documents back to both mass audiences and the folk 
themselves via radio, film, and even the personal computer. 
 Lomax’s tactical attempt to use media was perhaps most completely realizable, in 
theory if not in practice, when he worked with IBM (in the sixties) and then Apple tools 
(in the nineties) on a digital machine eventually called the “Global Jukebox.” At the 
Library of Congress—where he worked as “Assistant in Charge” at the Archive of 
American Folk Song in the thirties and forties—Lomax had often been frustrated, his 
letters suggest, by his inability to speedily copy records for interested inquirers (see 
Lomax, 2010). In other words, he had an adequate storage system but poor transmission 
capabilities. However, the Global Jukebox was a digital-folk database that would allow 
schoolchildren both to visually map and to aurally access the totality of the globe’s folk 
culture, and also potentially to upload their own voices in a cybernetic loop of authentic 
communion (see Lomax, 2003).  
 Many discussions of the folk revival, and of rock culture’s incorporation of the 
phenomenon, have noted the genre’s ideology of face-to-face and live performance and 
its anti-modern and anti-technological tendencies (e.g., Denisoff, 1971; Frith, 1981; 
Keightley, 2001). But what are we to make of Lomax’s take on technology? This chapter 
will draw on Kittler’s “McLuhanite” critical apparatus to read through the two epochs 
that can be demarcated across Lomax’s career as a folklorist: Phonographic Lomax and 
Computational Lomax. This will give us a fresh angle on an important figure in the 
history of communications. Although the significance of sound recording to both John 
and Alan Lomax has been discussed recently—see Kay Kaufman Shelemay (1991), Erika 
Brady (1999), Benjamin Filene (2000), Marybeth Hamilton (2007), and John Szwed 
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(2010)—Alan Lomax’s relation to medium theory and his complex understanding of 
digitality have not yet been considered. Filene’s (2000) excellent book Romancing the 
Folk explores the modernist dimensions of American folklore, with a focus on the 
Lomaxes’ field trips in the thirties. As he points out, their Dictaphone’s seeming fidelity 
led Alan’s father to think of their work as objective “sound photographs” (Filene, 2000, 
p. 56). Filene also discusses Alan’s radio broadcasts into the forties, his work at the 
Archive of American Folk Song, and (albeit briefly) Cantometrics and the Global 
Jukebox. And Szwed’s illuminating biography, Alan Lomax: The Man Who Recorded the 
World, highlights the importance of sound-recording technology as a tool for Lomax 
throughout his career: “Having lived through the transition from transcribing songs to 
recording them, he could appreciate the limitations of an audio-only medium, but also 
understood how these limits refocused the way music was received: the body of the 
singer could now be heard …” (Szwed, 2010, p. 334). Szwed’s book also includes 
detailed if descriptive accounts of the folklorist’s computer-aided projects. Still, Lomax’s 
cybernetic and proto-posthumanist renderings of machines have yet to be analyzed, and 
his digital escapades have gone unnoticed by scholars of media. To what degree did the 
technical networks Lomax worked with come to determine the very object of his quest? 
To what degree is he occasionally sensitive to these connections in his writings? 
 A second goal, however, will be to reconsider Lomax as a forgotten thinker and 
practitioner of digitality. As Mark Hansen (2004) has argued, Kittler neglects 
embodiment in his writings on the digital, primarily through his total endorsement of 
Claude Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication. A different articulation of this 
neglect can also be seen throughout trans-humanist and other digital-utopian rhetoric 
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(Hayles, 1999). Although there is much in Lomax that we would do well to leave 
behind—most urgently, the primitivism and Orientalism that variously run through his 
texts (Averill, 2003; Mullen, 2008)—what are of interest here are the ways in which he 
anticipates some of the claims of critics of cybernetics and information theory, such as 
Hansen and N. Katherine Hayles (1999), who have problematized the notion that 
information can be abstracted away from its material carrier. As we will see, Lomax’s 
phonographic fascination with embodied voices interestingly carries over into his 
encounters with computation. Lomax’s “deep digitality” is not an abstract world of 
sovereign code rendering particular media finally obsolete (which is how Kittler figures 
digital convergence); Lomax simply sought to plug the folk into informational networks, 
a conjunction he believed would challenge the hegemony of global media conglomerates. 
Thus Lomax points toward a fascinating, if “dead” or “imaginary” (see Parikka, 2012; 
Zielinski, 2008), assemblage of always-embodied voices and digital systems.   
2.2 Phonographic Lomax 
 In the early twentieth century, just as the phonograph was dazzling audiences 
across the world with the new registers of inscription it made possible (Gitelman, 1999; 
Lastra, 2000), many ethnographers and collectors of American folk songs were still 
operating within the logics of print culture (Brady, 1999; Filene, 2000). Song collectors, 
after all, were looking for songs, which can be written down and printed, not voices or 
bodies; as Regina Bendix (1997) has pointed out, the text became the locus of 
authentication for the Romantic folklorists of the nineteenth century, a legacy that would 
persist. For instance, Cecil Sharp’s introduction to his influential English Folk Songs 
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from the Southern Appalachians gives us a brief glimpse of the transmission model that 
grounds his interactions in the field: “[I was] accompanied throughout by Miss Maud 
Karpeles, who took down, usually in shorthand, the words of the songs we heard, while I 
noted the tunes” (1932, p. xxi). The speed of the musical event requires an efficient 
language, but nonetheless the data sought is meaningful. Elsewhere he writes:  
 The singers displayed much interest in watching me take down their music in my 
 note-book, and when at the conclusion of a song I hummed over the tune to test 
 the accuracy of my transcription they were as delighted as though I had 
 successfully performed a conjuring trick. (1932, p. xxvi)  
In Kittler’s (1999) view, the phonograph made it possible for the first time to conceive of 
documenting “the real”—sound recording allowed for the inscription of signals that the 
alphabet could not encode, including the noises of bodies—but Sharp seems unwilling to 
explore this new media landscape. Not coincidentally, Sharp was rather contemptuous of 
his informants, and his disregard for the singers he relied on had much to do with his 
class biases and his elitist fears of massification (Filene, 2000). Yet, there is also a basic 
contempt here for the material channel of the voice, a desire only for the information it 
happens to be preserving or transmitting (cf. Brady, 1999).  
 John and Alan Lomax too were collectors of songs, which are indeed made up of 
words and tunes. And yet, unlike Sharp, who was forced to hastily scribble down notes 
and words with his assistant, the Lomaxes had a machine do the work (Filene, 2000). The 
use of the phonograph in ethnographic field research goes back to the late nineteenth 
century (Brady, 1999; Sterne, 2003). Alan Lomax seems to have been especially 
sensitive, however, to what Wolfgang Ernst describes as “the (unconscious) replacement 
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of the vocal-alphabetic code by an electromagnetic flux of electrons” (Ernst, 2011, p. 
243), for his writings relate a different kind of field trip than Sharp’s.  
 Young Lomax figures primarily visual media, including print, as only one channel 
within the complex ecology of the field of folk music. Yet it is the aural channels of the 
voice and the singing body to which his attention seems to have been constantly drawn 
(Szwed, 2011). “‘Sinful’ Songs of the Southern Negro,” one of his first publications, 
explores the pleasure of what Roland Barthes (1977) describes as the “grain” of the 
voice, the fleshy ground beneath the articulation of linguistic meaning: 
This woman’s quartet which she herself had organized and led, was by far 
superior to any other group we had heard. None of them, in all likelihood, could 
read, and certainly none of them had had the slightest training in music; but their 
harmonic and rhythmic scope and pattern, their improvisations, were unusual and 
beautiful. Their lower lips big with snuff, they swayed back and forth, eyes 
closed, to the beat of their own singing, a beat accentuated by the spatter of 
tobacco juice on the rough pine floor. (Lomax, 2003, p. 11) 
Words and notes only go so far to document “the spatter of tobacco juice on the rough 
pine floor” or “unusual and beautiful” improvisations. Lomax seems to struggle between 
that which can be represented and that which exceeds mere signifiers; his prose reaches 
out to document sense, sound, and place. Elsewhere in the essay he describes a 
performance that we can only imagine Cecil Sharp vainly trying to document:  
There was Burn-Down in the middle of the floor shouting a rhythm from which 
the melody had practically disappeared, beating his “box” until it seemed the 
thing would fly to pieces at the next stroke of his yellow hand, and literally held 
up by the bodies of the dancers around him, who were still shuffling with bent 
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knees in the monotonous and heavily rhythmic one-step. Out in the moonlit yard 
again, away from the house, where the hound pup lay asleep in the dust, the 
separate sounds of feet and voice and strings disappeared, and in their place was a 
steady wham-wham that seemed to be the throbbing of the house itself. (Lomax, 
2003, p. 14)  
Lomax’s informants as well as the landscape blend into a physiological gestalt. The 
notion that there is something more to music than notes and words, something deeper, 
would continue to interest Lomax throughout his career. In “Reels and Work Songs” he 
writes, “[t]hese records are not to be listened to for text or tune so much as for the 
wildness, freedom, and rhythmic beauty of their contents” (Lomax, 2003, p. 71). In “Folk 
Song Style” he considers the incompleteness of Western musical notation: “The more 
refined the scores, the more certainly the essence of the exotic music escapes through the 
lines and spaces” (Lomax, 2003, p. 131). And, in “A New Hypothesis,” he again wonders 
explicitly whether Western music notation systems are suited to the study of folk music 
(Szwed, 2010).  
 Of course, Lomax was not only interested in the non-signifying dimensions of 
folklore and music. His book on Jelly Roll Morton (Lomax, 1993), for instance, 
incorporates meaningful narrative. Lomax asks Morton about his personal history, which 
gets written down, which circulates as interpretable texts. But there is simultaneously a 
world of sense beyond or beneath the level of signification: liquid and material registers 
that, à la Kittler, the recording apparatus itself seems to have a privileged capacity to 
“understand.” As Lomax (1993) writes of his session with Morton, 
The amplifier was hot. The needle was tracing a quiet spiral on the spinning 
acetate. … A gravel voice melting at the edges, not talking, but spinning out a life 
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in something close to song. Each sentence almost a stanza of slow blues … , each 
stanza flowing out of the last like the eddies of a big sleepy Southern river where 
the power hides below a quiet brown surface. (p. xiii)  
The machine is figured as a central component of the “pre-phonographic” event, the 
gravel voice spinning, like a record, right along with the acetate. The edges melt, writes 
Lomax, and the rich discourse he records is not just talking. Indeed, as in his description 
of Morton’s performance, metaphors of “the water” or “the river” often stand in as 
descriptors of the data Lomax was trying to capture with his machines. In a letter sent 
from the Bahamas to Oliver Strunk at the Library of Congress, he writes: “Here, you see, 
there is a live, flowing, vital folk culture and the collector lives in a continual state of 
confusion & exhilaration. … Songs & people pour in on us all day every day until we 
have to stop them in our weariness” (Lomax, 2010, pp. 10-11). With his phonographic 
ears, Lomax seems to have occasionally found the monstrous bandwidth of the folk to be 
overwhelming and in need of sorting out, somehow.  
 To be sure, Lomax’s notion of the field-recording interaction is saturated with a 
racialized primitivism. As Patrick B. Mullen (2008) claims in his discussion of American 
folklorist Newbell Niles Puckett, the notion in American folklore that speech and sound 
are more authentic than writing is attributable to racialized stereotypes of African-
Americans as exotic Others: “If blacks sang from the soul in an illiterate oral tradition 
and whites from the song books in a literate tradition, then civilization had cut whites off 
from the spiritual dimension of life” (p. 49). In Lomax’s aesthetic valuation of folk 
music’s channels, too, we can see evolutionism and primitivism variously articulated: 
“Alan Lomax definitely thought that black otherness held the secret of sensual and 
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spiritual renewal, and this was related to his own sense of whiteness as being incapable of 
experiencing pleasure” (Mullen, 2008, p. 111). And it was not only Black otherness that 
held this power for Lomax; like many of his contemporaries in the field of anthropology, 
he was drawn to those who appeared to be outside of modernity (see Fabian, 1983).  
 However, it is also worth pointing out that Lomax (2010) seems to have been 
sensitive to the fact that it was not he who was actually doing the perceiving in the field, 
that it was a machine inscribing the data and that this machine was not only a transparent 
window but also an agent of sorts: “A sound-recording machine should visit men in the 
camps and record the songs they have made up” (p. 210); “The department’s recording 
machine has had an interesting time this summer” (p. 8); “The machine now walks and 
talks properly again” (pp. 50-51); “This work is to be done by a modern field recording 
machine, with the idea in mind of getting down in the most accurate fashion the folk 
tunes and folk styles of the region” (p. 85). Lomax’s sound recorders are folkloristic 
automatons, workers able to infiltrate domains that had previously been unreachable to 
him, prosthetic extensions of the folklorist: “This machine draws its power from a set of 
batteries, and records electrically on aluminum or celluloid discs. Its play-back arm, 
which enables the singer to hear his song immediately after it has been sung, won us 
more songs than anything we said, more than all the cigarettes, tips, and compliments we 
distributed” (Lomax, 2003, p. 22). On the other hand, the human folklorist in turn 
occasionally comes to resemble an object in Lomax’s writings, a mere component within 
a larger network of mediatization: “The folklorist’s job is to link people who are 
voiceless” (2003, p. 92). And elsewhere: “I propose [we folklorists] should be two-way 
bridges and form a two-way inter-communication system” (2003, p. 116). When the 
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object of inquiry is the voice, the machine becomes the collector; meanwhile, the 
folklorist becomes an interactive channel, an interface between the folk and the machine.  
 The idea that sound-recording inscriptions can constitute a present reproduction 
of a sonic event has been critiqued and historically situated by several scholars (e.g. 
Lastra, 2000; Sterne, 2003; Williams, 1980). According to Alan Williams, for instance, 
sound recording always entails selection and representation; sound recording constructs 
the object it claims to document much like in other forms of discourse: “Microphones 
being more like ears than they are like rooms (they function as points and not as volume), 
it is never the literal, original ‘sound’ that is reproduced in recording, but one perspective 
on it, a sample, a reading of it” (1980, p. 53). Lomax, on the other hand, does often seem 
to believe that sound recording had given him direct access to the sounds and bodies he 
was documenting, which Filene (2000) and Szwed (2010) point out. And yet, folk music 
also occasionally seems to be only a node distributed across the network of technological 
media that have made possible its documentation. Thus, despite his Romanticism, Lomax 
also exhibits what Jonathan Sterne (2003) has called a “network sensibility” (p. 226), 
which is a sensitivity to the location of authenticity within media networks. The essay 
“Tribal Voices in Many Tongues,” for instance, begins with an anecdote about a truism 
Lomax would have us reconsider:  
I suspect it was on a tourist’s visit to Naples in the nineteenth century that some 
sentimental literary gentleman opined, ‘Music is a universal language.’ This 
absurd notion has bedevilled collectors of folk and primitive music ever since. I 
only wish I could hold the author’s head firmly against the bell of my loudspeaker 
while I played him a series of albums. (Lomax, 2003, p. 107) 
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Truth, in this imagined scenario, is not to be found in the field, but rather in proximity to 
the bell of his loudspeaker; authentic originals are what he often seemed to think he was 
after, but he seems to have been equally drawn to machinic inscriptions—to the discs, 
tapes, microphones, and speakers he relied upon.14  
 Of course, evoking Michael Taussig’s (1992) poetic exploration of the field-
recording interaction in colonial Latin America, Lomax does appear to enjoy, through his 
perception of the “primitive” Other’s experience with technology, his own culture’s 
repressed enchantment with mimetic machines: “It is always a dramatic moment for any 
one when his own voice comes back to him undistorted from the black mouth of a loud 
speaker. He seems to feel the intense and absorbing pleasure that a child experiences 
when he first recognizes himself in a mirror” (Lomax, 2003, pp. 64-65). But which one of 
the three agents in this web constitutes the folk? Lomax comes to rupture the dichotomies 
we might wish to impose on his thought, because the folklorist’s murky assemblage of 
technology and embodiment seems to have made who or what is inside modernity, and 
who or what outside, occasionally difficult to determine: “Although my primitive tape 
recorder disintegrated after that first trip, it sang the songs of my convict friends so 
faithfully that it married me to tape recording” (Lomax, 2003, p. 178; emphasis added). 
In anticipation of Donna Haraway’s (1991) poetic explication of the cyborg body, such 
                                                
14 Perhaps Alan Lomax inherited this fascination from his father. As Marybeth Hamilton writes of the elder 
song collector, “Inextricable from that sense of virile adventure was an evangelical enthusiasm for 
recording technology” (2007, p. 79). And, again, Filene (2000) has also identified the Lomaxes’ sense of 
the Dictaphone as an objective tool for documentation. But I am trying to highlight how the younger 




vivid renderings of Lomax’s faithful coupling with technology seem to dissolve 
boundaries between nature and culture, machine and human, and primitive and civilized. 
2.3 Computational Lomax 
 The “deep river of song” that Lomax sought to dam up via his role at the Library 
of Congress almost drowned him, and he began to experience a strain of what Jacques 
Derrida (1995) has called “archive fever.” In the forties and fifties he recorded massive 
volumes of music from around the world—from Spain, Italy, Haiti, Bahamas, and 
elsewhere—and yet he did not have the training to understand many of the songs his 
machine was now capturing as he ventured further from his native United States: “When 
you have to sit through a half-hour song in Spanish that you can’t understand … you need 
something else to do” (quoted in Szwed, 2010, p. 335). His archive’s will-to-
accumulation was spinning out of control. As he recollected in a lecture he gave in 1979 
entitled “From Lead Belly to Computerized Analysis of Folk Song”: “I just recorded—I 
figured myself as a sort of a suction pump. … But I didn’t know what I was doing, 
really” (Lomax, 1979).  
 Yet Lomax’s problem was not only one of comprehension. Although it seems to 
have subsided into the fifties with technological advances including tape-recording, the 
LP, and stereo (all which he welcomed with open arms), a technologically induced 
frustration had become apparent during his time in Washington: “We should be delighted 
to send you copies of everything you sang for us at once, but at the moment, we have no 
facilities for duplication of these records in the Library of Congress” (Lomax, 2010, p. 
138). Lomax was seeking to record all of the world’s authentic voices and to feed those 
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voices back to themselves; in the forties and fifties he hosted various programs on CBS, 
Mutual, and then the BBC (see Filene, 2000; Szwed, 2010). But his own analogue storage 
and sorting systems at the Library of Congress were cumbersome and too delicate: “The 
re-shelving of original records is becoming a very serious problem and I wish that you 
would make some arrangements about this soon to insure the originals against injury” 
(Lomax, 2010, p. 208).  
 Thus, as early as 1941, four years before Vannevar Bush’s Memex, Lomax (2010) 
had begun to dream of a virtual realm—a stack where the corporeality of the carriers was, 
if not erased, at least somehow better mobilized: 
 I hope that every note that is played in the United States during the next two 
 decades, in war or in peace, in whore-houses or for Henry Ford rolls across the 
 threshold of the music division, is catalogued, filed away in special self-
 liquidating cans which disappear until called for and demand constant attention 
 from a staff of three-thousand in a building that old John’s Blue Ox Babe could 
 turn around in without scratching her tender arse. (p. 221) 
Do folklorists dream of electric graphical user interfaces? Jonathan Sterne (2003) has 
explored how ethnographic phonography in the late nineteenth century was bound up 
with embalming practices and the Victorian cultures of death and remembrance. Lomax, 
though, sought to re-animate the archive as an interactive and dynamic database—where 
“special self-liquidating cans” disappear until called for—one of the purposes of which 
would be to connect the holdings to the very folk that constitute their source. Not 
surprisingly, then, the utopian discourse around personal computing would later give him 
cause for excitement. As he would write in a grant application for his multimedia 
software project: “The Global Jukebox … is not just an encyclopedia of music, dance, 
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and culture, but a dynamic model of the cultural universe which the user may explore, 
manipulate, and expand” (Lomax, 2003, p. 325; emphasis added). Before he could drag 
and drop self-liquidating cans, however, he would need to devise a system of sorting the 
data in his unwieldy analogue archives.  
 The Cantometrics project, which officially commenced in 1961 with the help of a 
Rockefeller grant, seems to have functioned in part as a salve for Lomax’s earlier archive 
fever. In it he found “something else to do,” and he also found what would eventually 
become, with his Global Jukebox software in the nineties, a way of potentially plugging 
life back into his sickly stacks of field recordings. If on his song-collecting journeys 
Lomax had occasionally found himself in the dark as a researcher, Cantometrics 
promised to be a sonar imaging device of sorts: “Cantometrics was designed to facilitate 
quick … mapping of a musical terrain” (Lomax, 1976, p. 79). Employing 
anthropologists, ethnographers, statisticians, and a computer programmer—not to 
mention Columbia University’s IBM 360 mainframe (Szwed, 2010), which was a crucial 
component of this interdisciplinary machine—the project attempted to systematically 
study the singing voice and its function within traditional societies. Lomax’s team 
devised a set of coding categories that would allow them to comparatively study the 
world’s folk music without actually looking at music or meaning as they had traditionally 
been conceived in studies of musicology and folklore: “We came to focus more upon the 
shape than the content of the model, more upon the ‘how’ than on the ‘what’ of singing, 
since the ‘how’ is the more constant element and thus, by definition, closer to the cultural 
core” (Lomax, 1976, p. 13). Thus at approximately the same time that McLuhan (2003) 
was trying to draw our attention away from the content of television and radio broadcasts, 
62 
 
for instance, and toward media as such, so Lomax was moving toward the materiality of 
folk music to consider the aesthetics and social functioning of vocal channels themselves.  
 The Cantometrics coding process was a complex and time-consuming procedure; 
thirty-seven categories were to be used, each with scales of varying ranges. A few of the 
qualities the team considered were the degree to which the singing group did or did not 
seem to have a leader; the degrees of rhythmic and tonal integration and organization in 
the singing group; and the degrees of “raspiness” and “nasalization” (Lomax, 1968, pp. 
22-23). The first meaning of “Cantometrics” is the measurement of singing style, and so 
the project thus sought to rationalize and to attribute discrete (and quantitative) symbols 
to the language-exceeding voices of the folk. Yet the term “Cantometrics” also pointed 
toward the fact that singing style is a measure of social structure and solidarity. After 
coding the approximately 3,500 songs that formed the basis of the Cantometrics data, and 
after mapping these results onto data taken from George Peter Murdock’s (1967) 
Ethnographic Atlas, Lomax and his colleague Victor Grauer concluded that singing styles 
were related to “1) Productive range; 2) Political level; 3) Level of stratification of class; 
4) Severity of sexual mores; 5) Balance of dominance between male and female: 6) Level 
of social cohesiveness” (Lomax, 1968, p. 6). By looking at the characteristics of a 
society, one can predict the kind of singing style that social structure would require. 
Conversely, by looking at singing style, one can also determine the kind of society a 
vocal style is helping to maintain.  
 Lomax’s Cantometrics project clearly aspired to objectivity, and he often refers to 
the computer as a mere tool. For instance, he does not give the machine much credit 
when he acknowledges that “the computer became the helpful servitor of this project” 
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(Lomax, 1976, p. 4). However, just as Lomax was reliant upon his prosthetic sound 
recorders on his field trips, the kind of information-processing he was interested in 
conducting with Cantometrics—cross-cultural factor analysis of the world’s recorded 
voices—required the IBM 360. And Lomax again found himself married to technology. 
As he put it in a televised interview with Robert Gardner:  
 The computer is buzzing with 500 variables, cross-correlated. And out of this 
 are emerging enormous forms, which are complex enough to satisfy almost any 
 cultural metaphysician. I swim in them all day long, and I must say I don’t feel 
 that I understand exactly how they work. One thing I am sure of, and that is that 
 … man is basically a master aesthetician. (Lomax in Gardner, 2005)  
Lomax is not sure how the cross-correlated variables function, and yet he swims in them, 
fully immersed in his new network (cf. Helmreich, 2007). Forrestine Paulay collaborated 
with Lomax on a sister project called Choreometrics, which sought similarly to 
informationalize the filmed traditional dances of the world, and she recalls the affective 
excitement Lomax expressed about his new partner’s power: “[Lomax would] call me 
and he’d say ‘Look at this,’ you know, and I’d see this stream of numbers and patterns. 
… And he’d say, ‘Look what’s happening here, look what this is showing!’” (Paulay, 
2006). Almost like “Neo” in The Matrix, Lomax could finally perceive the data that had 
been surrounding him all along. 
 Yet translation issues abounded. How best to let the folk speak to the researcher 
and to the mainframe, and vice versa? The parameters of the scales and categories, as 
Lomax himself acknowledges, were defined by the size of the IBM punch-card. So the 
bandwidth of the folk’s voice was delimited by the material structure of the computer’s 
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storage and processing media. But there were (human) eyes and ears that also needed 
consideration. The visual presentation of the coding sheet was thus designed so that it 
could facilitate interaction between these intertwined agents:  
The number of levels was limited to thirty-seven by the size of the coding sheet, 
and the number of points on any line was limited by the thirteen punches available 
in a column on an IBM card. No more points were included on any line than we 
felt could be handled by an attentive listener. These thirty-seven lines, with 219 
points, are set forth in a symbolic map on the right side of the coding sheet. The 
symbols, which are abbreviations for the distinctions made in each line, greatly 
facilitate learning and using the system. The listener records his judgments on the 
symbolic map and then transfers them to a number map on the left, which also 
serves as an IBM data sheet. (Lomax, 2003, p. 251).  
How can the scholar of folk music comprehend the vocal varieties of the world, on one 
hand, and harness the computational power of the digital computer? The coding sheet 
was offered as a relay joining the mind of the listener, the aural (analogue) voices of 
humanity, and the digital processing power of the mainframe. (User-friendly symbols on 
the right, and digital translations on the left.) 
 Still, initiation into this network would take time and patience; Cantometrics 
(Lomax, 1976) came with six cassette tapes, the purpose of which were to make the 
listeners’ ears compatible with the method established by the team. Lomax guides 
potential Cantometricians through dozens of clips on these hours-long cassettes, teaching 
us how to rate the coding categories for various samples of recorded folk music. The 
training tapes (the experience of which is not unlike slowly installing software) seem to 
work as a kind of protocol, ensuring compatibility between the listener and the 
65 
 
computational method: “The Cantometrics tapes allow the listener to adjust to the world 
ranges of many audible features of singing, arranged in scalar form” (Lomax, 1976, p. 
12).  
 Although human users of Cantometrics may have had trouble understanding the 
section of the coding sheet that was for the IBM 360 to “understand,” however, the 
computer itself apparently had trouble, too, with the demands of the project; it needed to 
be taught a new language. As the team’s programmer Norman Berkowitz explains, “[t]o 
obviate the loss of time and programming effort that would be entailed in such 
preparation on a problem-by-problem basis, a special language, REDODATA, was 
developed, during the period November, 1965, to July, 1966, to facilitate the automatic 
and flexible redefinition and transgeneration of data” (Berkowitz, 1968, p. 310). Only 
once everyone was on the same page (or punch-card) could the coding and information-
processing of the world’s archives of recorded folk music begin.  
2.4 Cybernetic Folk 
 So far we have seen how the materiality of the IBM 360 registered across the 
project and how the boundary-blurring network that included technology, folklorist, and 
folk interestingly recalibrated for Lomax’s digital period. But the very object of his quest 
interestingly morphed, too, into the Cantometrics research. In his early writings, 
phonographic Lomax seemed content to bask in the mystical richness he perceived in the 
voices and bodies of the folk, which, again, “[escaped] the lines and spaces” of Western 
musical notation. Cantometrics attempted to harness the voice and to make empirical 
sense of its variability on a social-scientific level. However, Lomax’s understanding of 
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the materiality of traditional music, as the results began to pour in, became permeated by 
some of the language and concepts of the field of cybernetics, of which “the digital 
computer was an essential condition of possibility” (Johnston, 2008, p. x). Therefore, 
whereas the “truth” of the sonic event had been complicatedly distributed along the 
sound-recording network within which he was working (from recording automata to the 
bell of the loudspeaker), here again the truth of the folk was to be found alongside the 
(now digital) machine.  
 The ideas of information, bandwidth, feedback, and homeostasis pervade the 
Cantometrics project (so the influence of Lomax’s teachers Margaret Mead and Raymond 
Birdwhistell, both cybernetic anthropologists, is also evident).15 Singing style is a fruitful 
field of study because it is a relatively redundant mode of communication. Lomax thus 
saw in the voice, vis-à-vis the disorienting swirl of images and sounds he perceived to be 
part of globalization, an effective noise filter. And once the team began to rate and 
compare the voices that he and others had recorded with Murdock’s ethnographic data, 
they came to figure singing style as a feedback mechanism between a variety of social, 
economic, and environmental factors:  
 Each song style we have studied … portrays some level of human adaptation, 
 some social style. Each performance is a symbolic re-enactment of crucial 
 behavior patterns upon which the continuity of a culture hangs, and is thus 
 endowed with the emotional authority of the necessary and the familiar. (Lomax, 
 1968, p. 8)  
                                                
15 On cybernetics, see Wiener (1950), Ashby (1963), Hayles (1999), and Johnston (2008). 
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The voice both expresses and reinforces particular social and environmental 
relationships, a component within a machinic circuit; it is the means through which a 
culture commands and controls itself. For instance, as Lomax (1968) writes of early 
modern Europe: “The bard was an early information specialist, storing the traditional 
knowledge of his group with the help of the redundant devices of poetry” (p. 134). The 
particular conclusions of the Cantometrics project tended toward evolutionism; more 
“complex” or “information-dense” singing styles were found to belong to more highly 
stratified social systems. Yet Lomax also seemed to wish to approach voice and society 
as a strictly relational system. Andrew Pickering (2010) has explored how some British 
cyberneticists regarded the brain as an adaptive, performative machine, and Lomax 
approached the voice with a similar lens. He had finally opened up this black box, and he 
saw that it was after all the homeostatic regulator of each of humanity’s diverse cultural 
systems. 
 The cybernetic notions of information, feedback, and homeostasis are also evident 
in the activist aspects of Lomax’s work with digital computers. Lomax perceived the 
explosion of mass media in the postwar era to be a culturally homogenizing force, a 
process figured as negentropic. As he writes in Folk Song Style and Culture,  
The work was filled with a sense of urgency. To a folklorist the uprooting and 
destruction of traditional cultures and the consequent grey-out or disappearance of 
the human variety presents as serious a threat to the future happiness of mankind 
as poverty, overpopulation, and even war. Soon there will be nowhere to go and 
nothing worth staying at home for. … Meantime Telstar rises balefully on the 
western horizon. (Lomax, 1968, p. 4)  
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Lomax grapples here with the contradictions of modern cultural imperialism. On one 
hand there is a proliferation of communications; on the other, the informational 
possibilities of any given message seemed to him to be rapidly decreasing (a 
phenomenon he terms “cultural grey-out”). His lament is not unlike Paul Virilio’s (1997) 
in Open Sky, where Virilio explores the erosion of situated horizons as a consequence of 
instantaneous telepresence and telecommunication. The noises of transnational industry 
and technology have increased to such a degree that it is no longer possible to recognize 
“[differences] which [make] a difference,” which is how Gregory Bateson (1972, p. 315) 
defines information. “There will be nowhere to go and nothing worth staying at home 
for,” Lomax puts it (1968, p. 4). 
 And yet, in the rich diversity of traditional singing styles, now comparable thanks 
to the sheer power of the IBM, Lomax saw a beautifully wide range of bandwidth and 
informational possibility. Further, the method of Cantometrics could be plugged into the 
voices of the world, he hoped, in an attempt to strengthen their functioning as relay:  
Experience teaches that … direct feedback of genuine, uncensored native art to its 
roots acts upon a culture like water, sunlight, and fertilizer on a barren garden; it 
begins to bloom and grow again. The direction, planning, and administration of 
this cultural feedback system will be facilitated by the recognition of style 
structures and style differences. (Lomax, 1968, p. 9) 
The traditional voices of humanity were weakening, Lomax thought, in part because they 
often lacked access to mainstream channels of communication, and yet Cantometrics 
might serve as a meta-governor—a servomechanism through which we could regain 
control of our most essential informational circuits. Thus Cantometrics should not only 
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be for scholars of folklore. Lomax (1976) thought that schoolchildren and even “just 
plain folks” (p. 9) can and should learn the method, and in the process better understand 
the singing styles that are foundational components of our cultural ecosystems. 
Cantometrics and Choreometrics findings were thus disseminated not only in academic 
publications and papers, but also in presentations and a film series entitled Rhythms of 
Earth (Lomax & Paulay, 2008). “People are very stubborn about keeping these bodily 
matters going. I think the human race is going to resist this homogenization and build up 
new kinds of civilizations on these structures. That’s what this film is for,” as Lomax 
explained to Robert Gardner (in Gardner, 2005).  
 The realization of Lomax’s living database seemed to become most possible with 
the Global Jukebox, designed to run on an Apple Macintosh IIcx (Szwed, 2010). 
Lomax’s writing career had (slightly) slowed down by the late eighties and nineties, and 
so there is less material here to explicate. But the grant application Ronald D. Cohen has 
included in Alan Lomax: Selected Writings (Lomax, 2003) and a video demonstration of 
the prototype (Naimark, 1993) promise an interactive and dynamic archive. The 
multimedia interface would make it possible to place beside each other, in both visual 
and aural forms, all the findings of Cantometrics, and one could manipulate the data to 
explore new patterns. But one would also be able to plug one’s own singing style into the 
database, making it not only a window into a static set of traditions, but a collaborative, 
hybrid pump or regulator: “The Global Jukebox … is not just an encyclopedia of music, 
dance, and culture, but a dynamic model of the cultural universe which the user may 
explore, manipulate, and expand” (Lomax, 2003, p. 325). The same networks that were 
eroding traditional cultures, then, might be put to good use in the global regeneration of 
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the diversity of singing styles. Unfortunately for Lomax, however, the Global Jukebox 
technology never made it past the prototype stages in his lifetime.  
2.5 Deep Digitality 
 Many have criticized the thread across the history of digital culture that posits 
digitization as a disembodying or abstracting process (e.g. Hansen, 2006; Hayles, 1999; 
Munster, 2006). N. Katherine Hayles (1999) traces the notion that information can be 
divorced from its material carrier from cybernetics and information theory through to 
nineties cyberculture and transhumanist rhetoric. Contemporary images of humans 
uploading themselves to computers carry forward the humanist dream of disembodied 
consciousness, which Hayles finds influentially articulated in the work of Norbert Wiener 
(Hayles, 1999). But not only utopian humanists understand digitality as a condition in 
which the medium of the body is left behind. Mark B. Hansen (2004) critiques the anti-
humanist (and decidedly dystopian) Friedrich Kittler on similar grounds. According to 
Kittler (1999), the modern differentiation of technological media (into gramophone, film, 
and typewriter—a.k.a. the real, imaginary, and symbolic) is eventually subsumed by the 
monolithic phenomenon of digitization:  
Before the end, something is coming to an end. The general digitization of 
channels and information erases the differences among individual media. Sound 
and image, voice and text are reduced to surface effects, known to consumers as 
interface. … Inside the computers themselves everything becomes a number: 
quantity without image, sound, or voice. (pp. 1-2) 
Focusing on the materiality of computational technology, Kittler emphasizes the removal 
of the writer/user from the process of digital inscription; according to Hansen, it is 
71 
 
Kittler’s reliance on Claude Shannon’s notion of information that leads him to an 
abstracted and disembodied understanding of the digital (Hansen, 2004).  
 But there have been other ways of conceiving of information and digitality. 
Hayles’s book returns to less influential cybernetic theorists such as Donald Mackay, 
who offered an account of information that did not neglect the situated, embodied 
contexts in which information is necessarily received. And, drawing on Gilles Deleuze 
and Henri Bergson, Hansen (2004) critiques Kittler by arguing that digital code is always 
already framed by the “in-formed” users that engage with it; Hansen explicates the 
necessarily affective process of digital mediation by closely analyzing the work of several 
new media artists, including Jeffrey Shaw and Tamás Waliczky.  
 There are dozens of ways one could critique Cantometrics as a social-scientific 
methodology (see Averill, 2003). Still, I submit that Alan Lomax’s strange inventions 
and writings also constitute an attempt to grapple with an understanding of digital data 
that is not abstract or disembodied but is rather situated in particular, necessarily 
embodied horizons. Lomax was excited by the possibilities afforded by information 
processing; the ability of the machine to sort and map binary data was to be appreciated: 
“It is exciting to realize that such a coherent and complete system, capable of accounting 
for world musical variation, was derived by a rigorous, mathematical procedure” (Lomax, 
1976, p. 21). And yet, Lomax never seemed to discard his initial fascination with 
performance, which for him always seemed to exceed the notes, words, and more 
recently the digital bits that might be used to encode it. As he offered only a few pages 
after the above quotation: “Music descends from the heavenly spheres of pure ideas and 
mathematics, where it was put by Pythagoras and Plato. Its performance framework 
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clearly does not rest on mathematical abstractions, but is a human, a social thing” 
(Lomax, 1976, p. 25). Lomax was sensitive to the possibilities engendered by computers, 
and yet his understanding of digital culture was palimpsestic—helpful binary code and 
embodied human life-worlds overlapping in an integrated mixed-reality network: 
You’ve got a theory of art … which is far more satisfying aesthetically, 
emotionally, intellectually … than any black/white thing of the sort that Levi-
Strauss has foisted on us in the last twenty-five years, where everything is ‘Yes or 
No.’ … It’s an enormously complicated web; it took the biggest computer in the 
world to make these comparisons—the whole of the mainframe was occupied 
with it for two days to get this map, because here you’re comparing the actual 
process of interaction between people. … Man is essentially an aesthetic animal—
we’re not a computer that goes ‘Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No,’ with a tree diagram 
making sense out of what we do. Our brains and our nervous systems connect us 
with every body around us. We carry these very complex social and 
communications systems with us. … It is an enormously complex interconnected 
network. (Lomax, 1979)  
Lomax, the poststructuralist folklorist, finds us constrained by Claude Levi-Strauss’ 
binary thinking. Rather, paralleling Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari—for whom “[t]he 
life of the nomad is the intermezzo” (1987, p. 380)—Lomax envisions an affective and 
distributed folk, a web that stretches across several strata, including nervous systems, 
“the biggest computer in the world,” and “every body around us.” Of course, by now the 
rhetoric of disembodied cyberspace has all but completely died out (Hansen, 2006). Still, 
Lomax was perhaps on the cutting edge of mixed reality, trying as he did to envision a 
digital convergence that did not erode previous media (including the body) but rather 
rejuvenated them by descending, deep, to the cultural core of our sung environments. So 
at around the same time that, for example, Nicholas Negroponte (1995) was touting the 
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majesty of “weightless” bits, Lomax was listening for a utopia wherein digital networks 
are always already plugged into our fleshy voices, which richly and complexly embrace, 
but shall not be reduced to, code.  
2.6 Conclusion 
 My aims in this chapter, to summarize, have been twofold. First, drawing on 
Kittler’s approach, I tried to explore how the objects of Lomax’s folkloristic desires were 
themselves products of the machines he employed as a field worker and as an archivist, 
or at least how he is often sensitive to this in his writings. This approach has allowed us 
to see connections between his body of work and medium theory. Second, inspired by the 
burgeoning field of media archeology and imaginary media research, I tried to explore 
how Lomax’s ideas and (failed) inventions constitute a fascinating virtuality that cuts 
across the genealogies of cybernetics and digital culture. By excavating media—which 
always include diagrams and dreams—we can open ourselves to lost potentialities 
(Parikka, 2012; Zielinski, 2008). What would it take to trade in our narcissistic iGadgetry 








Chapter 3 – Pete Seeger’s Tactical Media Theory 
 Our general theory is to throw as many songs as we are possibly able to do out 
 into the public air, so to speak, and let the people choose which they think are 
 good and which they think are bad. Which method can you think of that would be 
 more democratic than that? (Pete Seeger, 1972, p. 218)  
 By any media necessary. (Critical Art Ensemble, 2001, p. 2) 
3.1 Introduction 
 Pete Seeger, who performed as a young man with Woody Guthrie in the Almanac 
Singers, and who would go on to a long and still-unfolding career as a singer, songwriter, 
journalist, activist, and general “elder statesman” of the folk field, might seem to be an 
excellent example of the genre’s dialogic and nostalgic approach to communication. 
Seeger, for instance, is the one who allegedly exclaimed his desire to chop Bob Dylan’s 
microphone cord on the evening in Newport in 1965, when the younger songwriter traded 
in his acoustic guitar for an electric Fender Stratocaster. Even if we believe Seeger’s 
retrospective claim that his only problem was that the sound was poorly mixed during the 
set, and that Dylan’s masterful lyrics were not coming through (see Scorcese, 2005), we 
can recognize a fear of one of rock music’s characteristic messages, noise (Gracyk, 
1996), which according to Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver (1963) is the product of 
every channel. Seeger’s gesture evokes a fear of mediation and a desire for face-to-face 
communion. This longing for transparency found its way into Seeger’s writings as well. 
The song “The Ballad of Old Monroe,” for instance, begins by identifying but also 
defying Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman’s (1988) “media filters”: “The papers and 
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the TV never told a story straight / So listen now, I will to you the honest facts relate” 
(Seeger & Reynolds, 1963). Seeger often idealized the possibility of communicating 
outside mass-media channels, ironically often using media such as LPs to do so.16  
 However, Seeger’s understanding of communication is more complicated than his 
paradoxical and apparently naïve contempt for mass media would suggest. Benjamin 
Filene’s (2000) Romancing the Folk concludes with a chapter on Dylan and Seeger, 
pointing out the similarities across their respective bodies of work. Filene highlights the 
pragmatism and performativity of Seeger’s understanding of folk authenticity, and thus 
implicitly urges us to reconsider the alleged nostalgia of his thought: “To Seeger, folk 
music was not a collection of old songs but a process by which new ones were 
assembled. In theory, at least, any genre of music could become ‘folk’” (Filene, 2000, 
195). Ronald Cohen (2002) has also recently reconsidered the relationships between pop, 
commercialism, and authenticity in the folk revival, and due attention is paid to Seeger’s 
role.17  
 The current chapter will attempt to take a closer look at Seeger’s work as an 
author, broadcaster, and songwriter, focusing in particular on Seeger’s understanding of 
                                                
16 This is the kernel of the revival’s ideological character, as taken up by rock culture, for Simon Frith 
(1981). Inspired by arguments made by folk revivalists, rock ideologues in the mid sixties made it seem as 
though mass-industrial society’s media networks were capable of delivering “authentic,” community-
binding cultural products (Frith, 1981). Thus, as for Adorno (1973), authenticity is viewed as lubrication 
for an alienating socio-economic system.  
17 Seeger’s life and career have been documented and discussed (e.g. Dunaway, 1981; Wilkinson, 2009). 
More focused and academic work has also been done: Minnie Bromberg and Gary Alan Fine (2002) chart 
the evolution of Seeger’s reputation from Communist villain in the 1950s to liberal hero in the 1990s. And 
David Ingram (2008) looks at Seeger’s “complex pastoralism,” which he developed during his 
environmentalist stage beginning in the late sixties. Connections between Seeger’s thought and medium 
theory have not been explored, however, which is the contribution of this chapter.   
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media (which neither Filene nor Cohen explore in detail). First, I will consider how, 
despite his impatient critique of McLuhan, Seeger himself had a working “medium 
theory” insofar as he was conscious of the distinctive structuring capacities of what 
McLuhan called “hot” and “cool” media.18 Second, and drawing here on John Durham 
Peters (1999), I will consider the possibility that even when Seeger discusses “live” or 
“un-mass-mediated” performances (the so-called folk process), he clearly envisions a 
broadcasting model of dissemination. Ideal folk communication involves not the dialogic 
melding of souls but the casting of seeds. Seeger’s thoughts on “cultural warfare,” then, 
also warrant comparison to the field of tactical media, of which Seeger might be seen as a 
progenitor. Anticipating Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s machinic nomads, Seeger 
envisions a form of mediatized resistance in which movement, flow, heterogeneity and 
speed are essential qualities.  
3.2 Pragmatic Medium Specificity 
 Before looking at Seeger, we will recall a central feature of medium theory. 
Harold Adams Innis explores what he terms “space-” and “time-biased” media across the 
history of Western civilization, from Ancient Sumeria to the contemporary United States 
(Innis, 1991, 2007). According to Innis, the degree to which a medium is either durable 
but immobile, on one hand, or easily transportable but ephemeral, on the other, has far-
reaching effects on the cultures and societies in which it is deployed. Time-biased media 
such as pyramids or clay tablets foster tradition and decentralization; the adoption of 
                                                
18 “Hot media are …  low in participation, and cool media are high in participation or completion by the 
audience” (McLuhan, 2003, p. 39). 
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space-biased media, however, has tended to have disruptive effects on time-biased 
“monopolies of knowledge,” and has rather made possible the emergence of markets, 
industry, and secularization (Innis, 2007). Thus an analysis of both political and 
economic power requires a consideration of the specific material systems of 
communication that ground a given social assemblage:  
 Large-scale political organizations such as empires must be considered from the 
 standpoint of two dimensions, those of space and time, and persist by overcoming 
 the bias of media which over-emphasize either dimension. They have tended to 
 flourish under conditions in which civilization reflects the influence of more than 
 one medium and in which the bias of one medium towards decentralization is 
 offset by the bias of another medium towards centralization.  (Innis, 2007, p. 27) 
It was partly the introduction of print, then, that ended the monopoly of the church and 
led to the Reformation of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Innis, 2007).
 McLuhan’s work on media takes up Innis’s concern with materiality and medium 
specificity. McLuhan’s famous claim that “the medium is the message” (2003, p. 19) 
urges us to look, not only at the content or information of a communicative situation, but 
also at the particular channels grounding it. Yet, McLuhan sets aside Innis’s time/space 
heuristic for his own “hot” and “cool” categories (2003, p. 39). Hot media like print and 
radio are characterized by high definition and by the passive mode of reception they 
therefore require, and they tend to work on distinct senses (e.g. print on the eye, radio on 
the ear). Cool media, on the other hand, are corporate and participatory, and they tend to 
involve all of the senses simultaneously. Although print had all but eroded any trace of 
oral consciousness in the West, McLuhan believed that the postwar electronic ecology—
the television-fostered “global village”—offered a potential return to a cool, interactive 
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culture. Despite their differences in emphasis, however, McLuhan and Innis see particular 
media hybrids as crucial agents in various forms of struggle; just as print challenged the 
hegemony of the ancien régime according to Innis, television and rock music—the media 
of the sixties counter-culture—were perceived by McLuhan (and by many who read him, 
including the Yippies, John Lennon and Yoko Ono, and early video artists) to be threats 
to the hegemony of modern bureaucratic and industrial culture.19 
 Seeger was not an academic, and he never offers as systematic a vision of 
historical change as either Innis or McLuhan. Still, despite his rejection of “The 
McLuhanites,”20 Seeger’s essays and aphorisms for Sing Out!, Broadside and other 
publications did ruminate on the question of media. His understanding of medium 
specificity was central to his thoughts on tactical media warfare. First, he often points out 
the particularities of print, often considering the medium’s limitations:  
 A song is ever moving and changing. A folk song in a book is like a picture 
 of a bird in mid-flight printed in a bird book. The bird was moving before the 
 picture was taken, and continued flying afterward. It is valuable for a scientific 
 record to know when and where the picture was taken, but no one is so foolish as 
 to think that the picture is the bird. Thus also, the folk song in the book was 
 changing for many generations before it was collected, and will keep on changing 
 for many generations more, we trust. It is valuable for a scientific record to know 
 when and where it was collected, but the picture of the song is not the song itself. 
 If you think of folk music as a process, you know that words and melodies may 
                                                
19 See Bodroghkozy (2001) for a discussion of how and why the counterculture appropriated various 
aspects of McLuhan’s arguments about television.  
20 “If any McLuhanites are listening, I challenge them to let me visit their mailbox every morning for a 
month, and remove the contents of all their letters, presenting them only with the empty envelopes. The 
envelope is not the message. Just a part of it.” (Pete Seeger, 1972, p. 296) 
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 not be so important as the way they are sung, or listened to. The process includes 
 not only the song, but the singer and the listeners, and their situation. (1972, p. 
 145)  
Like many of his predecessors and contemporaries in American folklore (see Bendix, 
1997; Sterne, 2003), and like medium theorists (e.g. McLuhan, 2003; Ong, 1982), Seeger 
sometimes privileges embodied, experiential speech over abstracting and alienating print. 
The folk process is fluid and variable, and the flux of the folk stream cannot be wholly 
captured by mere signifiers:  
 Think of folk music as a process; then the history of any folk song will show 
 continual change, contradictions, action and interaction of opposing influences. 
 Now, this might be called, in the term of my mother-in-law (a wonderful woman), 
 diabolical materialism. (1972, p. 145) 
The community of singers and participants called into being by the act of folksinging 
involves not just the passive exchange of narratives or words, for there are affective 
registers to the folk process that printed texts can never quite capture: “Words, words, 
words. Sometimes the most eloquent song I can sing is ‘Wimoweh,’ with no words at all. 
Just melody, rhythm, and a great bass harmony” (1972, p. 320).  
 Despite his fascination with the murky material below “words, words, words,” 
Seeger acknowledged that a hybrid relationship between print and folksong could prove 
fruitful: “If we can force [the media] open, masses of people can learn from the printed 
page” (1972, p. 428). He spearheaded People’s Songs Bulletin in the late forties, the 
mimeographed publication that would eventually become Sing Out! Actually, his first 
calling as a teenager was to the field of journalism, which perhaps explains his penchant 
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for topical songs (Seeger, 1972). His experience of  briefly working at the Library of 
Congress under Alan Lomax in the late thirties (his job was to listen to the volumes of 
recordings of folk music that Lomax himself did not have time for), and the influence of 
his father (the folk-loving and leftwing composer and musicologist Charles Seeger), seem 
to have broadened his media horizons beyond print. But he was sensitive to both the 
limitations and possibilities of chirographic and print culture, and he recognized that 
distinct media—including multimedia networks, which he seems to anticipate in the 
following quotation—might have distinct roles to play in his project of prodding the 
whole world to sing together:  
 The printed page is a handy device, and there is value in being able to count on a 
 certain number of pages appearing regularly with up-to-date information on a 
 certain subject. … The basic idea would be better if we could afford to include a 
 phonograph record with every issue. Or a roll of video tape you could play  
 through your TV set. But this will come in time. The scientists will come to our 
 aid if they don’t blow us up first. (1972, p. 21) 
Although Seeger’s experience with mass-media institutions would often lead him 
pragmatically to privilege speech and singing, he grasps the position of these media in a 
hybrid and dynamic ecology, which, as we will see below, one can come to harness or 
wield like a weapon.  
 Importantly, Seeger was not against electric instruments per se:  
 Nowadays the [loud]speaker gives out more twang. But even so, I don’t think the 
 range of tone, or the flexibility, can beat a good acoustic guitar. And all that 
 equipment to lug around! Ugg. Of course, me, I’ve been playing electrified music 
 for a long time. Ever since I started using microphones. (1972, p. 288) 
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Seeger preferred acoustic guitars and banjos not because he wished to be “behind the 
times” like the pastoral folk, and he acknowledges that his own “live” performances often 
rely on modern technological media. Rather, it seemed to him that heavy electronic gear 
is simply not fast enough. A DIY techno-nomad, Seeger was willing to take up any tool 
(acoustic guitars, television programs, axes, etc.) fit for the task at hand and the situation. 
The hybrid assemblages called “songs” were his favourite, but only because they were 
able to cross so many channels and territories at such high velocity: “Songs can go places 
and do things and cross borders which people cannot” (1972, p. 209). This pragmatic 
medium specificity, this willingness to proceed “by any media necessary,” is pithily 
articulated in one of Seeger’s most well known compositions, “If I Had A Hammer,” co-
written with Lee Hays.  
 “If I had a hammer, I’d hammer in the morning. / I’d hammer it in the evening, all 
over this land,” Seeger sings (Seeger & Hays, 2009, p. 38). But there are other tools with 
which one can transmit particular effects: “If I had a bell, I’d ring it in the morning”; “If I 
had a song, I’d sing it in the morning” (p. 38). Each of these distinct channels is used to 
transmit “love between my brothers and my sisters,” and thus the song’s emphasis is also 
on content. Yet, the verses revel in the particularity of the makeshift weapons and in 
translation itself. The song revels in the specificity and materiality of particular acts of 
mediatized resistance. One sings songs, one swings hammers, and “to every thing … 





3.3 Performance and Television 
 As we have already begun to see, Seeger’s medium specificity is more 
complicated than the simple distinction between print and speech, a distinction that has 
been drawn many times across the histories of ethnography and American folklore (see 
Bendix, 1997; Brady, 1999; Sterne, 2003). For Seeger, even “live” performance is 
inflected by the channel; gesture and self-presentational style, but also the architecture of 
the performance space (or the format of documentation technology), are interrelated 
agents in the total communicative event of folk-singing. For instance, in 1960 he explores 
the features that would set the strongest folk festivals apart:  
 Set up a 50-foot stage, and have 5,000 or more seated in front of it eagerly 
 looking forward to a show—I mean a Show—and you might as well realize that a 
 lot of America’s truest folk performers could not appear successfully. From 
 beyond the tenth row no one would see the twinkle in the old ballad singer’s eye, 
 nor the grace of gnarled fingers on the fiddle strings. So who has to take over the 
 show—I mean, Show? The seasoned performer, who with gestures and broad 
 smiles and stage experience can project to the back rows. (1972, p. 197) 
Seeger ponders the ways in which particular media of assembly make possible varying 
engagements with both music and the body politic. Recalling Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
(2004) critique of the eighteenth-century stage and Paris, its breeding ground, Seeger is 
contemptuous of the ways in which performers in “Shows” are able to externalize their 
symbolic expressions, for “gestures” and “broad smiles” are abstractable and repeatable 
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signs.21 “The twinkle in the old ballad singer’s eye,” on the other hand, is not something 
that can be standardized, manipulated, or externalized; it is a causal index of authentic 
self-presence.  
 Of course, many contemporary scholars of culture and media will find Seeger’s 
faith in sincerity problematic, for even vocalizations are signifiers (Derrida, 1976), or as 
Erving Goffman (1959) and Judith Butler (1999) have taught us, all behavior and even 
identity is performative. Still, the point is that Seeger struggles here with the possibility 
that distinct media foster distinct kinds of aesthetic and political communities. Some 
modalities of communication (e.g. dissent) are not well channeled by the bourgeois 
concert auditorium. Indeed, there are forms of expression that such an auditorium simply 
cannot transmit. Thus a “good” folk festival does not only feature a certain repertoire 
(which concerns the level of content), but it must also be concerned with the technologies 
that conjoin the music to the audience and thus the audience to itself. Seeger was 
interested in the expression of what Deleuze and Guattari (1986) call “minor” literature; 
and, like Guattari (1995), Seeger recognized that the transmission of minor discourses is 
necessarily marked by the media ecologies in which such projects take place. 
 Given his interest in the minutia of performance, the twinkling eyes and gnarled 
hands of folksingers, and their intersection with various other architectural media, it is 
perhaps not surprising that Seeger was also sensitive to the question of how different 
performance styles might be better suited than others to television broadcasts, a question 
McLuhan would also explore. Beginning from the ontology of the medium (“It is not a 
                                                
21 See Richard Sennett (1977) for a discussion of Rousseau’s critique of theatricality. 
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photo in any sense, but a ceaselessly forming contour of things limned by the scanning-
finger” [2003, p. 418]), McLuhan (2003) claims that “hot” performances do not translate 
well into televisual images: “TV is a medium that rejects the sharp personality and favors 
the presentation of processes rather than of products” (pp. 413-414). On these grounds, he 
suggests that John F. Kennedy was able to beat Richard Nixon in the presidential race 
because the former’s performative mannerisms were more compatible with the cool, 
participatory televisual image.  
 Seeger was severely critical of existing television broadcasting in the fifties and 
sixties. Contra McLuhan, for Seeger the turn to participation and DIY culture expressed 
by the folk revival (and by the counter-culture it helped spawn) was a response to, rather 
than a product of, the new medium: “The revival of interest in all folk music, which 
proceeds this year of ’56 on an unprecedented scale, is simply part and parcel of a 
gigantic counter-trend in American life (the main trend is, of course, mass production and 
mass media)” (Seeger, 1956, p. 32). His own experiences as a potential (but often 
censored) televisual performer could only have further fuelled his contempt. Even when 
he was finally allowed on the Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour in 1967, for instance, 
which ended a seventeen-year blacklisting for his involvement with the Communist Party 
and for his unwillingness to participate in the HUAC hearings (yet not invoke the fifth 
amendment), his performance of “Waste Deep in the Big Muddy” was controversially cut 
before the program made it to air. The clear allegory and critique of the Vietnam War 
was too controversial for the CBS censors, though subsequent press coverage of this 
censorship would eventually urge CBS to invite Seeger back on the program to perform 
the song (see Bodroghkozy, 2001; Wilkinson, 2009).  
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 Nonetheless, there are glimmers of hope in his writings, even in the mid fifties, 
that the aesthetic potentials of television would one day be explored:  
 So this summer, there may be some fine big shows—but some of the finest may 
 not necessarily be the biggest. Unless—and it’s a $100,000 unless—somebody 
 takes the gamble of putting it on television. And this is another chapter in the 
 story. For the TV cameras can move in close, and can give you the twinkle in the 
 old ballad singer’s eye. (1972, p. 197) 
Seeger believed that television was saturated with possibility: “TV is the greatest 
medium. … It’s a goddamned shame that nobody is presenting it right” (1972, p. 447). 
The dynamic and embodied folk process, though not quite documentable by the printed 
page (though pages have their own uses), is well suited to television, if only the political-
economic structures governing the medium could be disrupted. Yet, this disruption could 
happen from inside: minor and counter-hegemonic forms of knowledge and 
communication could be amplified and distributed by this new medium despite the 
constrictions of its institutional and political contexts. 
 These aesthetic and political observations were put to work in Seeger’s own 
television program, Rainbow Quest, which began to air in 1967 on a handful of public 
television stations across the country (Wilkinson, 2009). A stark minimalism, 
videographic slowness (only two cameras sluggishly capture the action), and a seemingly 
improvisatory conversation style are perhaps the series’ most distinctive features. The 
average episode has Seeger strum a few tunes by a kitchen table on an otherwise bare set, 
then bring out a guest or two with whom he then swaps songs and stories in seeming 
absence of a script or even plan (guests included stars like Johnny Cash, Richard and 
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Mimi Farina, and Judy Collins, but also older and less well-known singers such as 
Mississippi John Hurt, Roscoe Holcomb, and Reverend Gary Davis). Even in contrast to 
other “cool” countercultural talk shows of the time, such as The Dick Cavett Show, 
Rainbow Quest is marked by a deliberate anti-professionalism; the program is a willfully 
amateurish affront to spectacular culture via the spectacle’s own channel of choice.22 
McLuhan, who claimed that TV transmitted processes, not products, would have 
approved, if the transmissions had made it to him in Toronto.   
 Ironically, the folk revival’s mainstream television debut had come a few years 
earlier via a program called Hootenanny (ABC, 1963–1964), which took its name from 
the rent parties held by the Almanac Singers in Greenwich Village in the forties, which 
Seeger himself had helped plan and at which he performed. As we will explore in more 
detail in chapter 5, at the original “Hootenanies” distinctions between performer and 
audience (and perhaps between self and other) had been playfully and politically effaced, 
but ABC’s Hootenanny was a fast-paced “Show.” Hosted by the lugubrious and 
handsome Art Linklater, the program consisted of a light montage of images of pleasant 
college life mixed with quaint folk and country standards. Massive college auditoriums 
were filled with enthusiastic young fans, here spectators only, aside from the occasional 
sing-along. Performers did not have time to speak or engage the host (or the crowd) in 
discussion. One performer even drew attention to the hot rigidity of this performative 
                                                
22 The release of the Sony Portapak in 1967 produced an excitingly utopian discourse—suddenly television, 
it was believed, could become a two-way medium—and in some ways Seeger’s own aesthetic is very 
similar to that put forth in such works as Guerilla Television (Shamberg, 1971) and the magazine 
Raindance, which explored the interactive potentials of the new medium of video. 
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situation: “Hey, hey, if you guys keep clapping, they’re going to cut me short,” said Hoyt 
Axton, as he quickly moved on to his next song (in Dietrick, 2007).  
 Hootenanny was denounced across the pages of Singout! and Broadside by critics 
who felt that the program misrepresented the spirit of the revival. Seeger described it 
recently as “a half an hour of kids clapping, fun and games” (in Brown, 2007). Rainbow 
Quest, on the other hand, though the show largely stuck to music and did not often deal 
with overtly political topics, can be read as a medium-specific affront to “hot” culture:  
 June Carter and Johnny Cash, they’ve been touring around the world, they just got 
 back from overseas, they have a whole big show. Normally, it’s a little unfair to 
 ask them to perform without their whole show here, because it’s a wonderful  
 show, but I asked them if they’d come around just the two of them, so we could 
 get a chance to talk a little, and if we kind of improvise our way through a 
 program, I think maybe you’ll get to know them better; it won’t be an act or 
 anything like that. (Seeger, 2005) 
Sometimes the pace of the obviously unrehearsed program would grind to a halt, with 
Seeger taking almost painfully long pauses to think, and often clumsily leading the guest 
through the repertoire. In this way, Seeger demonstrates an adventurous exploration and 
negotiation of media hybridization. An articulation of the kind of info-war McLuhan 
called “counterblasting” (McLuhan, 1969), Rainbow Quest was a relatively DIY attempt 
to cool down the wasteland.   
3.4 Folksinging as Dissemination 
 So far we have seen how, despite his impatient critique of “McLuhanism,” Seeger 
himself brought a material sensitivity to the various channels at his disposal as a 
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folksinger and activist, and we also considered how his pragmatic medium specificity 
inflected his work as a television programmer. Yet, even when he discusses the folk 
process (often held to be a “live” or face-to-face communicative act), he clearly has in 
mind a broadcasting model of communication. The dream of a face-to-face public sphere, 
in which rational citizens engage in dialogue (e.g. Habermas, 1989), is not to be found in 
Seeger’s musings on media. Rather we see a field of cross-firing projectiles, 
pragmatically mobilized channels whose function is the scattering of signals (cf. Peters, 
1999). 
 Seeger’s theory of dissemination is worth thinking about because many medium 
theorists have privileged presence, immediacy, and orality in varying ways (Peters, 
1999). Innis’s (1991) essay “A Plea for Time” suggests that a return to the dialogic forms 
of Ancient Greece is just what the space-biased contemporary media ecology requires, if 
flexible democracy is to be achieved once again. The ephemerality of cheap newsprint, 
radio, and other forms of popular culture have led to the forgetting of tradition and time, 
and Innis thought that a rejuvenation of oral dialogue might remedy this state of affairs. 
Similarly, McLuhan’s (2003) “global village” described the contemporary return to 
orality that he believed “cool” electronic media were fostering. Although he 
acknowledges that villages can also be nasty places, McLuhan was clearly excited by the 
new forms of acoustic involvement he saw emanating from television, electronics, 
Happenings, and rock music. McLuhan’s student Walter J. Ong (1982) makes similar 
judgments about technology and the word; sound recording and televisual broadcasts 
promise a “secondary orality,” not quite as integral as the first, but nonetheless closer to 
the human condition than modern, alienating print culture had been.  
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 Of course, the idea that the voice is a more integral or natural channel of 
communication has been critiqued from numerous angles. Jacques Derrida (1976) 
famously deconstructed the logophonocentrism privileged over the history of Western 
philosophy by exploring how the “present” voice was always already contaminated by 
the writing it had tried to exclude. Poststructuralists like Roland Barthes, Michel 
Foucault, and Jean Baudrillard all worked over similar ground: nothing exceeds the 
ideological processes of signification—power is everywhere—the map is the territory. 
Recent media scholarship has offered more historically grounded variations on these 
arguments (e.g. Auslander, 1999; Lastra, 2000). Jonathan Sterne (2003, 2011) takes on 
Innis and McLuhan in particular for their essentialist understandings of sound and 
hearing.   
 John Durham Peters’s Speaking into the Air (1999) comes at the issue from a 
fresh angle. Peters reconsiders not orality or literacy as such, but rather the ethical 
frameworks that have tended to get mapped onto these models of media. Peters begins by 
contrasting Plato’s critique of writing with Jesus’s endorsement of dissemination. 
Socrates in Plato’s dialogue Phaedrus articulates a sender-oriented defense of dialogue, 
whereas Jesus in the Gospels promotes a broadcasting ideal of communication, which 
gives more attention to the act of reception: “The sower engages in a purely one-way act: 
no cultivation of the fledgling plants occurs, no give-and-take, no instruction as to 
intended meaning” (Peters, 1999, p. 53). Once the seeds have been scattered, the 
disseminator has little control over which take root and which do not. Peters is not 
claiming that we should do away with dialogue or with the dream of dialogic 
transparency. Still, the notion of communication as transparent or oral/aural communion 
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can be just as violent and oppressive as it can be democratic (Peters, 1999). Although 
cultural criticism and media scholarship over the twentieth century has often lamented the 
effects of mass-media broadcasting, Peters finds redemptive potential in the point-to-
multipoint diagram: “The practice of the sower is wasteful. He lets the seeds fall where 
they may, not knowing in advance who will be receptive ground, leaving the crucial 
matter of choice and interpretation to the hearer, not the master” (1999, p. 55).  
 Despite his fascinating anticipation of McLuhan’s thought, Seeger’s medium 
theory values not intimate communion (the “cool” dialogue promised by the “global 
village”) but relatively anonymous dissemination. He seems to have picked up the idea of 
folksinging as broadcasting from Woody Guthrie, entirely appropriate given that it is not 
a theory of innovation but rather of collaborative diffusion: “Since [Woody] frankly 
agreed that he couldn’t tell which of his songs would be good and which would soon be 
forgotten, he adopted a kind of scatteration technique—that is, he’d write a lot of songs, 
on the theory that at least some of them would be good” (Seeger, 1972, p. 405). The act 
of folksinging is figured as the spraying of a stream, and the folksinger does not search 
for face-to-face recognition, but rather wanders the earth spreading the seeds of the folk. 
Which seeds are “folk,” and which not, is not for the broadcaster to determine. Like a 
radio or television station’s transmitter, the folksinger is necessarily without knowledge 
of which of her seeds will bear produce:  
 For great songs to be written we must have an outpouring of topical song. What  
 does it matter that most will be sung once and forgotten? The youthful Joe Hills, 
 Tagores, Burnses and Shakespeares and Guthries can only thus get their training.  
 … Time will sift the good from the bad. And perhaps centuries from now, when 
 we are all crumbled to dust, some child in a world which has long since proceeded 
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 to tackle other problems besides how to ban the Bomb will be singing a verse 
 which you tossed off in a moment of inspiration. (1972, p. 399).  
As in Peters’s reading of Jesus as represented in the Gospels, Seeger does not mind if 
some signals are spilled, or if others decay, as they necessarily are when radio and 
television stations transmit across the ether, because he recognizes the autonomy of the 
receivers and their ability, indeed their need, to tackle the songs from within their own 
horizons of experience. In a recent documentary, Seeger even directly invokes the parable 
of the sower: “I look upon myself as a planter of seeds. And, like in the Bible, some of 
them land in the stones and they don’t sprout, some land in the pathway and get stomped 
on, but some lay on good ground and grow and multiply a thousand-fold” (Seeger, 
2007).23  
 We can consider Seeger’s vision of folksinging as a complex remediation of 
broadcast television, radio, and even print. Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin (1999) have 
explored the ways in which historical media change involves a “double logic.” As media 
evolve and borrow from past forms and genres, new media either tend to borrow from 
other media in order to efface the process of mediation or else to emphasize it; 
“remediation” tends towards either immediacy or “hypermediacy” (Bolter & Grusin, 
1999). An example of a newer medium borrowing from an older one in order to create an 
effect of immediacy is television’s incorporation of theatre’s and radio’s ontologies of 
“liveness” (Auslander, 2008). And yet, media do not move forward through time in a 
                                                
23 In addition, American folk hero Johnny Appleseed, after whom Seeger would name his Sing Out! 
column, served as a model. In his first column, he makes it clear that the act of planting and spreading 
seeds is what attracts him to Appleseed’s mythology: “This column is dedicated to Johnny Appleseed 
Jrs.—the thousands of boys and girls who today are using their guitars and their songs to plant the seeds of 
a better tomorrow” (1972, p. 155).   
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uniform manner, Bolter and Grusin argue. “Old” media also become repositioned within 
the wider ecology. Seeger’s conception of folksong dissemination is a remediation of 
broadcasting by folksinging, where the folksinger incorporates the ontology of point-to-
multipoint transmission. 
 Indeed, although Seeger critiques “Shows” for their lack of intimacy, his work 
and writings also point to a pleasure taken in the act of mediation, a pleasure in 
transmission for transmission’s sake. We have already glimpsed this disposition in “If I 
Had a Hammer.” Quite appropriately (as he has had many hammers), Seeger’s 
discography constitutes an almost preposterous number of recordings—over one hundred, 
at this point (Dunaway, 2011).24 In a self-review of his career, covertly published in the 
sixties under his wife Toshi’s name, Seeger takes pride in the sheer volume of 
transmissions he has emitted (see Wilkinson, 2009). He acknowledges that not all of his 
emissions will have been successful, that some will have fallen by the wayside:  
 Does a performing artist have the same right to spew out thousands of 
 recorded performances to the commercial market, without being judged for the 
 poor ones as well as the good ones? … If one could dub onto a tape a few songs 
 from here and there on his many LPs, one might have quite a good one-hour tape 
 of Pete Seeger. The trouble is, no two people would make the same selections. 
 Therein lies his defense. (1972, p. 268).  
Although he essentially began his career working as a cultural emissary of the Old Left, 
Seeger seems sensitive to the violence that inheres in imposing aesthetic or political 
                                                




systems onto others. This receiver-oriented exploration of hypermediacy is also nicely 
illustrated in Woody Guthrie’s song “Letter to You,” which Seeger often included in live 
performances and which he also recorded. “I’m gonna wrap myself in paper, I’m gonna 
wrap myself in glue / Stick some stamps on the top of my head / I’m gonna mail myself 
to you.” Seeger tried to counter McLuhan by claiming that the envelope is not the 
message, but here we see that it is indeed: “I’m gonna mail myself to you.” There is a 
provocative selflessness in this figure of the singer as both sender and seed. The 
folksinger transforms into the medium, and the conjunction becomes a gift for the 
audience to open how it pleases. 
 Many scholars (both sympathetic and critical) of the folk revival have missed, 
then, what is one of the more interesting features of the field’s (or at least Seeger’s) latent 
theory of communication. Serge Denisoff (1971), for instance, argued that the first 
generation of the proletarian folksong movement was based in face-to-face performance 
situations (the Almanac Singers indeed played primarily at union rallies, etc.), whereas 
the revival of the early sixties was distributed primarily through LP recordings. Even 
though Robert Cantwell (1996) is much more sympathetic to the revival than Denisoff, he 
still wants to distance this musical culture from the degraded and degrading medium of 
television. However, Seeger’s take on the folk process gives us a much more subtle 
understanding of media ecology, for we can see that broadcasting and a specifically 
televisual ontology were central to Seeger’s deliberations on the politics of dissemination. 
David Ingram (2008) articulates the general understanding of Seeger’s image when he 
claims that “Seeger’s political values were informed more by pastoral nostalgia and 
American nationalism than by the dogmatic economic materialism of the Communist 
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Party” (p. 25); but Ingram too misses the profoundly mediatized concept of scatteration. 
The concept of mobile, mediatized, and boundary-crossing seeds that Seeger has passed 
on challenges both nostalgia and nationalism. 
3.5 Guerilla Media Warfare 
 Seeger’s broadcasting ethic is not simply a utopianism wherein the more 
transmissions the better, a liberal-democratic celebration of the benevolence of the 
marketplace of ideas (or, it is both this naïve utopianism and something else besides). For 
Seeger, not all transmissions are created equal. The air into which one sings is a field of 
power in which corporate control and spectacular entertainment play a malignant role:  
 For thirty years I assumed that the kind of songs I sang would be blacklisted from 
 the mass media. I was resigned to it. I am no longer. America does not have ‘all 
 the time in the world’ to solve its problems. The rulers of all our mass media must 
 be blasted loose from their tight control; genuine controversy (not fake 
 controversy) must be heard or there will be hell to pay. (1972, p. 481) 
To sing into the air is to potentially disrupt hegemonic structures via the warfare of 
material media, and in these battles one must reach for the tools at one’s disposal, each of 
which has its own particular capabilities:  
 Before I leave Duke I’m going to take a stone with me, and put it in my banjo 
 case, and if I ever meet a TV man up there who says he won’t cover a story like 
 this because there’s no violence, something is going to get hurt. (1972, p. 482) 
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Banjos and stones are media suited to different sets of situations. However, both share in 
common the mobility and flexibility Seeger values in the activist’s arsenal. As he writes 
of his years on the blacklist,  
 It may seem a farfetched comparison, but for many years I figured I pursued a 
 theory of cultural guerilla tactics. I could not hold a steady job on a single radio or 
 TV station. But I could appear as guest on a thousand and one disc jockey shows, 
 say a few words while they played a few records. I could not hold down a job at 
 the average college or university, but I could appear to sing some songs, and then 
 be on my way. (1972, p. 211)  
With his light, flexible toolbox in hand, nomadic Seeger engaged in guerilla info war, 
quickly attacking with the help of larger media networks (local radio and television 
stations, universities and colleges) and then just as quickly hitting the road.  
 The tactics utilized here share much in common with the thought of Mao Tse-
Tung (1961), Vo Nguyen Giap (1970), and Che Guevara (1997). The guerilla Communist 
fighter was to make use of the environment, the tools at hand, and the situation, and 
speed and flexibility were to reconfigure small size (a liability in more traditional kinds 
of modern Western war) as an asset. As Mao puts it in his influential text On Guerilla 
Warfare (1961): “Guerilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobility, and 
attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of 
communication, the relative strengths, the weather, and the situation of the people” (p. 
46). Seeger similarly sought a flexibility and dynamism in his tactical maneuverings, and 
a quick recap of his more famous campaigns reveals a guerilla-like attentiveness to 
situation. While blacklisted from television and also many live venues in the fifties and 
sixties, he made due by travelling the United States, playing on college campuses and 
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releasing recordings on independent labels like Folkways; in the seventies he sailed up 
and down the Hudson River on a nineteenth-century sloop he had had recreated, stopping 
for concerts along the way in an attempt to raise awareness of the industrial pollution that 
had despoiled this landscape (see Ingram, 2008); he recently joined the crowds at Occupy 
Wall Street for some folksinging amplified by the utterly technologized “People’s 
Microphone”; and prior to Occupy he accompanied Bruce Springsteen at the Lincoln 
Memorial for Barack Obama’s inauguration. The last example hardly seems like a 
“subversive” or tactical cultural project, at this point. Yet as Mark Pedelty (2009) has 
pointed out, Seeger slipped into his rendition of “This Land is Your Land” Woody 
Guthrie’s three original (“communist”) verses, which have largely been excised from the 
songbooks in American schools.25 Thus, the folksinger once more sized up the situation 
and reached for a tool (this time grabbing his star image, which partly derives from his 
historical cache as someone who participated in the Civil Rights movement), meanwhile 
casting a few more seeds.  
 Seeger’s ethics of reception make him a somewhat anomalous theorist and 
practitioner of cultural guerilla warfare, however, for Mao, Giap, and Guevara all 
remained firmly within the Marxist-Leninist idea of the revolutionary party who leads the 
proletarian. As Guevera (1997) puts it: “The guerilla band is an armed nucleus, the 
fighting vanguard of the people” (p. 52). But truth and meaning, for Seeger, derive not 
from the vanguard or even “the people” conceived as one body, but from the larger 
                                                
25 Two of the verses go: “In the square of the city, in the shadow of a steeple; / By the relief office, I’d seen 
my people. / As they stood there hungry, I stood there asking, / Is this land made for you and me? / There 
was a big high wall there that tried to stop me; / Sign was painted, it said private property; / But on the back 
side it didn’t say nothing; / That side was made for you and me” (quoted in Pedelty, 2009, p. 425).  
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multiplicity of possible ways of engaging with the world. Truth for Seeger lies in the 
“distribution of the sensible,” to borrow a concept from Jacques Rancière (2009). 
Whereas the critical theory tradition has often wanted to educate “the masses” in one way 
or another (Rancière, 2009), Seeger sees value in the diverse horizons of experience from 
which his audience comes to meet his transmissions. 
 Seeger’s theory of dissemination thus puts him much more in line with 
contemporary theorizations of tactical media, which have often emphasized the 
heterogeneity and eclecticism of cultural resistance (Raley, 2009). Groups like Electronic 
Disturbance Theatre, whose online protests drew international attention to the Zapatistas’ 
struggles, or the Yes Men, who have maneuvered ironic critiques of corporate culture 
from within mainstream media networks, are direct descendants of Seeger insofar as they 
emphasize both receptivity and medium-specific pragmatism. Obviously, the reliance 
(and almost obsession) with digital media demonstrated by some tactical media theorists 
puts Seeger’s tools in sharp historical relief. Still, David Garcia and Geert Lovink’s “The 
ABC of Tactical Media” (2003) make the lineage clear:  
 But it is above all mobility that most characterizes the tactical media practitioner. 
 The desire and capability to combine or jump from one media to another creating 
 a continuous supply of mutants and hybrids. To cross boarders, connecting and re-
 wiring a variety of disciplines and always taking full advantage of the free spaces 
 in the media that are continually appearing because of the pace of technological 
 change and regulatory uncertainty. (pp. 108-109)  
In the sixties, power had not yet pervaded the network model, and so “rhizomatic” 
guerilla maneuverings could automatically appear as strikes at the heart of the system 
(Galloway & Thacker, 2007). Still, Seeger, like tactical media artists, understands the 
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necessity of fostering disturbances within “the system” and of making do with the tools 
ready to hand. 
 There are also differences worth noting between Seeger and the discourse of 
tactical media, differences that make Seeger not just a historical pit stop in a genealogy of 
such practices but a thinker perhaps worth returning to yet. As Mckenzie Wark (2002) 
has argued, tactical media discourse suffers from an insistent focus on ephemerality over 
time. Wark (2002) suggests that we adopt the long-view characteristic of both strategic 
and logistical thinking: 
 Tactical media has been a productive rhetoric, stimulating a lot of interesting new 
 work. But like all rhetorics, eventually its coherence will blur, its energy will 
 dissipate. There’s a job to do to make sure that it leaves something behind, in the 
 archive, embedded in institutions, for those who come after.  
Others have echoed Wark’s observations on the limitations of tactical media discourse, 
which initially seemed content merely to play and experiment in the interstices of 
power’s grip (see Dieter, 2011; Lovink & Rossiter, 2005). Seeger’s eclectic writings, 
however, straddle both the topographic concerns of the nomadic tactician and the “time-
biased” longings of a strategist. The purpose of shooting so many projectiles in the first 
place was that some of them, some day, might eventually bear fruit, which usually 
requires the setting of some kind of roots. In a move that Harold Innis (1991) would have 
approved of, Seeger balances the immediate (i.e. tactical) concerns of space and the more 
strategic dimension of time. Seeger recognizes the importance of building structures and 




 This chapter has attempted to revisit Pete Seeger, focusing in particular on his 
journalistic writings and on some of his songs, as a media and communications theorist. 
Mass media were not something to be excluded from Seeger’s toolbox; they were to play 
a crucial role. From the subtle slowness possible on television to the power of singing, 
Seeger envisioned broadcasting itself as a utopian ringing. Many of the thousands of 
seeds Seeger casted have by now all but wilted, probably, for we do not sing many of the 
songs he tried to teach us. And yet, the diagram of tactical media he helped develop itself 










Chapter 4 – Bob Dylan, Apple, and Revolutionary Writing 
Machines 
 Ain’t gonna work on Maggie’s farm no more (Bob Dylan, 1973, p. 161) 
 Think different (Apple Inc.) 
 There is nothing that is major or revolutionary except the minor. To hate all 
 languages of masters. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 26) 
4.1 Introduction 
 According to both Steve Jobs and those who were close to the late “iCEO” of 
Apple, Bob Dylan was a major influence on the Silicon Valley entrepreneur. A friend 
from his teenage years recalls the hours they spent hanging out in the late sixties: “I don’t 
remember ever listening to anything other than Bob Dylan tapes” (in Gray & Quinn, 
2011). Ironically, though the corporation he co-founded would become a key player in 
the still-unfolding enclosure of the internet’s function as collaborative cultural 
commons—in part through the online music store iTunes and MP3 player iPod—young 
Jobs’s fandom was expressed through an obsessive quest for illegal bootleg recordings of 
Dylan concerts (see Isaacson, 2012).  
 There is more of interest here than that a love for Dylan fits neatly into Jobs’s star 
image as a “countercultural” businessman, though that too is part of the story (see Turner, 
2006). Dylan’s particular articulation of cool—which one can consider across songs, 
performances, star texts, and other writings—has been mobilized by both Jobs and Apple 
on key occasions. At the unveiling to shareholders of Apple’s Macintosh in 1984, Jobs 
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quotes from “The Times They Are A-Changing”; Dylan is included, along with Albert 
Einstein, John Lennon and Gandhi, in the “Think Different” television ad of 1997; and an 
early iPod commercial also features the bard. Below these overt synergies between Apple 
and Dylan run profound affinities, too, notions of what exactly it is that creative people 
do with machines. Across the discourse enveloping these brands and products we find 
likenesses of the Romantically expressive, directly transmitting artist-individual. The 
medium is not the message for Dylan fans, it has often seemed, or for Apple fans; great 
minds think, and transparent tools (be they pens, typewriters, electric guitars, personal 
computers, or even mobile music players) are conduits for self-possessive monads of 
creative production (or, ironically, consumption).26  
 Drawing on Friedrich Kittler’s concept of “discourse networks” (1990, 1999) and 
Félix Guattari’s concept of “faciality” (2011), this paper explores Dylan and Apple as 
machines of subjectivation—as assemblages which both represent and make possible 
particular ways of understanding the materialities of self, society, and technology. Into 
what shape is the model of communication voiced by these iconic brands? I explore how 
one reading of Dylan, the one Jobs and Apple have incorporated, constitutes a re-
articulation of Romantic authorship: the contributions of writing machines are effaced, 
and expression is framed as an aesthetic act of pure intention. Drawing also on Félix 
Guattari will help us to grasp a political edge latent in Kittler’s work. As I aim to show, 
the baby faces of Dylan, Jobs, and the Mac’s Graphical User Interface can be read 
                                                
26 My understanding of Romantic authenticity has been informed by M. H. Abrams (1953), Friedrich 
Kittler (1992), Charles Guignon (2004), and Charles Taylor (1989, 1992).  
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themselves as mis-readings and as ideological obfuscations of the deep materiality 
underlying what Félix Guattari (2011) has termed “capitalist facialization.”  
 In the latter section of the chapter I refocus my emphasis, returning to Dylan’s 
work (mostly his mid-sixties “turn” both to rock’n’roll and to typewriting) to consider 
aspects of his star text and writings that contradict Apple’s rhetoric of the channelization 
of creativity. I will thus position Dylan at a new metaphorical crossroads. On one side of 
Bob Dylan is the Romantic immediacy valued by Apple and mainstream digital culture, 
but on the other are the machinic assemblages taken up more recently by hackers and 
tactical media artists: individualized, privatized creativity (which disavows its 
indebtedness to living but also to dead labour) versus an aesthetic acknowledgement of 
the rhizomatic criss-crossings of creativity, communication, and machines.27 Which side 
are you on?  
 In addition to the readings of Dylan and Apple, at two points throughout the 
chapter, as a way of enacting the noisiness that is part of my subject matter, I interject in 
the form of “Feedback Squeals.” Inspired by Michel Serres’s (2007) book about the 
parasite, these sections of theoretical inquiry—exploring “discourse networks” and 
                                                
27 Gilles Deleuze himself was aware of some of the connections I want to make. As Jason Demers (2011) 
has pointed out, Deleuze and Guattari actually met Dylan and Joan Baez backstage in 1975, and Deleuze 
would come to cite Dylan’s lyrics in an essay: “[A]s a teacher I should like to be able to give a course as 
Dylan organizes a song, as astonishing producer rather than author” (Deleuze quoted in Demers, 2011). 
Todd Kennedy (2009) has also interpreted Dylan using Deleuzian concepts, and his study focuses on 
images of the hobo and the nomad. Interestingly, however, I am arguing the exact opposite of Kennedy, 
who claims that “Dylan has consistently merged aspects of blues, country, and literary traditions, to invoke 
images of mobility that examine individual freedom in a world where technology, fragmentation, and 
homogeneity seem to result in a destructive dehumanizing of individuals” (2009, p. 37).  
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“faciality”—are meant to intrude, perhaps like a rolling stone, upon my charting of 
Dylan’s and Apple’s connections and divergences.    
4.2 Situating the Research  
 Much has already been written on Dylan. In fact, he has probably received more 
popular and academic attention alike than any other figure in the history of American 
popular music. Some good work has stood out, to be sure, particular attention having 
been paid to Dylan’s mastery as a lyricist and as a proto-performance artist (e.g. Boucher 
& Browning, 2004; Day, 1988; Dettmar, 2009; Marcus, 2005, 2011; Ricks, 2003; 
Williams, 1994). The objective of Lee Marshall’s (2007) Bob Dylan: The Never-Ending 
Star is perhaps closest to the current chapter’s mission, however, because Marshall tries 
to think historically about Dylan’s broader star text rather than simply amplifying the 
legend of his genius. Miller explores how Dylan’s work and Romantic star image has 
evolved alongside broader socio-cultural transformations, including intergenerational 
stratification and the formation of the counterculture. And Karl Hagstrom Miller’s cheeky 
piece “How to Write About Bob Dylan: A Step-by-Step Guide” (2011) is a call to arms 
for anyone interested in moving away from pure praise and towards writing about Dylan 
as a social and historical phenomenon. Particularly provocative is Miller’s suggestion that 
we connect Dylan’s turn from solidarity and towards individuality with the neoliberal 
turn that would follow on the heels of the sixties (Miller, 2011). In a sense, tying Dylan to 
Apple, as I do here, is one way of making this connection. Neither Marshall nor Miller 
pays attention to the place of media in Dylan’s work and star text, however, or to the 
influence he has had on mainstream digital culture, which will be my contribution.  
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 Apple and its brand’s connotations of rebellion and individuality have also been 
explored. Fred Turner has traced the changing meaning of computation in the wake of the 
“New Communalists,” the strand of the broader sixties counterculture that was more 
concerned with aesthetics than with political solidarity and class struggle, a story 
involving Stewart Brand, Whole Earth Catalogue, and Apple (Turner, 2006). And 
Thomas Streeter (2011) has explored the historical ties of Romanticism to contemporary 
digital culture. Although his primary focus is the Internet, he also discusses the 
microcomputer “revolution,” in which Apple played a key role (Streeter, 2011). The story 
I tell here overlaps with those told by Turner and Streeter. However, looking to media 
theory and to Guattari’s post-humanist aesthetics, and to Dylan, will give us a different 
way into this cultural-technological sediment. Both Turner and Streeter see technological 
determinism as part of the ideological dimension of personal computing (which conceals 
social structures and forces). Here, on the other hand, we will explore the “ideological” 
consequences of not being technologically determinist enough! Following John Durham 
Peters (2011), we will offer “two cheers for technological determinism.” 
4.3 “Folk” Dylan and his Media 
 Bob Dylan grew up in Hibbing, Minnesota, worshipping rock’n’roll stars and 
Hollywood rebels like Marlon Brando and James Dean. It was not until shortly before he 
briefly attended the University of Minnesota that he discovered folk music, quickly 
immersing himself in the genre’s conventions and canon. Drawn to the burgeoning folk 
scene in Greenwich Village, in 1961 Dylan dropped out of college and made his way to 
New York City, where he received a favourable review in the New York Times, which in 
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turn led to a record deal with Columbia. His first three LPs (Bob Dylan, The 
Freewheeling Bob Dylan, and The Times They Are A-Changing) drew heavily on aspects 
of the American folksong canon, and by his third album he had become known as a 
leading “topical” songwriter, who borrowed traditional chord patterns and harmonies but 
sang about contemporary political issues (Civil Rights in particular). Joan Baez, Peter 
Paul and Mary, and Pete Seeger all covered his material, and he was invited onto the Ed 
Sullivan show but refused to play (like a good protest singer) when they censored his 
song choice (“Talkin’ John Birch Society Blues”). Although the 1964 release Another 
Side of Bob Dylan irked many of the folk field’s Old Guard (Irwin Silber lambasted 
Dylan publicly for the apolitical direction he seemed to be taking), it was in 1965 that he 
most dramatically severed ties with folk and protest culture: he famously went “electric” 
at the Newport Folk Festival, where he had previously been hailed as the next Woody 
Guthrie, and as a writer he was increasingly working towards a more surrealist and 
“inner-directed” poetic vision. At least, these are a few of the signposts and events often 
discussed and repeated—ad nauseum, as Miller (2011) bitingly indicates—in both 
popular and academic accounts of Dylan’s career in the sixties. This is the story of Dylan 
that Jobs would come to love.28   
 According to Lee Marshall (2007), young Dylan’s songs already articulated an 
individualism that was at odds with the earlier proletarian folksong movement: “In 
Dylan’s work individual experiences have always been the most important thing” (p. 67). 
                                                




The point that Dylan constitutes a turn to individualism in the folk revival is also made by 
Hampton (1986), who is more moralistic in his evaluation:  
 After the 1960s, certainty gave way to ambivalence. In the lyrics of some of Bob 
 Dylan’s songs from this period the problems are buried in deep symbolism and 
 dark imagery. The answers were no longer obvious; they were merely ‘blowing in 
 the wind.’ The motives of the protest singer had become increasingly ignoble. … 
 The protest singer came to value his career and artistic integrity above the utopian 
 One. (p. 55) 
However, it seems to me that in the nascent star discourse enveloping the singer across 
his “folk” phase (c. 1962–1964), and in his own work during this time, Dylan himself 
seems variously positioned as both folk mouthpiece and individual stylist, roles and 
functions interestingly in conflict. In a Sing Out! feature published in 1962, Gil Turner 
discusses Dylan’s indebtedness to tradition, and his tendency to write new words but 
deploy old chord progressions and melodies. Turner (1972) quotes Dylan himself, who is 
modest in taking credit for his own work as an author: “The songs are there. They exist 
all by themselves just waiting for someone to write them down. I just put them down on 
paper. If I didn’t do it, somebody else would” (p. 25). Dylan seems to be more of a mere 
writer—or anamneusis (see Wershler-Henry, 2005)—than an author; he is a medium (the 
nineteenth-century spiritualist variety) for the anonymous contributions of a reservoir of 
prior creators. Dylan the inscription mechanism is without consciousness or agency (“If I 
didn’t do it, somebody else would”). He merely “[puts the songs] down on paper.” The 
folksinger seems to flirt here with Karl Marx’s notion of the general intellect—itself 
perhaps a materialist spin on the Grimm Brothers’ earlier conception of the anonymous 
“folk”—which spans generations and is a collective production. Dylan is the general 
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intellect’s secretary or paper machine. In a similar vein, one of his first compositions, 
“Song to Woody,” acknowledges that both the experiences of the poet, and his mode of 
representing them, have preceded him:  
 Hey, hey Woody Guthrie, I wrote you a song                                                                        
 ‘Bout a funny ol’ world that’s a-comin’ along.                                                        
 Seems sick an’ it’s hungry, it’s tired an’ it’s torn,                                                                                
 It looks like it’s a-dyin’ an it’s hardly been born.                                                   
 Hey, Woody Guthrie, but I know that you know     
 All the things that I’m  a-sayin’ an’ a-many times more. (Dylan, 1973, p. 5) 
According to this homage, the voice through which Dylan sings and the world it sings 
about have already been occupied and understood. Dylan’s might be a privileged position 
(though Woody “knows,” it is possible that the audience does not yet “know”), but it is 
nonetheless one that has been taken up before. The task of the writer and singer is 
explicitly to revive something that has already been, to channel a pre- or trans-individual 
awareness. 
 Of course, already waiting in the wings was the individual and his personal style. 
Dylan might draw on folk resources, and acknowledge these debts, but his reception 
seems to have been immediately split between this fact and the allegedly individual 
creativity and personal charisma of the rising star.29 The aforementioned Gil Turner 
article of 1962 is titled “Bob Dylan—A New Voice Singing New Songs.” A Robert 
Shelton piece in the New York Times from the same period, “Bob Dylan Sings His 
                                                
29 Marshall explores Dylan’s individualization as the work of the star system in general: “While Woody 
embodied the spirit of the folk, a personification of the multitudes, stardom offers something different. It 
utilizes stars as embodiments of social groups and types but it also valorizes the specific individuality of the 
star” (2007, p. 78).  
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Compositions,” remarks at how Dylan “breaks all the rules of song writing” (1972, p. 
28). Comparisons are drawn to Rimbaud and Yevtushenko, but the unique vision of 
Dylan is the primary theme: “Mr. Dylan’s words and melodies sparkle with the light of 
an inspired poet” (p. 28). Similarly, Sidney Fields (1972) in the New York Mirror 
explains that Dylan was once indebted entirely to his folk forbears, but that he now writes 
from within himself: “His songs always start as stories. When he was on the road he 
became a fine teller of other people’s stories. But he quit that. ‘Because Dickens and 
Dostoievski and Woody Guthrie were telling their stories much better than I ever could,’ 
Bob Dylan says, ‘I decided to stick to my own mind’” (p. 35).  
 It was not only journalists and folk gatekeepers who seemed variously to position 
Dylan in the antithetical modes described above. Dylan’s prose, pseudo-autobiographical 
piece “My Life in A Stolen Moment,” which was included in the program for a concert in 
1963, also seems conflicted. Recalling Jack Kerouac’s travelogues, the narrative follows 
a mythologized version of Dylan from his home in Minnesota through hitchhiking 
journeys across the United States; also recalling Guthrie, the text presents Dylan as a 
rugged individual in search of unique experiences (Marshall, 2007). But in the midst of 
the rugged individualist’s self-mythologizing he pauses to speak of his sources:  
 I can’t tell you the influences ‘cause there’s too many    
 to mention an’ I might leave one out       
 An’ that wouldn’t be fair       
 Woody Guthrie, sure        
 Big Joe Wiliams, yeah       
 It’s easy to remember those names      
 But what about the faces you can’t find again     
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 What about the curves an’ corners an’ cut-offs     
 That drop out a sight an’ fall behind       
 What about the records you hear but one time     
 What about the coyote’s call an’ the bulldog’s bark     
 What about the tomcat’s meow an’ milk cow’s moo     
 An the train whistle’s moan       
 Open up yer eyes an’ ears an’ yer influenced      
 An’ there’s nothing you can do about it (Dylan, 1973, p. 51)  
Dylan again frames himself as a transparent channel. The messages and the codes alike 
are derived not from his own inner genius, however, but rather from the complexities of 
modern life, made up of fleeting social experiences (“the faces you can’t find again”), 
ephemeral consumer culture (“the records you hear but once”), industry and technology 
(“the train whistle’s moan”), and even the non-human world (“the tomcat’s meow”). 
Dylan’s muse is an overflowing phylum of becoming-animal and becoming-machine, to 
which one needs only to open one’s eyes and ears in order to be “influenced.” There’s 
nothing you can do about it, he writes. Again, the folk poet is not the source but merely 
the sender.  
 These competing diagrams—collective reservoir versus individual rebel-genius—
would be subjected to varying degrees of tension in “folk” Dylan’s star discourse. 
Mainstream critics emphasized his eccentricities as a performer and his talent as a poet. 
On the other hand, the folk revival’s gatekeepers (Newport Folk Fest organizers, 
Broadside, Sing Out!) often preferred to emphasize his status as a mouthpiece of a larger 
cultural movement and tradition of protest. Consider Ronnie Gilbert’s introduction of 
Dylan at the 1964 Newport Folk Festival, a year prior to his “electrification”: 
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 They tell me that every period, every time, has its heroes, every need has a 
 solution and an answer. Some people—the press, magazines—sometimes think 
 that the heroes that young people choose lead the way. I tend to think that they 
 happen because they grow out of a need. This is a young man who grew out of a 
 need. He came here, he came to be as he is, because things needed saying, and the 
 young people were the ones who wanted to say them, and they wanted to say 
 them in their own way. He somehow had an ear on his generation. I don’t have to 
 tell you, you know him, he’s yours, Bob Dylan. (in Lerner, 2007) 
Dylan’s face and ears hover above, but only slightly above, an entire generation, which 
itself has written the poet into existence. Dylan’s very being is attributed to a collective 
need to speak in a new way. Somewhat paradoxically, Gilbert grants credence to a 
modernist reading of Dylan (this is a “new” way of speaking) while simultaneously 
locating his very innovativeness within social and cultural forces.  
 Despite the conflicted nature of his status as a writer in his early star discourse, as 
a performer “folk” Dylan’s relationship with media would remain relatively consistent. 
Much like many other stars across the history of American folk music, from Aunt Molly 
Jackson to Joan Baez (see Denisoff, 1971; Frith, 1981, 1986), “folk” Dylan c. 1962–1964 
was framed as dressed down, unaccustomed to the ways of the studio or to technology. 
For instance, a televised performance shot in Toronto in 1964 stages Dylan in a rustic 
cabin setting, performing (microphone not visible) to the card-playing lumberjacks and 
workers around him (see Wolman, 2012). Dylan seems to express his songs directly back 
to the people from which they have been derived. Tracking shots of the audience are 
interspersed with close-ups of Dylan’s pale visage, which is framed as the clear interface 
between the folk and their cultural heritage revisited.  
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 Similarly, at the beginning of his performance of “When the Ship Comes In” at 
Dr. Martin Luther King’s March on Washington in 1963, which was televised across the 
nation and a significant moment in “folk” Dylan’s star narrative (Hampton, 1986), a man 
in a grey flannel suit hurries over to adjust Dylan’s mike (see bbaaeezz, 2011). The 
technological apparatus and the “squares” that facilitate it seem to strain to capture 
Dylan’s sincere message. The performer himself seems unconcerned, however, with the 
medium. He appears not to notice the older soundman, focusing only on his (“direct”) 
communication with the audience. Voice of the folk or not, this is a face that does not 
need any tools. “[They] just happened to be there, that’s all.”    
 Of course, even “unplugged” Dylan was in fact reliant on a massive arsenal of 
machines as a creative worker, for since the advent of electric-amplification technology 
in the 1920s musicians have gone “electric” (Theberge, 2001). And yet, the mis-en-scene 
described above seems to lend the singer an uncanny ability to shoot through the techno-
infrastructures of studio recording and “live” performance alike. Thus “folk” Dylan can 
indeed be read with Simon Frith’s critique of folk ideology in mind. Frith (1981) saw an 
impoverished notion of immediacy in the folk revival, and here indeed the mediating 
effects of technology, industry, the star system, and consumer culture more generally are 
effaced from the presentation. It appears as though Dylan presents his voice in a face-to-
face, intimate setting for those about and for which he sings. And yet, he is a star, a 
commodity, recorded and transmitted by a massive and thoroughly industrialized and 
commercialized apparatus (Frith, 1981).30   
                                                





4.4 “Poet-God” Dylan and His New Tools 
 As already mentioned, Dylan famously moved away from his role as a voice of 
protest, which caused a furor with some of his earlier fans and friends (e.g. Joan Baez, 
Phil Ochs, and Pete Seeger, to name a few). Dylan’s turn was from broader social issues 
and towards the personal experiences of alienation and longing, from universal questions 
(e.g. “How many rows must a man walk down before you call him a man?”) to 
individualized and increasingly abstract experiences and perceptions (e.g. “Hey Mr. 
Tambourine Man, play a song for me”).31 The hopefulness that marked both the revival 
and Dylan’s early work was traded in for a more apocalyptic and tragic sensibility. “How 
does it feel to be on your own, no direction home, like a complete unknown?” he howls 
in “Like a Rolling Stone.” Or, “Let me forget about today until tomorrow,” he 
apathetically crows on “Mr. Tambourine Man.” It is more than coincidence that the 
Weathermen, who were part of the broader move in late-sixties activist circles towards 
violence and anarchism, took their name from a mid-sixties Dylan song: “You don’t need 
a weatherman to know which way the wind blows” (Marquesee, 2003).  
                                                
31 Silber’s (1972) early critique of Dylan emphasized his turn to individualism and cryptic imagery, which I 
echo in this paragraph. But this understanding of Dylan’s “turn” has become both a rallying point for rock 
critics who defended him and for literature scholars more recently. 
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 Irwin Silber (1972) called out Dylan early in an open letter (published in 1964, 
before his “electrification” at Newport), complaining not only that the singer who now 
travelled with an entourage had noticeably begun to remove himself from his listeners at 
concerts and festivals (which is what pop stars do, not folksingers), but also that his 
lyrics had abandoned themes of social protest in favour of an absurdist, existentialist 
philosophy. Silber (1972) echoes aesthetic debates in Western Marxism begun decades 
earlier (e.g. Adorno’s modernism versus Lukács’s social realism): “Your new songs seem 
to be all inner-directed now, inner-probing, self-conscious—maybe even a little maudlin 
or a little cruel on occasion” (p. 67).32 But those who defended Dylan’s changes did not 
fundamentally disagree with Silber’s observations. Paul Nelson, for instance, also in Sing 
Out!, lauded Highway 61 Revisited: “It is a highly personal style-vision: Dylan’s 
unyielding and poetic point of view represents a total commitment to the subjective over 
the objective, the microcosm over the macrocosm, man rather than Man, problems not 
Problems” (1972, p. 104). The disagreement was over whether or not existentialist-
absurdist poetry was itself of value, and over whether the songwriter was obliged (and 
able) to represent the world or only his self. 
 The transition from topical protest songs to surrealist poetry, and from acoustic to 
electric guitar, involves marked media-ecological shifts as well. As Simon Frith (1986) 
puts it: “By ‘going electric’ Bob Dylan embraced all those qualities of mass culture that 
the folk movement had rejected—stardom, commerce and manipulation” (p. 265). Dylan 
                                                
32 Lawrence Wilde (2004) has fascinatingly explicated Dylan’s “expressionist” period using the thought of 
Ernst Bloch and Adorno. See the edited collection The Political Art of Bob Dylan (Boucher & Browning, 
2004) for this and other interesting attempts to reconsider the political aspects of Dylan’s “anti-political” 
work.   
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traded in his folksy acoustic for electric Fender guitars; and, for the fogies at Sing Out! 
and Broadside, the problem of mediation was part of Dylan’s lamentable mid-sixties turn. 
As Dylan powered through his electric set at Newport ’65, Seeger cried for an axe so that 
he could cut the microphone cord (see Scorsese, 2005). In this distaste for Dylan’s new 
direction (the sheer noise, the indiscernibility of the linguistic articulation) we see an 
acknowledgment of, if also a wish to conceal, the materiality of technological media. The 
fuzzy weight of the medium was drowning out the first responsibility of the protest 
singer, that being the delivery of simple, comprehensible, and politically engaged 
messages (Ingram, 2008). Dylan was not paying enough attention to the receiving end in 
his new system.    
 For rock critics and fans—including Steve Jobs, who listened mostly to bootlegs 
of Dylan’s electric concerts c. 1965–1966, we are told (Isaacson, 2012)—noise was not a 
problem; it was just another signal.33 It too could be hermeneutically interpreted as the 
willful expression of the poet. As Nelson (1972) writes of Dylan’s new direction:  
 To put it as simply as possible, the tradition that Dylan represents is that of all 
 great artists: that of projecting, with the highest possible degree of honesty and 
 craftsmanship, a unique personal vision of the world we live in, knowing full well 
 that unless the personal is achieved, the universal cannot follow. (p. 104) 
The original ambiguity with respect to source (collective reservoir versus individual 
genius) seems here to be resolved. The source is Dylan, not the folk (Marshall, 2007). 
However, his relationship to his tools seems relatively unchanged. That is, they are mere 
                                                
33 According to Gracyk (1996), noise is a characteristic feature of rock aesthetics in general.  
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interfaces between the creator and the created, vessels of authenticity.34 Thus in 1965, 
when asked how he composes, he responds much differently than he had in his work shirt 
and jeans a few years prior: “Well, I just sit down and the next thing I know it’s there” 
(quoted in Shelton, 1997, p. 285). Although Dylan’s mid-sixties turn is often summed up 
as “plugging in” or “going electric”—both phrases which highlight a marked leveling-up 
of mediation—the electrified machines wielded by the artist are figured as extraneous 
extensions of his will. Whether Dylan is onstage with a shiny telecaster, or hunched over 
his typewriter (as he is seen doing in a memorable scene in the 1967 documentary Don’t 
Look Back), he seems to be transparently emitting his “uniquely personal vision.” “Think 
different,” as Apple will encourage us, ex nihilo.   
Feedback Squeal #1: “Discourse Networks” and “Faciality” 
 In Discourse Networks, Friedrich Kittler (1990) explores the Romantic literary 
culture on which Dylan’s mid-sixties image greatly draws (the lone innovator, who 
creates out of nothing but himself). Whereas in the “Republic of Scholars” texts endlessly 
referred to a circuit of other legitimated texts, the “Age of Goethe” was marked by novel 
relationships between inscriptions, souls, and voices (Kittler, 1990). Emergent 
Romanticism in the early nineteenth century tended to elide the materiality of the 
signifier; readers and authors were disciplined into understanding inscriptions as 
communing with the signified, as thus communing with content, the signified here often 
being the soul of the poet (Kittler, 1990). According to Kittler, this was a complex 
                                                
34 Here Dylan taps in to a larger discourse of electric guitar as sincere tool. According to Simon Frith 
(1986): “The guitarist became a symbol of rock because he (masculinity is a necessary part of the 
argument) communicates physically on stage even more obviously than the singer” (p. 268). 
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hallucination effected by a host of media and institutions. Via the process of universal 
alphabetization, readers were taught to interpret printed matter as the continuous, sensual 
handwriting of sensitive poets: “The great metaphysical unities invented in the age of 
Goethe—the developmental process of Bildung, autobiography, world history—could be 
seen as the flow of the continuous and the organic simply because they were supported 
by flowing, cursive handwriting” (1990, p. 83). Others have critiqued and historically 
situated the Romantic “author-function” (e.g. Barthes, 1977; Derrida, 1976; Foucault, 
1980), but Kittler emphasizes the role of media within historical configurations of 
authorship, in addition to institutions and practices: “The term discourse network … can 
also designate the network of technologies and institutions that allow a given culture to 
select, store, and process relevant data” (1990, p. 369).  
 This way of approaching media’s relationship to subjectivity is a contribution to 
the now centuries-old tradition of post-humanist thought. Karl Marx (1998) and Georg 
Lukács (1971) showed how liberal individualism was both created by and in the service 
of capitalist power structures. Freud (2002) analogously unseated the conscious subject 
by claiming that the ego is only a medium in the midst of a technically unknowable field 
of drives and traumas. In Kittler’s case, it is the technologies we use to record and 
transmit ourselves that have always already disrobed transcendental consciousness and 
self-presence. Subjectivity is a product of exterior others such as pens, phonographs, 
typewriters, film, and fiber-optic data streams. Indeed, Kittler’s periodization of media 
change since the Enlightenment is a narrative of increasing fragmentation and erasure, a 
tale of increasing post-humanization (which, despite the apocalyptic overtones, he seems 
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to take great pleasure in telling). The smooth handwriting of Romantic individuals is 
exploded by the new media of the late-nineteenth century:  
 Typewriters do not store individuals; their letters do not communicate a beyond 
 that perfectly alphabetized readers can subsequently hallucinate as meaning. 
 Everything that has been taken over by technological media since Edison’s 
 inventions disappears from typescripts. The dream of a real visible or audible 
 world arising from words has come to an end. (1999, p. 14) 
Digital convergence altogether erodes the distinctions between technological media; we 
cease even to be able to perceive the apparatuses that inscribe our histories, oblivious to 
all but the “surface effects” offered by the interface (Kittler, 1999). Yet, much like the 
Romantic author who obscures the reach and complexity of the discourse network that 
made him possible (which includes mothers, university professors, and literary 
pedagogies), our easy-to-use pointing and clicking that seems to command our operating 
systems obscures the underling material structures of the digital condition.35 We speak of 
software and of users, but there is only hardware, to paraphrase Kittler (1997).    
 If the discourse network of 1900 has consigned the Romantic author to the 
dustbin of history, as Kittler claims, what are we to make of its persistence in American 
culture, from the Beats, into the sixties counterculture, on through to contemporary 
digital consumer culture? Félix Guattari offers a concept which is compatible with 
Kittler’s “discourse networks” and which highlights the political stakes of materialist 
orientations towards media (which Kittler somewhat stubbornly refuses to pursue or even 
                                                
35 On the history and aesthetics of the Graphical User Interface, see Galloway (2012), Johnson (1997), and 
Munster (2006). Munster (2006) also uses Deleuze and Guattari to explore “interfacial” media art, though 
connections to Kittler are not made. 
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acknowledge). According to Deleuze and Guattari, “faciality” exists at the intersection of 
“subjectification” and “significance” in modern capitalist social formations (1987, 
p.167).36 It is a point of convergence, in a sense, between linguistic systems of order and 
the more embodied processes of discipline that Louis Althusser (2001) calls 
“interpellation.” Bundles of sensation and desire, widely varying strata of meaning and 
possibility, are crystallized via the constitution of individuated identities, which appear to 
us focused through the face. For the Marxist-Nietzschean Guattari, all is becoming and 
flux, but systems, signifiers, and disciplinary apparatuses pin down this anarchical, 
immanent movement—the face being one such marker of disciplinary inscription. Not 
false but not true either, neither natural nor inevitable, faciality is the condition of being 
marked as a being with a face, as an individual.  
 To think of the artifice of faciality is not to say that some groups do not have eyes 
or noses for organs, for example, but merely to think about the historicity of these 
markers: “Certain assemblages of power (pouvoir) require the production of a face, 
others do not” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 175; emphasis in original). Technologies of 
subjectivation go to work on heterogeneous strata of becoming, infecting not just faces 
per se but entire realms of code, from the couple to the family to private property: 
“Concrete faces cannot be assumed to come ready-made. They are engendered by an 
abstract machine of faciality (visagéité), which produces them at the same time as it 
gives the signifier its white wall and subjectivity its black hole” (1987, p. 168; emphasis 
                                                
36 As Genosko (2002) points out, Guattari explored the concept of faciality in The Machinic Unconscious 
(2011) before the idea was further developed in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (1987). 
However, I agree with Genosko on the point that worrying about which author came up with which idea is 
contrary to the spirit of their work.  
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in original). Thus the face for Deleuze and Guattari is a crucial focalization of power. 
Faces are not only regions of our flesh made to appear a certain way (i.e. ways of 
“reading” the self). They constitute arbitrary and contingent windows or ports: into “the 
soul” (or “unconscious”) and out onto an apparently ordered world. 
 In his excellent book on Guattari, Gary Genosko (2002) describes faciality as “a 
fundamental category of redundancy of the machinic unconscious” (p. 47), and we too 
can think of the concept in terms of information theory. If the entropic quality of group 
subjectivity pushes out and beyond individuals and their discrete bodies and minds, 
capitalistic faciality is the negentropic force that pushes back by cancelling noise and 
making meaning of our selves. In other words, faciality is the difference that makes a 
difference right between your eyes. And, just as cybernetic and information theorists 
Claude Shannon (1963) and Norbert Wiener (1950) sought to minimize the noisiness of 
channels, capitalist faciality abhors the parasitical hunger of the medium and the 
materiality of message-transmissions:  
 The investigation of the concrete role of faciality in capitalistic pragmatic fields 
 will only further highlight the absurdity of the path that consists in reducing 
 speech and language to a simple transmission of messages. This essay began with 
 the question: ‘how do we escape from language?’ But it is primarily through its 
 facial substance that language escapes itself, fleeing in all directions. Every 
 proposition only receives its social weight of truth insofar as a ‘service’ faciality 
 takes charge of it. Every segment of signifying discourse is a tributary of faciality 
 traits that ‘manages’ its morphemes, that supports them in relation with dominant 
 significations or deprives them of their sense (Guattari, 2011, pp. 83-84).  
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By reducing immanence to discrete, exchangeable units of expressivity, faciality 
presupposes a disavowal of material infrastructures (including our writing machines).37 
Faciality shores up the deep eyes of our sensitive poets, whose souls seem to pour out 
onto their blank pages or screens. 
 Although media make possible various modalities of capitalist faciality (Deleuze 
and Guattari cite the filmic close-up, but think also of the Facebook profile pic, or the 
smooth pens of the Romantic era explored by Kittler), for Guattari the disciplining of 
subjects is always an unstable affair. Technology is a key tool in the breaking-apart of 
molar subjectivations. On this point, Guattari parts ways with the airtight rigidity of 
Kittler’s framework (indeed, it could be said that the late German media theorist makes 
Althusser sound like Timothy Leary). For Guattari, faciality is a site of struggle:  
 Faciality then generates an optional micropolitical subject constantly moving 
 between two states: –that of facializing, globalizing, binarizing, phallicizing 
 forms in constant resonance with social roles and the capitalistic Imaginary; –that 
 of singular faciality traits which, on the contrary, are likely to interact with 
 machinic redundancies conveying new quanta of the possible while crossing the 
 faces, being connected to other singularity traits of all kinds, circumventing micro 
 black holes of anxiety and culpability. (2011, p. 77)  
Faces float like tethered balloons above heterogenous battlefields of hardware and data. 
But there are many faces, some of which, with the help of machines like performance and 
sound art, tactical media, or folk music, break past that individualizing triangle of nose, 
                                                
37 See Michel Serres (2007) for an exploration of noise and parasites that, like Guattari’s concept of 




eyes, and mouth (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).38 Literature and music for Guattari are 
important fields of possibility in the reclamation or generation of machinic facialities, 
which we will further explore below when we take on Dylan from another angle. But 
now for something completely the same.  
4.5 Steve Jobs and Capitalist Faciality  
 Jobs saw Dylan as a hero. According to his high-school girlfriend Chrisann 
Brennan, Jobs even spent time with a typewriter in a cabin in his late teens, rapturously 
pounding out his own versions of Dylan lyrics (Brennan, 2011).39 But his fan-boy love 
was not only about the music; he was also drawn to the artist’s image and brand. Jobs 
admired the way he appeared to move only in the opposite direction of the crowd:  
 One of my role models is Bob Dylan. As I grew up, I learned the lyrics to all his 
 songs and watched him never stand still. If you look at the artists, if they get 
 really good, it always occurs to them at some point that they can do this one thing 
 for the rest of their lives, and they can be really successful to the outside world 
 but not really be successful to themselves. That’s the moment that an artist really 
 decides who he or she is. If they keep on risking failure, they’re still artists. Dylan 
 and Picasso were always risking failure. This Apple thing is that way for me. I 
 don’t want to fail, of course. But even thought I didn’t know how bad things 
 really were, I still had a lot to think about before I said yes. I had to consider the 
 implications for Pixar, for my family, for my reputation. I decided that I didn’t 
                                                
38 As Gary Genosko (2002) puts it, “There are different kinds of subjectivity, but they are always of the 
group” (p. 75).  
39 His desire to be like Dylan even reached pathologically creepy proportions in the 80s, when he dated 
Joan Baez for two years (see Isaacson, 2012). 
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 really care, because this is what I want to do. If I try my best and fail, well, I tried 
 my best. (Jobs, 2011, p. 91) 
There are several clichés and truisms of the American entrepreneurial spirit running 
through Jobs’s self-mythologization. But the nugget that interests us here is the 
thoroughly modern distinction between the will of the artist and the will of all others 
(“the outside world”). Fans and followers and critics (“who prophesize with their pens”) 
are of no account in Jobs’s understanding of the creative self, and neither are the 
networks of techniques and technologies that cut across it. Jobs’s role model is not the 
highly differentiated recording industry that made Dylan’s mass reach possible, or 
Edison’s cylinder phonograph and its ancestors, or the noisy amps Dylan overdrove at 
Newport, or the typewriters he clacked away on in cars and above cafés (which might not 
have been surprising, given that Jobs was in the writing machines business), or the 
soundmen, or the groupies. It’s Dylan. “That’s Bob Dylan,” as he reminded his 
shareholders in 1984.  
 As if following a script written by Jobs, the outpouring of obituaries following his 
death in 2011 sought to understand the entrepreneur’s contributions in a Dylanesque, 
Romantic light. At the same time that Occupy Wall Street gathered momentum (which 
we will think more about in the next chapter), Jobs was admired for his talent, for his 
eccentric je ne sais quoi, and for his determination to change the world using only his gut 
as guide. In one of the more sycophantic remembrances, Michael Malone in The Wall 
Street Journal writes:  
 Every generation produces a few individuals whose will to restructure the world 
 in their own image is so powerful that they seem to distort reality itself. They 
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 change the world, not always for the better—and that in the U.S. they often 
 choose to pursue entrepreneurship and industry rather than politics is one of the 
 uncelebrated blessings of American capitalism. Mr. Jobs—who emerged from an 
 uncertain childhood brilliant, charismatic and charged with an ambition that 
 would make most mortals blush—is one of those figures, a fact recognized even 
 before he reached adulthood. As his fame and power grew, so did the reach of his 
 will. … He began that arc by willing the modern personal computer into 
 existence. (Malone, 2011, n.p.) 
The original Macintosh team consisted of dozens of artists, engineers and programmers, 
and at the time of Jobs’s death Apple employed thousands of collaborating thinkers, 
which is all aside from the fact that Apple definitely did not single-handedly “[will] the 
modern personal computer into existence” (see Friedman, 2005; Streeter, 2011). This is 
only to scratch the surface of a digital discourse network also involving coltan mining in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, manufacturing in the notorious Foxconn factory in 
China, the intellectual work of ad agencies, and the affective labour of sales and service 
representatives.40 Underneath the smooth handwriting that Jobs is thought to have 
scribbled across the IT industry we might consider the high-speed algorithms that motor 
trade and speculation (including of Apple stock) at lightning speeds; as Geert Lovink 
(2011) writes, “The autonomous western individual is delegating skills and knowledge to 
what Clay Shirky terms the ‘Algorithmic Authority,’ and instead of gaining power, this 
act of outsourcing only further weakens the subject’” (pp. 33-34). And yet, Jobs’s 
                                                
40 On the exploitative nature of global ICT production from various perspectives, see Taffel (2012), Dyer-
Witheford and De Peuter (2009), Gabrys (2011), Nest (2011), and Pasquinelli (2008). The serious game 
company Molleindustria (2011) has also explored these various levels of the digital discourse network in 




individualized, Romantic face is the “black hole” through which these complex systems 
are recognized as the simple expression of one talented man—a brilliant demigod who is 
encumbered neither by machines nor by trends but who pushes through his own will onto 
the noise of reality. As Jobs put it in the “famous” commencement speech he gave at 
Stanford, “don’t be trapped by dogma—which is living with the results of other people’s 
thinking. Don’t let the noise of others’ opinions drown out your own inner voice.” A new 
T-shirt with this poetry emblazoned across the front is only a click away. 
 It is not only Jobs who can write in this noise-cancelling manner. We can become 
like Dylan too with the transparent vessels of creativity Apple offers. The Romanticism 
of American computing does not begin with Jobs or Apple, as Thomas Streeter (2011) 
has explained in detail.41 But Apple has made particularly synergistic use of 
Romanticism, framing both the corporation itself and the tools it produces as conduits of 
immediacy (the former serving the artist Jobs, the latter serving the consumer). As far 
back as the original Apple logo, though it was soon abandoned in favour of the 
minimalist fruit image, we find an inscription by the Romantic poet William 
Wordsworth. The forgotten co-founder of Apple Ronald Wayne recalls:  
 They had hit upon using the name of Apple … And around the border I put in 
 the philosophical comment: ‘A mind forever voyaging through strange seas of 
 thought alone.’ Which of course comes from the Wordsworth sonnet. And that 
 line seemed to fit perfectly with the whole concept of this wonderful new 
 product. (in Welcome to Macintosh, 2008) 
                                                
41 Streeter fascinatingly connects the ideologies of Romanticism to the neoliberalist market fundamentalism 
of the 1980s. Yet, again, for Streeter Romanticism’s “blind spots concern social relations and historical 
context” (2011, p. 178), whereas I am moving here towards a more post-humanist and media-theoretical 
consideration of communication and subjectivity.  
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A mind thinking alone must be without collaborators or material agents of inscription, 
and this claim to transparency cuts across the whole history of their marketing 
campaigns, from the famous “1984” ad which frames the Mac as intuitive guerrilla 
weapon,42 to the “Think Different” ads, to the recent campaign featuring cool Mac Guy 
versus dully bureaucratic Windows Guy, through to recent product names (e.g. iGadgets). 
In addition to thought, however, we now voyage through the strange seas of sound and 
information alone, as Michael Bull’s (2007) fascinating study of the individualizing and 
isolating dimensions of iPod culture has made clear, and it is entirely appropriate that 
Dylan be called upon to appear in an iPod add, being Jobs’ appointed patron saint of 
solipsistic individualization. A television spot in 2002 nicely sums up this long legacy: 
“Mac OS10 gets out of your way, whereas Windows wants to constantly be in your face 
all the time” (EveryAppleAds, 2012). The Mac and its little cousins get out of your way 
so you can just be, voyaging alone, unencumbered by others or by anything: “I can’t hear 
you anymore.” 
  Apple’s extensive product-placement strategies and marketing campaigns over the 
past three decades make a complete account of the various meanings attached to their 
brand unwieldy; immediacy, individuality, and usability are recurring tropes. The 
Showtime comedy series Californication (2007–present) is worth brief consideration, 
however, because it takes writing and creativity as its primary themes and in many ways 
offers an exemplary representation of Apple products as vessels of authenticity. The 
                                                
42 It has not often been noted that the screen in the 1984 Macintosh ad is “hyper-mediated” (cf. Bolter & 
Grusin, 1999). Opaque data and numbers crowd the interface between the mindless crowd and the “Big 




show’s protagonist Hank Moody (played by David Duchovny) is a successful writer, 
whose first novel God Hates Us All was a darkly existentialist and erotic look at 
postmodern American life. He seems modeled after his Beat forebears, a television-ready 
pastiche of Kerouac, Dylan, and Archie Bunker. Like some of his antecedents, Hank 
drinks and fornicates excessively (though his “spiritual” connection with his daughter’s 
mother seems inviolable), pastimes which make writing difficult yet also constitute the 
necessary raw material for his inspired writing sessions. However, though the series 
follows the life of a creative labourer, we see Moody compose only a handful of times. 
He first breaks past his writer’s block on a trip back to New York City, which we do not 
witness, as he simply returns to L.A. with a manuscript completed over a two-week burst. 
In the second season, Hank agrees to write a biography of a record producer, which he 
seems to complete in a single sitting. The artist needs only to live authentically, which for 
Hank involves exceedingly heteronormative sexual adventures, and then it will all pour 
forth.  
 What kind of tool can facilitate this explosive reservoir of expressivity? On one 
hand, he seems decidedly analog. Hank complains of his daughter’s frequent cell-phone 
usage, throwing her device against the wall in a rage in one episode, and he finishes the 
rock producer’s biography on a typewriter. He offends a girlfriend by criticizing her use 
of IRC jargon (“BRB,” etc.), and in a flashback to the nineties, the time during which he 
was working on the novel for which he would become successful and famous, we see that 
he was working with an electric typewriter. He even composes a crucial bit of text on this 
machine: a love letter to Karen, who he has just learned is pregnant. Moody takes himself 
as a craftsman, and the mechanical sound and feel of the typewriter seems suited to this 
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self-image (see Wershler-Henry, 2005). The typewriter is between a tool and a machine, 
according to Martin Heidegger (see Kittler, 1999), but Hank’s vigorous and passionate 
clacking of keys seems to push the scales towards the former.  
 On the other hand, when he does need a digital channel for his irrepressible will-
to-expression, he is an Apple man. Hank reluctantly agrees to begin writing a blog about 
life in Los Angeles in season one, and he heads to an Apple Store to get suited up (an 
image of which is included in the show’s intro sequence). We see him lounging around, 
hung-over, in several scenes with his Macbook, and when his lover Karen moves back to 
New York it is through Apple products that they stay in touch. Alan Liu (2004) has 
explored the contemporary culture of “cool” in the immaterial workplace, and Hank fits 
right in: he is a constant critic of Hollywood filmmaking, he self-identifies as a vestige of 
integrity in America’s symbolic cultural wasteland, and yet we are happy to watch him 
grumpily sell his writings so that he can further fund his comic, hedonistic escapades. 
The crystal interface of the Mac makes it the exemplary writing tool for this author-
persona.  
 Ironically, when Hank’s literary agent and sidekick Charlie Runkle is digitally 
surveilled masturbating at work while surfing the internet (which leads to his humiliation 
and termination), Runkle’s Mac-like personal computer, with its smooth white curves, 
serves as his portal to the World Wide Web. But the Apple logo is nowhere to be seen. 
Real Macs are for being artists and perhaps for videophone pillow talk with loved ones. 
Aspects of the dark underbelly of digital culture (e.g. compulsive connection [Turkle, 
2011], circulation without communication [Dean, 2009], pornography [Pasquinelli, 
2008], and workplace surveillance [Dyer-Witheford, 1999]), are included because of the 
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comedic possibilities, but product placement seeks to escape such moments because they 
call Apple’s diagram of clear expressivity into question.  
Feedback Squeal #2: “Chaosmosis” and Machinic Faciality 
 In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari (1983) observe that “[d]esiring-machines 
work only when they break down, and by continually breaking down” (p. 8). Creativity is 
corralled by molar sinkholes like capitalist faciality but constantly de- and re-
territorialized by competing blocs and forces. The Cartesian ego, the Lockean labourer 
and communicator, and the Romantic author, for instance, are abstract machines of 
subjectivity that still persist in various discourses and fields but which are necessarily and 
constantly under threat. Cybernetics, anonymity, hacktivism, and tactical media are just a 
few domains wherein their ability to self-replicate has become compromised. Guattari 
emphasizes the role that material media theory can play in such micro-political processes 
of de- and re-subjectivation:  
 Just as social machines can be grouped under the general title of Collective 
 Equipment, technological machines of information and communication operate at 
 the heart of human subjectivity, not only within its memory and intelligence, but 
 within its sensibility, affects and unconscious fantasms. Recognition of these 
 machinic dimensions of subjectivation leads us to insist, in our attempt at 
 redefinition, on the heterogeneity of the components leading to the production of 
 subjectivity. (1995, p. 4) 
Guattari revels in the multiplicity of ways and possibilities of being. But his theoretical 
project is not about cancelling out false subjectivities in favour of the truest ones. Rather, 
the ethico-aesthetic projectiles he launches across his solo work aim to amplify and cross-
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pollinate our limits. Guattari’s theory is a bandwidth boost for collective forms of co-
existence and praxis.  
 Thus faciality (which we have seen function as an imprint of capitalist, serial 
individualities) is always already disintegrating. An “ethico-aesthetic” apprehension of 
the face, and the messages it sends, would look straight into the eyes of our sincere poets 
but see beyond them, straight down to the heterogenous, medial ground upon which the 
self can only seem to stand: “Neither the symbolic entry into the order of faciality nor 
transcendent symbolic facialities exist. Faciality can oscillate to the side of serial 
identification, but it can also operate on behalf of desiring machines” (2011, p. 76). In 
this spirit we can consider how Dylan, although he did so much, perhaps unwittingly, for 
our Macs’ GUIs, also helps us to “think different” for real. At least, let us give it a shot. 
4.6 Dylan’s Channels  
 One of the Mac’s key marketable features was usability: if you can point, you can 
use a Mac, some early ads said. The machine would not get in the way of your need to 
transmit. When Dylan turned away from protest songs his move was also away from 
meaning, and away from pointing. “There are no finger-pointing songs in here,” he said 
of Another Side of Bob Dylan. And, in 1965, he lampooned artists who would serve only 
as informational relays, a practice he had seemed to take pride in only a few years earlier: 
“Message songs, as everybody knows, are a drag. … What I’m going to do is rent Town 
Hall and put about thirty Western Union boys on the bill. I mean, then there’ll really be 
some messages” (quoted in Shelton, 1997, p. 287). 
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 Dylan’s mid-sixties songs indeed moved away from content (which both Dylan 
and McLuhan agreed was a drag) and towards the media that might carry them. We are 
repeatedly drawn to communication diagrams in which messages do not arrive, in which 
they joyously (sometimes anxiously) morph or mutate over the course of transmission. 
Machines of various sorts get in the way. In “Black Crow Blues” (1973) the speaker 
listens to billboards flapping in the breeze, his wrist without a watch but his nerves 
“kickin’, tickin’ like a clock” (p. 124). In “Chimes of Freedom” (1973) he is again tuned 
in to unlikely frequencies, shadows emerging from sounds and ringing chimes exploding 
into flashing lights. There seems to be no decipherable meaning in these synesthetic 
signals, however: “Through the wild cathedral evening the rain unraveled tales / For the 
disrobed faceless forms of no position / Tolling for the tongues with no place to bring 
their thoughts” (1973, p. 126). Dylan had championed the down-and-out in earlier songs; 
here he seems rather to champion the “faceless” and “disrobed” materialities of 
communication—the “tongues with no place to bring their thoughts” (tongues which 
must not have access to a Mac).  
 Similar images of channels, noise, and translation run through the three rock 
albums. In “Mr. Tambourine Man” (1973) laughter, spinning, and swinging are 
broadcasted but “not aimed at anyone” (p. 167) in particular. Tambourines, of course, are 
not the best conduits for songs; the speaker seems drawn rather to the thing itself, its 
jingle-jangle, which comes to pervade the entire landscape, even time (e.g. “your jingle-
jangle morning”). In “It Takes a Lot to Laugh, It Takes a Train to Cry” the narrator “went 




 Lights flicker from the opposite loft                                                                                        
 In this room the heat pipes just cough                                                                          
 The country music station plays soft                                                                            
 But there’s nothing, really nothing to turn off (1973, p. 207)  
The song as a whole is an appropriately obscure meditation on interpretation. How are we 
to receive information? It is clear that to focus on the sending of signals from point A to 
point B is sometimes to veil the possibilities of becoming, because there’s nothing to turn 
off—no signal, only the medium itself, coughing, flickering, getting in the middle. In the 
strange but stunning final stanza, “the harmonicas play the skeleton keys and the rain / 
and these visions of Johanna are now all that remain” (1973, p. 208). Thinking back to 
“folk” Dylan’s “A Hard Rain’s Gonna Fall,” his poetic voice was once in self-present 
control: “And I’ll tell it and think it and speak it and breathe it” (1973, p. 39).43 By 
1966’s Blonde on Blonde, however, the poet’s Romantic face and voice seems to have 
splintered out into a constellation of sources and secret channels.  
 Sending, receiving, and noise are frequent motifs throughout Dylan’s mid-sixties 
period. In terms of general stylistic shift, we can also consider how the typewriter 
imprinted itself across his work.44 Darren Wershler-Henry (2005) has explored 
typewriting as a modern technological assemblage. Connecting typewriting discourse to 
                                                
43 When poet Allan Ginsburg recalled hearing Dylan for the first time, he remembered this line in 
particular; he claims to have cried because he recognized that a younger generation was carrying on the 
torch of the Beats (in Scorsese, 2007).  
44 I have found varying accounts as to how Dylan composed into his rock period. Clinton Heylin (2009) 
claims that Dylan would continue to write primarily with a pen or pencil, using a typewriter only to revise. 
This does not seem supportable to me, going by the first-hand accounts of Baez and Robertson cited below. 
Regardless, images of Dylan at a typewriter began to circulate increasingly into his rock/“poet-genius” 




Paul Virilio’s thoughts of modernity as a “dromocratic revolution,” he explores how 
authors like Jack Kerouac and William Burroughs explored new registers of both 
discipline and play—the will-to-speed being a central feature of typewriting culture 
(Wershler-Henry, 2005). The speed of typing runs wild through Dylan’s rock work as 
well. His folksy syntax famously explodes into often-illogical jumbles of images and 
rhymes, a move for which we might give the typewriter equal credit. Indeed, Truman 
Capote’s snide description of Kerouac’s work (“That’s not writing, it’s typing”) applies 
equally to Dylan’s “electrified” material; one can almost picture the keys clacking along 
with the raucous opener of Bringing it All Back Home: 
 Johnny’s in the basement         
 Mixing up the medicine       
 I’m on the pavement       
 Thinking about the government       
 The man in the trench coat        
 Badge out, laid off        
 Says he’s got a bad cough        
 Wants to get it paid off        
 Look out kid         
 It’s somethin’ you did        
 God knows when        
 But you’re doin’ it again       
 You better duck down the alley way     
 Lookin’ for a new friend       
 The man in the coon-skip cap       
 In the big pen          
 Wants eleven dollar bills        
 You only got ten  (1973, p. 160) 
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The machinic propulsion of Dylan’s cadence pulls us away from any referents and 
towards the signifiers themselves, which is the mark of the typewriter according to Kittler 
(1999) and Wershler-Henry (2005). Rather than the individual poet reaching into his 
genius to express a poem, the song seems to be written (and sung) by a machine, the poet 
in turn having become only a typist.  
 The face of the typewriter looks a bit different than the face of the Romantic poet. 
Whereas “folk” Dylan claimed to have used a pencil to take down the songs already 
waiting for him, consider Joan Baez’s description of Dylan’s new assemblage:  
 Bob stood at the typewriter in the corner of his room, drinking red wine and 
 smoking and tapping away relentlessly for hours. And in the dead of night, he 
 would wake up, grunt, grab a cigarette, and stumble over to the typewriter again. 
 He was turning out songs like ticker tape. (quoted in Heylin, 2001, p. 169; 
 emphasis added) 
The integrity of the finished poem is discarded here in favour of an endless reel of letters 
on pages: “i will nail my words to this paper, an fly them on to you. an forget about 
them…thank you for the time. youre kind” (p. 11), as he puts it in his “novel” Tarantula 
(1971), which was written in the mid sixties but not published until 1971. As has often 
been the case in typewriting culture, this machinic process makes who or what is actually 
writing difficult to discern (Wershler-Henry, 2005). As the liner notes of Highway 61 
Revisited conclude:  
 I cannot say the word eye any more. . . . when I speak this word eye, it is as if I 
 am speaking of somebody’s eye that I faintly remember. . . . there is no eye—
 there is only a  series of mouths—long live the mouths—your rooftop—if you 
 don’t already know—has been demolished. . . . eye is plasma & you are right 
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 about that too—you are lucky—you don’t have to think about such things as eyes 
 & rooftops & quazimodo. (1973, p. 182) 
The integrity of the singular subject, who reaches into his soul for his poems, is shattered 
at the hand of this new appendage. No longer just one voice, he now seems to be a hydra-
headed many, with no use for “I”/eyes any longer (which is fitting given that, as Kittler 
[1999] has explained, typewriters were initially designed for the blind). It is also fitting 
that Dylan describes his de-territorialized subjectivity as “a series of mouths”: he would 
also refer to the draft typescript of “Like a Rolling Stone” as “a long piece of vomit” 
(quoted in Heylin, 2009, p. 240). 
 Some descriptions of Dylan typing manage to position the machine as just another 
tool. Consider Robbie Robertson’s (2004) description of Dylan’s writing process:  
 When he and I went to Nashville in 1966, to work on Blonde on Blonde, it was 
 the first time I’d ever seen a songwriter writing songs on a typewriter. We’d go to 
 the studio, and he’d be finishing up the lyrics to some of the songs we were going 
 to do. I could hear this typewriter—click, click, click, ring, really fast. He was 
 typing these things out so fast; there was so much to be said. (p. 66) 
Like Hank Moody or Kerouac or Steve Jobs, Dylan’s integrity as discrete and soulful 
subject above remains intact, the typewriter being only a spigot hanging off his 
wellspring of creativity. But one of Dylan’s most iconic performances on film 
interestingly problematizes this model, lending credence to my reading of him as typist. 
In D. A. Pennebaker’s cinéma vérité documentary Don’t Look Back (1967), the film 
opens with a proto-music video of “Subterranean Homesick Blues.” Dylan appears in the 
middle of an alleyway holding a stack of cue cards (Allen Ginsberg and Bobby Neuwirth 
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appearing to chant to the side, behind a garbage bin). The white cards contain text of 
nouns and phrases delivered over the course of the song (but not the entire work, and not 
always accurately transcribed). As the music plays, Dylan silently drops the cards, 
struggling to keep up with the beat, often falling behind. This ghostly presentation of 
material textuality and speed emasculates the poet of both his voice and hand. The song 
seems to write itself, the phrases and lines interchangeable just like any one key or 
inscription surface on a typewriter. Dylan’s cool face seems cloudy and impenetrable 
here; he is only plugged into a series of mouths and machines, along for the ride.45   
4.7 Conclusion 
 We have seen a few different versions of Dylan: the folk channel of collaborative 
ancestors, the expressive individual, and the media-materialist schizoid assemblage. 
Steve Jobs understood Dylan’s face as a window between Dylan’s own brilliance and a 
public struggling to catch up. This Dylan’s connection with transparent vessels of 
creativity was translated (even if it was not the only source) into Apple’s rhetoric of 
microcomputers as tools of personal liberation. Yet, by putting Kittler and Guattari to 
work on some perhaps unlikely texts, we have seen that there are other ways of 
downloading Dylan’s output in the sixties. Dylan the typist’s ego seeped out towards the 
margins of the page, revealing his other faces to be only glitches.  
                                                
45 Others have discussed Dylan’s theatricality as a star and as an artist (see Cossu, 2012; Marshall, 2007; 
Shank, 2002; Williams, 1994). Indeed, his current popular image—as articulated in Todd Haynes’s film 
I’m Not There (2007)—is of a consummate performance artist. But “machinic faciality” moves us away 
from these dramaturgical readings. As Guattari (2011) puts it, “it is not legitimate to bring faciality back to 
a theatrical mask, as the Etruscan etymology of ‘persona’ would wrongfully result in doing. This would 
suppose that a profound, authentic, originary, inalienable faciality would continue to exist behind this 
superimposed masks” (p. 81).   
136 
 
 So aside from Jobs and his smooth white gadgets, we could consider other 
descendants of Dylan and his typewriter. Perhaps reminding us of Dylan’s poor reception 
in Newport’s garden of the folk (he was booed there, after all) Molleindustria’s highly 
critical app Phone Story (2011) was banned from the App Store within a few hours of its 
posting. “Let me tell you the story of this phone while I provide you with quality 
entertainment,” the game begins. The player gets to: point semi-automatics at children 
toiling in a coltan mine; save suicidal Chinese factory workers, who have jumped from 
the top of the Foxconn factory to their deaths, with a trampoline; launch shiny 
commodities at zombie-like consumers who charge your store; and, finally, recycle the 
materials on a dangerous assembly line before it all plays over again on account of built-
in obsolescence. Pete Seeger only cried out for an axe. Apple, on the other hand, had one 
ready, and they cut the cord. But there are deeper parallels between Dylan and 
Molleindustria, for Phone Story too refocuses our attention away from clear 
transmissions and towards the meat and grime on the thing itself, including 
manufacturing and marketing work, but also the algorithmic pleasures we derive from 
digital games. Molleindustria’s tactical media interventions are much more overtly 
political than Dylan’s rock records (these games are akin to what Dylan called “finger-
pointing songs”). Still, both Dylan and Phone Story foreground the channel and the 
desiring-machines below our only apparently clear interfaces. This in itself is often worth 





Chapter 5 – The Hootenanny, Smule Apps, and the Folk 3.0 
 Our planet is full of singing people. (Pete Seeger, 1972, p. 149) 
 Smule’s mission is to connect the world through music. (Smule, 2012a)  
 The best song, you don’t even have to yell it—you just double up your fists, roll 
 up your sleeves, and thump it out on any convenient silk hat. (Woody Guthrie, 
 1975, p. 139) 
5.1 Introduction 
 It has been tempting, for fans of folk music, to celebrate the creative possibilities 
afforded by Web 2.0 as a sign of the resurgence of something like a folk revival. Despite 
Google’s monstrous position in the global information industries, the collaborative and 
DIY aesthetic of some corners of YouTube seem to hearken back to the authorless folk 
body as influentially articulated by Johann Gottfried Herder or the Brothers Grimm in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (see Burgess & Green, 2009). Some American 
folklorists in the early twentieth century were interested in the aspects of performance 
that cannot be documented by writing or by print—Alan Lomax, as I have explored 
above, prophetically envisioned folk music as an embodied and multi-media 
experience—and digital networks would also seem to be an ideal channel for the 
interactive folk process Lomax described. At long last, after the false start that was 
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television, we have Marshall McLuhan’s (2003) “global village” for real: folkloristic 
authenticity as a byproduct of digital convergence culture.46  
 Many scholars and journalists have taken the bait.47 David Dunaway (2010), for 
instance, has divided the history of folk revivalism in the United States into three periods. 
His first wave lumps together a wide range of collectors, researchers, and activists, from 
ethnographers who documented Aboriginal languages and cultures with their cylinder 
phonographs in the late-nineteenth century to the more overtly political and 
propagandizing efforts of Alan Lomax, Woody Guthrie, and Pete Seeger in the thirties 
and forties. Next is the “folk boom,” which featured the mass-commercial success in the 
fifties of the Weavers and then the Kingston Trio, which then blossomed in the early to 
mid sixties with the national coverage of the Greenwich Village scene, the Newport Folk 
Festival, and the folksong-fueled Civil Rights movement (Dunaway, 2010). Happily, the 
folk revival has returned again, according to Dunaway, beginning in the late eighties and 
early nineties, and the World Wide Web has been a key source of the new varieties of 
folk expression recently on offer: “They are pulling out songbooks or warped records 
from their parents’ folk revival, learning to play an instrument or two, and then 
performing for their Myspace friends or the virtual audience” (2010, p. 4). Dunaway 
(2010) cites a Rolling Stone article from 2007 that dubs this the “YouTube Folk Revival” 
                                                
46 Indeed, understandings of digital media as somehow fostering a return to a participatory or folk culture 
have become cliché. More famous examples of such positions include the work of Henry Jenkins, Howard 
Rheingold, and Lawrence Lessig.  
47 And, amazing if we consider the vicious debates over the meaning of authenticity that have unfolded 
across its pages (see Bendix, 1997), the Journal of American Folklore has recently begun to publish work 
on video games and net culture as objects of folklore. Kiri Miller (2008) has recently explored the 
folkloristic qualities of the game Grand Theft Auto, and Robert Glenn Howard (2008) has pondered the 
vernacular aspects of digital networks, taking blogging as a case study.  
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(p. 4), which is defined by a reliance on networked personal computers. With guitar and 
social media in hand, anyone (at least anyone with a webcam, computer, and internet 
connection) can interpret any song they like and contribute to an ongoing and apparently 
organic process.  
 One could consider the developer Smule’s popular line of iPhone apps as part of 
this neo-folk media constellation. Their products—including Ocarina, Ocarina 2, Magic 
Piano, IAMTPAIN, and Sing!—allow users to transform their sleek gadgets into 
expressive and simple instruments, ironically using complex algorithms and Artificial 
Intelligence to do so, often foregrounding the voice of the user as a key component of 
recombinant musical texts. Smule apps seem to answer Woody Guthrie’s call to his 
fellow citizens that they must, and inevitably will, soon remember how to sing; they 
allow us to join together in song by fostering digitalized reincarnations of our most 
“organic” and “timeless” instruments of all, our voices.  
 I want both to problematize and to more deeply explore the narrative that 
Dunaway and others have constructed of the digital return of the folk. By travelling from 
the late thirties to the present, this chapter is going to excavate a couple of different 
models of communication that can be found littered across the long, intertwining histories 
of folk revivalism and digital culture in the United States. First we will examine the 
Hootenanny, initially a form of rent party made popular in New York City in the 1940s 
by the group the Almanac Singers. We will see that the Hootenanny (and the ideals that 
were attached to the concert format) constituted a complex site of convergence of a range 
of interests, styles, media, and performance genres. However, for the Almanacs there 
were explicitly political aspirations at stake as well; the Hootenanny constituted a 
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machinic, networked body through which bourgeois distinctions, it was believed, were 
challenged. Second, I will explore how the utopian vision of a community joined in song 
has also been taken up recently by Ocarina, Sing!, and other Smule iPhone apps. 
Drawing on the critical literature on “prosumption” as a novel form of exploitation, 
however, as well as Jodi Dean’s work on politics in an age of “communicative 
capitalism,” I will ultimately consider how the techno-authentic mediation idealized by 
the Almanacs has trickled down to a narcissistic will-to-be-“in touch” in mainstream 
digital culture.  
 This will not only be a tragic story of incorporation, however, or a lament for the 
good old days of the “face-to-face” folk revival. In the third and final section, I will draw 
connections between the Hootenannies of the Almanacs and the more recent “People’s 
Microphone” of the Occupy movement. Because public address systems were banned in 
Zuccotti Park, New York City, where thousands gathered in the fall of 2011 to protest 
skyrocketing political and economic inequalities in the United States, occupiers utilized a 
collective means of amplification that involved the repetition by a crowd of individual 
statements (and, sometimes, songs). I read the People’s Microphone as a site where the 
communicative dreams of the folk revival have been reimagined and repurposed. 
Building on but slightly departing from other scholars who have argued that the 
popularity of the People’s Mic marks a return to orality in our contemporary media 
ecology (King, 2012; Ruby, 2011), I will attempt to read the performance insofar as it 




5.2 The Hootenanny 
 The word “Hootenanny” came to Pete Seeger and Woody Guthrie in the late 
thirties, when the two were touring the country together, playing union rallies and 
anywhere else they could get a quarter or two. The trip is often cited (by himself, and by 
critics and biographers) as an important educational experience for Seeger, who was the 
younger and more inexperienced of the two; this is where Seeger is thought to have 
learned how to win over potentially hostile audiences, which anticipated his ceaseless 
drive to perform for all who would listen (see Dunaway, 1981; Seeger, 1972). But there 
was another important discovery to be made on this tour: in Seattle they found 
themselves playing a monthly political fundraiser that their hosts called the 
“Hootenanny.” According to the Oxford English Dictionary, Hootenanny’s pre-revival 
meaning was “thing-u-ma-jing” or “gadget”—a playfully pragmatic catchall with 
technological connotations. Thus even in this early incarnation in Seattle, the word 
prefigures elements of digital networks. All sorts of practices and activities could be 
transmitted through an all-encompassing frame of celebration: food, music, camaraderie, 
causes, etc. The Hootenanny was a “downhome” channel of convergence.   
 The connection of “Hootenanny” with folk and leftwing musical expression was 
somewhat accidental, as we can perhaps imagine Guthrie and Seeger finding any number 
of other semi-archaic terms to employ, such as “pod,” which shares a similar 
etymology.48 But nonetheless the word would soon become attached to parties and 
                                                
48 According to Apple folklore, the “pod” of “iPod” was inspired by Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space 
Odyssey (which in its time also expressed an anti-IBM theme). But one of pod’s archaic meanings is “the 
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concerts held at the “Almanac House” in Greenwich Village, New York City. The 
residents there, which included Guthrie and Seeger, began to hold “Hootenannies” on 
Sundays when they were short on rent, and the events soon became popular, festive 
events where many notable folksingers and performers might drop by on any given 
weekend, such as Alan Lomax, Aunt Molly Jackson, and Lead Belly. But the “Almanac 
Singers” who lived there were perhaps the mainstays. Featuring a revolving membership 
that included Guthrie, Seeger, Sis Cunningham, Lee Hays, Gordon Friesen, and Millard 
Lampell, the Almanac Singers embodied the turn to nativism in left-wing American 
cultural politics in the mid to late thirties (Cohen, 2002; Denisoff, 1971; Reuss, 2000). As 
both Serge Denisoff (1971) and Ronald D. Cohen (2002) have recounted, the Composers 
Collective had earlier in the thirties tried to prod “the masses” into class-consciousness 
using European avant-garde forms; but in the wake of the Lomaxes’s efforts, and broader 
shifts in Soviet cultural policy, we have the Almanacs, who were committed to using the 
language and music of the American “folk” (as they saw it) to spread their gospels of 
solidarity and class warfare.49 As Robert Cantwell describes their style: “None was a 
trained singer. Accents, phrasing, vocal timbre, and range, all mixed, both among the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
socket of a brace into which the end of a bit is inserted” (Oxford English Dictionary). Fascinatingly, 
Gordon Friesen’s recollection of the original usage of “Hootenanny” points in a similar direction: 
“Hootenanny had been in use in rural America from way back to designate something you didn’t know the 
exact name of. Say, for example, a couple of farm boys in Oklahoma might be overhauling a ‘T-bone Ford’ 
out behind the barn with pieces spread all around, and in fitting them back together one might say to the 
other, ‘that thing-a-ma-jig goes here and that hootenanny goes there’” (Cunningham & Friesen, 1999, p. 
211).  
 
49 They did, however, abandon this pacifist commitment in the latter stages of their existence, after Adolf 
Hitler broke his non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union. Many on the left in the United States decided 
to come together and join in the struggle against fascism—the idea being that they would deal with class 
struggle after the war (Denisoff, 1971; Reuss, 2000).  
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singers and with each individually, with a disarmingly unprofessional heterogeneity that 
drew on a number of flatly incompatible traditions” (1996, p. 140). The Almanac 
Singers’ Hootenannies, then, were embodiments and extensions of this eclectic, 
heterogeneous performance ideal. Folksingers, comedians, activists, and storytellers were 
all welcome, and the audience too was expected to join in on the choruses or even take a 
turn leading the group.  
 But what exactly happened at these parties? What did they signify? How did they 
feel? Scholars of the folksong movement such as Cantwell are working with unreliable 
remembrances and a long-simmering process of mythologization when they write about 
the Almanac’s Hootenannies, because the fleeting events went mostly undocumented. In 
the fifties, Folkways did release two LPs of “Hootenannies,” but these live recordings 
were made long after the disintegration of the Almanac House in the mid forties, after 
which “Hootenanny” concerts in New York had begun to grow in size and had become 
more of a brand associated with a particular group of performers and friends than a 
distinctly participatory concert format (Roy, 2010). Eventually the word “Hootenanny” 
found its way to magazine covers, Hollywood teen films, and an ABC television series; 
as Ronald D. Cohen (2002) describes the craze: “‘Hootenanny’ became attached not only 
to a show and countless records, but also sweat shirts, pinball machines, shoes, paper 
dolls, even vacations and Ford dealerships; the New Jersey’s Palisades Amusement Park 
had a Miss Hootenanny contest” (p. 200). But even if the original Almanac Hootenannies 
are misremembered or idealized, and even if the signifier eventually all but emptied 
itself, we can take the Almanac-era utopian idea as a ritualized model of communication: 
knowledge and culture not as a point-to-multipoint transmission (which is the 
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characteristic process of the mass-media industries, as the Almanacs themselves were 
well aware) but as a multipoint-to-multipoint interaction.50 For instance, in the liner notes 
to the Folkways record Hootenanny at Carnegie Hall, Sing Out! editor Irwin Silber 
(1960) lists essential features of the performance form: “(1) Audience participation; (2) 
Topicality; (3) Variety; (4) New performers; (5) The audience” (pp. 2-4). Silber’s 
descriptive topography of the Hootenanny posits a diverse, collaborative, self-replicating 
structure (“authentic” but also sensitive to new historical events and new generations, as 
is evinced by “topicality” and “variety”). The Hootenanny was a distributed network that 
involved the dynamic circulation of knowledge and affect across audience members, 
performers, and songs. The Almanacs have been critiqued for effectively “preaching to 
the choir” (Denisoff, 1971; Roy, 2010), but in theory anyone could plug into the circuit. 
Indeed, as is the case with more recent digital networks, the more connections the better.  
5.3 Voices as Machines: weHootenanny Technology 
 I want now to think more deeply about the media ecology within which the 
Hootenannies were situated. Was this a garden of intimacy, a face-to-face homage to the 
already-eroding public sphere? Popular music scholars have pointed to the valuation of 
“live” performance by the mid-century revivalists (e.g. Frith, 1981; Keightley, 2001). As 
I have explored above, however, there are interesting moments where the long revival’s 
                                                
50 In his book When We Were Good, Robert Cantwell (1996) approaches similarly Bakhtinian territory: “It 
was a music of symbolic social leveling but not, as the federal agent supposed, one of social control. Quite 
the contrary: the audience had in effect been invited to one of the Almanacs singing hootenannies or rent 
parties, where people often widely divergent socially—upper class and working class, Jewish and gentile, 
black and white, easterner, southerner, and westerner—put these distinctions aside in a spirit of festive 
mutuality in a space apart from the quotidian world of social mistrust, suspicion, resentment, and conflict. 
This was a manifestly popular or people’s music …” (p. 142). 
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ideals of immediacy and “liveness” disintegrate. Alan Lomax fetishizes his sound-
recording machines (and the mainframe computers he worked with later in his career) at 
times richly and provocatively in his writings. He even works towards a productive yet 
anomalous understanding of digitalization in the context of early-nineties cyberculture. 
And Pete Seeger’s understanding of the folk process is grounded in a media ontology that 
John Durham Peters (1999) has described as dissemination: folk-musical expression 
involves not the intimate fostering of dialogue, in other words, but the broadcasting of the 
mediatized seeds of the folk.  
 The Almanac Singers too, as well as the topical songwriting movement more 
broadly, considered singing to be a hybrid media form. The “Almanac” in the group’s 
name refers to the only book, aside from the Bible, that rural Southern families were said 
to have kept in the house (Wilkinson, 2009).51 The group was a living text, then, a 
remediation of collective, singing struggle with the printed word. As well, Phil Ochs’s 
(1964) formulation “all the news that’s fit to sing”—which sums up the broader topical 
songwriting movement of the sixties, inspired by the Almanacs—figures oral expression 
through the parameters of print and writing.52 Topical songwriters were aiming their 
voices (qua newsprint, qua radio broadcasts) at the noises emanating from states and 
corporations. In this light, the voice is not a pre-modern relic of nature, then, but a wired, 
                                                
51 As the group themselves put it, “a farmhouse would have two books in the house, a Bible and an 
Almanac. One helped us to the next world, the other helped us make it through this one” (quoted in Farell, 
1997).  
52 Broadside was spearheaded by former Almanac Singers Agnes “Sis” Cunningham and Gordon Friesen, 
who believed that Sing Out! was not giving enough attention to the burgeoning topical songwriting 
phenomenon (“topical” songs used folk melodies and chord structures but lyrically explored contemporary, 
often political, issues). To name just a few, the magazine amplified the pens of Malvina Reynolds, Phil 




greased, loaded gun. As Woody Guthrie put it, “a song will shoot straighter than a long 
bore 32-20, and do more damage than the biggest cannon” (1990, p. 83). 
 A closer consideration of Guthrie, co-founder of and frequent participant in the 
Almanacs’ Hootenannies, can further extend our image of the early Hootenanny 
participants’ complex understandings of media. Although the photographs we have of 
him portray a wandering field worker, and though he tended towards Luddite sentiments 
in some of his early writings,53 Guthrie also occasionally explored the remediation of folk 
instruments within distinctly modern media ecologies.54 In keeping with the progressive 
spirit of the times, he famously labeled his acoustic guitar a fascist-killing machine. But 
the voice and the body also occasionally seem to be components within a larger system. 
For instance, in his “Car Song” Guthrie revels in the experience of speed that derives 
from plugging into an automobile, his voice even playfully mimicking a motor in the 
chorus: 
 Take me ridin’ in the car, car        
 Take me ridin’ in the car, car        
 Take you ridin’ in the car, car       
 I’ll take you ridin’ in the car       
                                                
53 When wearing his Luddite hat, it is usually deskilling and the unemployment stemming from automation 
that are Guthrie’s biggest problems with technology. As he writes of film and sound recording, for 
instance: “One or two preferred folks get on the screen or on wax or on the air—and hole flocks go 
without” (1975, p. 126).  
54 Billy Bragg and Wilco’s Mermaid Avenue collection, which involved the artists reimagining unrecorded 
Guthrie lyrics composed during the fifties primarily in New York City, has allowed for a reconsideration of 
Guthrie’s far-ranging interests as a writer (see Fischer, 1999). Initiated by Guthrie’s daughter Nora Guthrie, 
who oversees the Guthrie archive in New York City, the albums include work that would perhaps have 
surprised an earlier generation of Guthrie fans (Fischer, 1999). In “Ingrid Bergman,” for instance, he uses 
thinly veiled metaphor to probe his sexual desires for the famous film star: “Ingrid Bergman, you're so 
purty / You’d make any mountain quiver  / You’d make fire fly from the crater, Ingrid Bergman” (Guthrie, 
1998). Guthrie here perhaps anticipates audience studies and reception theory.   
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 Vroom vroom vroom vroom vroom vroom      
 Vroom vroom vroom vroom vroom vroom (Guthrie, 1999) 
The “natural,” “organic” voice of Guthrie seems to rev and idle, in between the verses, 
evoking the larger American desire for gasoline-fueled adventures and experiences.55 
And, although Guthrie’s “This Land is Your Land” probably still connotes images of 
rural pastures of plenty, the song is also full of machines and speed: 
 As I was walking a ribbon of highway      
 I saw above me an endless skyway       
 I saw below me a golden valley      
 This land was made for you and me       
 … I’ve roamed and rambled and I've followed my footsteps  
 To the sparkling sands of her diamond deserts    
 And all around me a voice was sounding     
 This land was made for you and me  (Guthrie, 1999)  
The voice of the song does refer to his feet, as if he is walking across the United States of 
his own volition. But Guthrie also gestures towards “that ribbon of highway,” which was 
relatively new at the time; as Robert Cantwell sensitively describes it, “the ‘ribbon of 
highway’ and ‘endless skyway’ owe much to Firestone Tires, Pan American Airways, 
and Life magazine, during a period when America’s celebration of itself could include, 
without contradiction, its technological and commercial monuments” (1996, pp. 137-
138). We must also wonder if the voice “sounding” all around him is a face-to-face 
Hootenanny or rather the radio broadcasts bouncing their way across the nation. 
                                                
55 Although he does not discuss “Car Song,” Cantwell (1996) also identifies the importance of the car in the 
Almanac Singers’ work and image: “The most important instrument in this effort was the automobile—the 
Almanacs travelled in a ’31 Buick—and after it the portable recording machine” (p. 144).  
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Guthrie’s friend Alan Lomax hosted his own programs on a handful of networks 
beginning in the late thirties, and Guthrie too performed on dozens of radio programs in 
the thirties and forties, both with the Almanacs and as a solo performer, including on 
Norman Corwin’s famous We the People (see Cray, 2011). “A voice was sounding” 
perhaps refers to both the live and the mediated. Or, perhaps here the distinction does not 
matter.  
 Considering the range of technological connotations attributed to the voice in 
Guthrie’s writings, it is perhaps worthwhile to approach the Hootenanny as a 
“diagrammatic” or “abstract machine” as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have 
described it: “The diagrammatic or abstract machine does not function to represent, even 
something real, but rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality” 
(1987, p. 142). Machines for Deleuze and Guattari include technical practices and 
devices, but also anything that works; recalling the original meanings of both “pod” and 
“hootenanny,” dynamic and adaptive abstract machines can be plucked from one 
structure and inserted into another. They can harmonize with a set of strata or break 
through them entirely: 
 Either the abstract machines remain prisoner to stratifications, are enveloped in a  
 certain specific stratum whose program or unity of composition they define (the 
 abstract Animal, the abstract chemical Body, Energy in itself) and whose 
 movements of relative deterritorialization they regulate, Or, on the contrary, the 
 abstract machine cuts across all stratifications, develops alone and in its own right 
 on the plane of consistency whose diagram it constitutes. (1987, p. 56)   
Abstract machines are assemblages that help account for change and revolution in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s framework. Whereas the “flows” of history can be drawn into any 
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number of striations and sedimentations, abstract machines can disconnect and make 
themselves available for other uses.  
 There is a similarity between Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of “machinic 
faciality” and the more general abstract machine. The diagrammatic machine, in 
particular, is not a clear channel directly transmitting disembodied content, nor is it an 
immediate conveyor of unmediated authenticity. Diagrammatic or abstract machines are 
rather an affront to the cybernetic dream of homeostatic, noise-free informational circuits: 
“transformations that blow apart semiotics systems or regimes of signs on the plane of 
consistency of a positive absolute deterritorialization are called diagrammatic” (1987, p. 
136). Wrenches in the structures of the present, diagrammatic machines produce glitches 
and noises that point towards new ways of being (cf. Serres, 2007). 
 Anticipating Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of diagrammatic machines, Guthrie 
vividly represents the machinic character of group singing in his pseudo-autobiographical 
novel Bound for Glory (1968), which he largely pounded out—on a typewriter, letting the 
pages fall where they may—at the kitchen table of the Almanac House during the period 
that the Hootenannies were first held in New York. The novel is a Kunstleroman of sorts 
about a folksinger who makes his way out of the Oklahoma dustbowl during the 
Depression, on the way discovering the power of song in social struggle. “Good” 
communality is not simply distinguished from “bad” structures of commerce or 
individuality, however, for Guthrie portrays a complex social and cultural battlefield. 
Across the opening pages, for instance, we see a violent and chaotic form of collectivity. 
Bodies and the train cars that carry them seem to mingle together, and yet the wanderers 
and ramblers have not yet found a connection: 
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 We looked like a gang of lost corpses heading back to the boneyard. Hot in the 
 September heat, tired, mean and mad, cussing and sweating, raving and 
 preaching. Part of us waved our hands in the cloud of dust and hollered out to the 
 whole crowd. Others was too weak, too sick, too hungry or too drunk even to 
 stand up. The train was a highball and had the right of way. (1968, p. 9)  
Guthrie vividly portrays a latent mass not yet sensitive to its collective potency and 
without a common language or channel. Hands wave into the dust and voices “holler,” 
useless, into the crowd; seeds scatter but none seem to find their way to fertile ground. In 
a striking passage later in the book, we are offered a performance of collectivity and 
connectivity that sharply contrasts with this earlier representation of pre-political 
virtuality, and it is the establishment of a common channel and code that is the 
transformational catalyst. A group of anti-racists confronts thugs and tormenters by 
standing and singing together:  
 So as the last car of the train went on down the middle of the street, everybody 
 was singing like church bells ringing up and down the grand canyon of the old 
 Skid Row: 
  Just like         
  A treeeee         
  Standing by         
  The waterrr         
  We          
  Shall not         
  Be          
  Moooooved! 
  The whole bunch of thugs made a big run at us sailing cuss words of a 
 million filthy, low-down, ratty kind. Gritting their teeth and biting their cigar butts 
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 and frothing at the mouth. Everybody on our side kept singing. They made a dive 
 to bust into our line. Everyone stood there singing as loud and as clear and as 
 rough-sounding as a war factory hammering.  (p. 356)  
Thus the machine that kills fascists is much more than the exterior “axe” that is the 
acoustic guitar. Voices and bodies can meld and conjoin, too, forming a throbbing and 
propulsive “war machine” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), a steely rhizome of sonic 
solidarity.  
 The performance of Guthrie’s “This Land is Your Land” carries a similar 
affective weight. “All around me a voice is sounding,” when sung by a mass of people, is 
a performative statement (Austin, 1962)—one hears and sings, and thereby propels into 
being, a collective voice.56 Some sound scholars have suggested that there is no such 
thing as an “original” sound, because sounds always also include the material in which 
they resonate (e.g. a room, an open space), and materials are always experienced 
differently depending on one’s point of view (Altman, 1992; Lastra, 2000). In other 
words, because we are all stuck in our own, individualized cages of audition, there can be 
no “original” sound to speak of but only an endless variety of interpretations, of which 
sound recordings too can only ever be an interpretation or reading (Lastra, 2000).57 But 
Guthrie imagines a different kind of singing and hearing, whereby it is possible, if even 
for a moment, for everyone to hear and sing more or less the same thing. Sounds are 
indexical imprints, in Guthrie’s utopian model of sending and receiving, they are circuits 
                                                
56 I am indebted here to Homay King’s (2012) article on the People’s Mic, which he also describes using 
Austin. 
57 Drawing on a Derridean logic, sound scholar James Lastra (1992) rhetorically asks, “Is it ever possible to 
be present at the original event, fully?” (p. 82). Lastra has never been to a Hootenanny.  
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that can wrap together “a gang of lost corpses” into a collective agent. It is the 
diagrammatic machine called the Hootenanny that makes real this “impossible” way of 
hearing and singing. “All around me, a voice was sounding.” 
 The Hootenanny was not just a machine of pure and undivided union, however, 
for the form constitutes a utopian voice marked by both solidarity and multiplicity. 
Obviously the harmony of group singing was a key feature of political folk performance 
(see Roy, 2010), but variety and even conflict also marked the Hootenanny as practiced 
by the Almanacs and as taken up by Broadside and Sing Out! Both folksong magazines 
positioned themselves as purveyors of the tradition begun by the Almanacs, but both 
often emphasized their commitment to the publication of writers and singers whose views 
conflicted with those of their editorial boards. As issue no. 2 of Broadside declaimed: 
“Our policy is to let each songwriter speak freely—even though we may not freely agree 
with the sentiments expressed—and let each song cut its own trail” (Broadside, 1962, p. 
7). Thus the Hootenanny form, which was indeed translatable from performance to print, 
involved both solidarity and multiplicity. Indeed, you might have to sing along to 
something you do not like. To do so, for the folkies, seemed important in and of itself.  
5.4 Smule Apps 
 We turn now to some of the revival’s unlikely heirs. Jeff Smith and Dr. Ge Wang 
founded the mobile apps developer Smule in 2008. Their objectives hearken back to the 
participatory and DIY ethos of the long American folk revival, which, starting with the 
small Hootenannies at the Almanac House’s basement, tried to encourage the whole 
world to sing. According to the company’s homepage: 
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 Smule’s mission is to connect the world through music. With the premise that 
 everyone is creative, Smule uses the magic of technology to liberate the 
 expressive musician in everyone. Smule’s award-winning applications include 
 Magic Piano™, I Am™ T-Pain, and Ocarina.  (Smule, 2012a) 
Anyone can sing or play music. At least, we should all try. Indeed, with Smule software 
and iPhone in hand, many have done just that, for as of January 2013 Smule claims to 
have 15 million active users (Caplan, 2013). The revival’s mimeographed publications 
like Sing Out! and Broadside tried to make folk knowledge accessible (the magazines 
offered sparse chord charts for the most recent batch of topical songs, and often published 
the compositions of amateurs and unknowns), but Smule goes one step further by 
eliminating technique insofar as it is possible to do so without compromising the feelings 
of expressivity and virtuosity that can come from playing music. As Anthony Ha (2012) 
has described Wang’s vision: “When someone opens a Smule app, he says they shouldn’t 
ask themselves, ‘Am I a musician?’ because the answer is usually no. Instead, the goal is 
to draw people in, then by the time they realize they’re making music, ‘it’s too late — 
they’re already having fun.’” 
 Indeed, their programs are responsive and intuitive. The Ocarina and Ocarina 2 
apps turn your phone into something akin to a medieval pipe. The user blows into the 
microphone, directing the pitch by pressing various combinations of fingerings on a four-
button touchpad. Magic Piano works similarly but with obvious differences in sound 
samples and interface. The user touches falling notes on the screen (a cascading visual 
which matches the song’s rhythm, not unlike musical games such as Guitar Hero or Rock 
Band) to recreate the central melodies of well-known hits. And Sing! harnesses the voice, 
allowing you to sing along to contemporary chart-toppers, pop and rock classics, and 
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even public domain “folk” songs. Traditional numbers like “Twinkle Twinkle Little Star” 
are free, but you need to pay to participate in the folk process of material such as Justin 
Bieber’s “Girlfriend.” 
 The clear expressivity of Smule apps hearkens back to certain aspects of the folk 
revival, but so too does the machine-like quality of some of the programs. IAMTPAIN, 
Songify, and Autorap all deploy the encoding device “Autotune,” which has increasingly 
been used since the late nineties to foreground the digital ground of contemporary 
popular music. Users can record observational monologue or improvisational singing 
(you could even recite Guthrie lyrics), and IAMTPAIN, Songify, or Autorap will carve up 
and manipulate the recorded speech or song into rhythmically and harmonically pleasing 
(and often humorous) music, foregrounding the computational motor of the process.58 A 
new app called Mad Pad even blends this recombinant mashup aesthetic with the art of 
field recording as pioneered by Alan Lomax: “Remix your life with MadPad! Turn 
everyday sights and sounds like your car, an empty soda can, or your friends into the 
ultimate percussive instrument. Who would have thought everyday life could be so 
musical?” (Smule, 2012b). Field recordings become samples to be remixed at the 
discretion of the folklorist-cum-deejay. Guthrie sang like a car, echoing the delirious 
proclamations of Tomas Marinetti and other Futurists but from within a Marxist 
framework, and Smule’s folk revival also allows us both to sing into, and as, the 
machine.  
                                                
58 The technology behind Autotune has a fascinating source in the military-industrial complex, in particular 
the oil industry, as Dave Tompkins’s (2010) history of the vocoder has recently highlighted. Jonathan 
Sterne (2013) has also recently presented work on this strange history. 
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 In addition to sound and feel, though, a key connection between the Hootenannies 
and Smule apps are the latter’s various sharing functions. Ocarina allows you to drop in 
on anyone on the planet currently logged in and jamming in real time. You are given a 
visualization of their current location, and also the opportunity to “love” their 
performance, which is as easy as clicking on a heart-shaped icon. The accumulated total 
of “love” is then tabulated and displayed. On the theme of “social” music, Wang boasts 
of the revolutionary potentialities of his instrument:  
 We use location to geo-tag people who have recently played the Ocarina; we can 
 actually send that anonymously to the Smule cloud, as it were, and it’s the first 
 instrument that we know of in history that allows its players to hear one another 
 from around the world. … We believe this is just the beginning of a new 
 revolution, where people will relate to one another differently and people will 
 express themselves differently, all facilitated by what we can do on this device. 
 (in Kirn, 2009) 
And more recent Smule apps do not just allow you to toot your own horn or merely 
admire the tooting of others; you can now play with other anonymous folk through 
collaborative cloud networks. Sing Karaoke, for instance, allows multiple vocalists each 
to contribute a line or even just a phrase to their favourite tune, and the collaborative 
product can then be enjoyed and shared by all. On Smule’s Facebook page, where an 
enthusiastic virtual community gathers to like and respond to recent promotions and 
contests, users have shared and commented on Sing! recordings featuring up to twenty 
collaborators. Each individual contribution recorded on the way to work, perhaps, in 
bedrooms, at recess: “All around me, [voices] sounding.” 
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 As we have begun to see, there are obvious echoes of the Hootenanny in the 
music-making mobile software of Smule. But Pete Seeger’s (1972) observation, “our 
planet is full of singing people” (p. 149), was for Seeger an implicitly political remark. 
To reclaim individual and collective voices would be to reject the “phoniness” churned 
out by the military-industrial-entertainment complex. Smule apps might seem to rekindle 
the promise of the original Hootenannies, at which distinctions between observer and 
participant were cast off, but we will now consider a few different ways in which Smule 
apps are an effect rather than a revolutionary cause—an articulation of a relatively new 
form of work, and of the degradation of political culture, in the era of cognitive 
capitalism. 
5.5 Composition or Repetition? 
 In his book Noise, political economist Jacques Attali (1985) explores the 
overdetermined relationship between our historical understandings of music and noise, on 
one hand, and social and economic change and revolution, on the other. Music for Attali 
is not just a reflection of particular socio-economic forces, though it is in some senses 
that as well; music—and more importantly, what a musical culture excludes as noise—
also signals towards new social potentialities. The emergent bourgeois notion of the 
hermetically sealed work helped to prepare the ground from which the ancient regime 
would eventually be toppled (Attali, 1985). And the “stockpiling” of labour time in the 
twentieth century, which is how Attali figures sound recording, pushed capital towards 
new horizons of surveillance and commodification (Attali, 1985). The concluding and 
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ambiguously utopian chapter explores what Attali terms the age of “composition,” which 
he describes as:  
 Doing solely for the sake of doing, without trying artificially to recreate the old 
 codes in order to reinsert communication into them. Inventing new codes, 
 inventing the message at the same time as the language. Playing for one’s own 
 pleasure, which alone can create the conditions for new communication. (1985, 
 p. 134) 
We might be reminded of Smule apps and the “YouTube folk revival” in general when 
we read Attali’s utopian prognosis. Although self-branding and promotional culture 
pervade social networking sites and platforms like Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, or 
Academia.edu (Hearn, 2008), many of Smule’s virtual communities seem to be forums of 
anonymous folk creation. Faceless flutists and singers going by the names of prem, 
fatsausage, pimpflute, Link, (anonymous), montreal, Marco, Emelie, PBMike15, sword, 
Thanatos, unicorngiggle, RIPLeRoiMoore, and PressTheHeart are just a few of the nodes 
that cut across this rhizome. They do not seem to be playing for recognition, but because 
they enjoy being creative for its own sake, or “doing for the sake of doing.”   
 But the hardware underneath the magical music-making Ocarina and its phylum-
mates is always ready for more (or perhaps less) than “composition”: iPhones are only 
ever a swipe or a click away from becoming once again the tethering gateways to a 24/7 
immaterial workplace, as some neo-Marxist scholars have described it.59 As the modern 
disciplinary boundaries between factory and home, public and private erode, exploitation 
                                                
59 Vince Manzerolle (2013) has also recently explored the complex dynamics of mobile “smart” phones in 
the post-Fordist workplace, though from more of an Innisian perspective.  
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reaches beyond the assembly line to subsume virtually all corners of social life (Dyer-
Witheford, 1999; Hardt and Negri, 2000). Franco “Bifo” Berardi (2009) has aptly 
described this confluence of exploitation and creativity with his term “cognitariat,” and 
mobile communications are important vectors across which “cognitariat” subjects 
generate and share the affects and knowledges captured by cognitive capitalism:  
 Labor is the cellular activity where the network activates an endless 
 recombination. Cellular phones are the instruments making this recombination  
 possible. Every info-worker has the capacity to elaborate a specific semiotic 
 segment that must meet and match innumerable other semiotic fragments in order 
 to compose the frame of a combinatory entity that is info-commodity, 
 Semiocapital. (Berardi, 2009, p. 89)  
From this angle, Smule apps appear as merely the folksy mask of the larger mobile 
interface keeping us in constant contact to the endless streams of data many are required 
to sort through in order to be valuable contributors on the informational labour market. 
Guthrie’s machine killed fascists, and Seeger’s surrounded hate and forced it to 
surrender. Now, the mobile, individualized pods carrying Ocarina and Sing! circulate 
value-generating affects, symbols, codes, and communication.  
 However, these instruments are not only happy distractions to keep flexible 
immaterial labourers amused in between calls or jobs. Like many applications and 
platforms that make up Web 2.0, Smule apps can also be considered as sites of value 
extraction. As Christian Fuchs (2010) has put it, “[c]apitalist produsage is an extreme 
form of exploitation of labour that the producers perform completely for free” (p. 48), 
and the uncountable hours anonymous users have spent building and sustaining Smule’s 
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network would be an example of the “produser” exploitation Fuchs describes.60 As the 
Smule privacy agreement makes plain: 
 Smule shares demographic, profile and other general information about you and 
 our other customers with our partners on an aggregate basis. This means that we 
 tell our advertisers general information about the characteristics of our customer 
 base. … Smule may share your unique device ID with advertisers or your 
 location (based on opt-in location-based services, which rely upon a device’s GPS 
 coordinates). (Smule, 2012c)  
Smule apps are part of the broader cultural industry of social networking, where 
creativity, communication, and collaboration are all surveyed and mined for aggregate 
data. The song collectors John and Alan Lomax shared in Leadbelly’s copyrights, and 
took two thirds of his haul at concerts (Filene, 2000; Miller, 2010). Thus Smule 
participates in a long tradition of American song collectors’ exploitation of the folk. 
“YouTube Folk Revival” indeed.  
5.6 The Politics of the Chorus 
 We could say that the Almanacs’ Hootenannies actually anticipated the 
contemporary “prosumer”: the audience was expected both to pay and to sing along, to 
plug into a participatory network and derive pleasure both from the network itself and 
from their own contribution. And, again, both the Hootenanny and the iPod share similar 
etymologies. But clearer differences emerge when we go back to the idea of singing as a 
                                                
60 Fuchs is pointing to the term “prosumer,” which was coined by the futurist Alvin Toffler (1981).  
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diagrammatic machine, for the Hootenanny and Smule apps constitute materializations of 
very different utopian visions.  
 In Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies, Jodi Dean (2009) describes 
“communicative capitalism” as “the materialization of ideals of inclusion and 
participation in information, entertainment, and communication technologies in ways that 
capture resistance and intensify global capitalism” (p. 2). Of particular interest is Dean’s 
discussion of technological fetishism and the transition of communication from the 
sending of messages (with destinations) to the endless circulation of “contributions.” 
Political action is as easy as pointing and clicking, liking and sharing, but these activities 
are harnessed by capital and in turn reconsolidate the grip of neoliberal policies, 
according to Dean. As Geert Lovink (2011) more simply puts it in his similarly sobering 
account of social media: “When everyone broadcasts, no one is listening” (p. 7).  
 Eavesdropping on a live “jam” by an Ocarina user nicely highlights some of the 
claims Dean makes. We are confronted with a clean, pixelated image of planet Earth 
(perhaps recalling the Whole Earth Catalogue, whose cover ported an image of the 
“whole wide world”). Glowing in the background are all the other active users, tiny dots 
scattered across the planet; we audition one performer at a time, whose live musical 
expressions are visualized as waving streams (think Ghostbusters) shot straight out 
through the atmosphere and into space. Yet, the colourful stream of “social” music 
emitted by each Ocarina player is not intended for the other nodes in this strangely 
solipsistic network, it seems, or even for the eavesdropper. (Ocarina 2 has removed the 
other nodes from view entirely.) Its target is the process of contributing as such, and in 
the visual representation of this folk machine we see the peculiar synthesis that is 
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networked communication and narcissistic individualism. “All around me, voices 
sounding / Away from each other / Directly up into outer space!” Ocarina players are 
hyper-connected to an online community boasting 15 million users: a virtual Hootenanny 
to end all Hootenannies. But it is not possible for their broadcasts to take root, which is 
the ideal end of the folk process, according to Seeger and Guthrie. It is not possible for 
their broadcasts to be translated into other forms of embodied solidarity, which the 
program itself fascinatingly narrates. Ocarina players’ contributions are by and for the 
medium—folksongs by and for spectacle itself.  
5.7 The People’s Microphone 
 Jodi Dean’s description of communicative capitalism posits an apathetic political 
culture constrained by the very circuits and networks that capture and transmit value 
across the globe; the ability to resist or revolt is disarmed by the informational 
apparatuses of communication and consumption. But some Autonomist Marxists—
though their analysis of the ability of “Empire” to biopolitically control and capture 
laboring subjects parallels Dean’s—prefer simultaneously to emphasize the potentialities 
of new media to push beyond the logics and axioms of high-tech capital. For instance, 
inspired in part by the anti-globalization movements that swelled in the late nineties, Nick 
Dyer-Witheford’s (1999) Cyber-Marx explores two sides of our digital ecology. On one 
hand, informational networks enable capital to more flexibly mobilize and surveil 
resources and labour in the interests of further surpluses (Dyer-Witheford, 1999). 
Drawing on Antonio Negri’s work, however, Dyer-Witheford identifies another tendency 
in new media cultures. Because capital in the post-Fordist epoch of “immaterial labour” 
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goes to greater and greater lengths to capture human sociality and creativity, alienation 
and political action are productively (if unpredictably) mashed together in an emergent 
subject: “Surveying the scope of … dissident media activity, it appears that capital, in 
developing its media apparatus, has let the genie out of the bottle. … On occasion 
corporate control can be interrupted and spaces opened within which a multiplicity of 
social movements, all in different ways contesting the dominance of the market, can be 
connected and made visible to each other” (p. 121). Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
(2000) describe this political body as “multitude”: a networked, carnivalesque machine 
that necessarily contests and spills over the ways in which globalized capital tries to 
deploy it.  
 The Occupy Wall Street Movement was seen by some to be an excellent example 
of the wired multitude in action (e.g. Dean, 2011; Hardt & Negri, 2011). Edged on by 
knowledge of the revolts that made up the “Arab Spring,” and by the Canadian anti-
consumerist magazine Adbusters, a group assembled in New York City on September 17, 
2011, to protest Wall Street as the symbolic center of twenty-first century capitalism run 
amok. After being diverted by the NYPD to the privately owned Zuccotti Park, protesters 
set up camp, and news of the occupation began to spread via social networking sites, 
mobile phones, and word of mouth. Soon this brief intentional community began to erect 
makeshift institutions, including a library, health clinic, the famous “general assembly,” 
and a drum circle (see Taylor & Gessen, 2011). Within weeks, most of the United States’ 
major networks and newspapers were covering the occupation, which eventually began to 
spread across North America to other cities, even to London, Ontario.   
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 One aspect of Occupy Wall Street’s political structure that received media 
attention was the “People’s Microphone.” A pragmatic response to restrictions on P.A. 
equipment in Zuccotti Park, the People’s Mic involved a group of people joining together 
to relay a message from one speaker to the surrounding audience. The closest audience 
members would chant a repetition of the message, which would then echo outwards to 
other circles, an active process which continued depending on the size of the group. 
According to Ryan Ruby (2012), this performance of communicative solidarity marks a 
willful return to orality as famously explored by Walter Ong and Marshall McLuhan:  
 These are not merely strategic responses to a contingent situation (laws 
 prohibiting amplified sound) or tactics retrofitted to a particular geography 
 (NYC’s financial district), they are indicative of developments in something much 
 larger, the history of communication itself. The People’s Mic and the Occupy 
 hand signals will one day come to be regarded as paradigms of politics in a post-
 literate age.   
In addition to the People’s Mic, Ruby lists SMS, Twitter, and live streaming as 
articulations of the integrated, wholesome “post-literate” paradigm of communication 
that Occupy embodies. Focusing on the experiential and sonic dimensions of the 
performance, Homay King (2012) has also explored the solidarity-engendering properties 
of the People’s Microphone as a form of performative communication: “Through 
collective speech, the people’s mic shifts away from sovereign, solitary personhood” (p. 
239). King does not rely on Havelock or Ong, as does Ruby, but he nonetheless traces 
this way of speaking back to the Ancient Greek chorus. King recognizes the intersection 
of the People’s Mic with digital and broadcast media: “To be sure, state-of-the-art 
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technology can help move things along” (p. 239). Still, there is something wholesome 
and primordial about the act of speaking together, according to King.  
 King and Ruby identify aspects of the People’s Microphone that have resonated 
for both journalists and academics. We have already begun to see connections, too, with 
the Hootenanny, in particular the foregrounding of interconnection and solidarity via 
performative ritual. But the approach offered by McLuhan’s and Ong’s work on “post-
literacy” misses, perhaps, a dimension of the diagrammatic structure of the People’s Mic, 
which is its function as an abstract machine. According to Friedrich Kittler (1999), the 
digital epoch involves not a humanistic return to orality but rather the end of media as 
such; Jodi Dean (2010) runs with this idea in her description of blog and online-
discussion culture as an “endless loop.” Much commentary on the People’s Mic, 
however, has failed to confront these insights. Ruby and King both emphasize the “old” 
quality of the medium; it hearkens back to the pre-literate poets of Ancient Greece, 
harmoniously transplanting healthy democracy onto our networked culture. Conversely, 
others have imported an unsubtle digital utopianism into their analysis. Douglas Kellner, 
for instance, sees the Occupy movement as a whole as a mirror reflection of potentially 
liberating digital technologies: “In using new media and social networking, the Occupy 
movements had the same decentralized structure as the computer networks they were 
using” (2012, p. 240). Either the People’s Mic constitutes a longing for embodied orality, 
or else it is part of a virtual, “decentralized” triumph. My question is: How does the 
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performance called “The People’s Mic” both mimic and break beyond the circuits Jodi 
Dean describes?61     
 The People’s Microphone of Occupy is not just an example of decentralized 
resistance or a promising expression of post-literate awareness. It is an abstract machine 
that imagines a circuit in which endless circulation, contribution for contribution’s sake, 
is not the telos of communication. Thus in addition to the social dreaming that fruitfully 
emerged from the broader Occupy event, we can perhaps also see the emergence of a 
different way of conceiving of signs and signals, channels and faces. In particular, the 
Mic’s ritualized way of speaking revels in the indexical relationship between both 
sources and destinations; speakers bound up with the circuit experience reception at the 
same time that they are obliged to retransmit the broadcast. The endless circulations of 
communicative capitalism momentarily find an efficient and functional end in the 
analogue machinations of multitude. Whereas the “endless loops” of communicative 
capitalism echo upwards and away, the transductive punch of the People’s Mic rather 
moves across and down—into both the bodies and the throats of the nodes that must 
momentarily lend themselves to the distribution, which have a decidedly narrow 
bandwidth.  
 This reimagining of the relationships joining words, bodies, and social realities 
(which should also remind us of Guthrie’s vivid portrayal of singing struggle) also was 
interestingly articulated on the “We Are the 99 Percent” Tumblr blog. The site featured 
                                                
61 Dean has not written much about the People’s Microphone in particular (although she did make a speech 
through it [see Taylor & Gessen, 2011], or anything about the connections between Occupy and the folk 
revival, but she has recently written on Occupy’s rupturing of communicative capital (see Dean, 2011).   
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an almost endless array of photos of individuals holding hand-written signs explaining 
their particular situations. On November 23, 2011, for instance, an image was posted of a 
middle-aged man in glasses and black tee-shirt holding a sign that reads: “I AM 
DISABLED AND LIVING ON SOCIAL SECURITY, FOOD STAMPS, and 
MEDICAID. I AM THE 99%” (We Are The 99 Percent, 2011). To date, five hundred 
and thirteen notes (i.e. “likes,” re-bloggings, and comments) have been posted in 
response to this single image. Of course, the “We Are the 99 %” blog currently occupies 
the same digital networks as Smule’s fun-loving flutists. Still, in these images of people 
testifying (via digitizations of their own writings and prints and profiles), and in the 
digital traces of all those who have “liked” the testimonies, I see a productively utopian 
longing for a new relationship between messages and networked subjects. Contra 
Derrida, the Occupy bloggers hold their signs, often staring directly at the camera almost 
like the Depression-era photographs for which Guthrie’s songs were the soundtrack; they 
plead with us to read their writings as present inscriptions of the real. Dean (2009, 2010) 
draws on Žižek and Lacan to claim that digital comment culture suffers from a decline in 
“symbolic efficiency.” But, on the Occupy Tumblr blog, signs and symbols enjoy a 
renewed capability. Occupy the signifier! On one hand, the site is indeed part of the 
fabric of endless circulation and a deflated symbolic efficiency; on the other, the images 
implore us to have faith that they are connected to something beyond other links or 
signifiers (that they are connected to desire and commonality, for instance). 
 The analog, transductive process of the People’s Mic—similarly explored on the 
Occupy Tumblr blog—contrasts sharply with the abstracted, recombinant cycles of our 
digital datascapes. This reading is not Luddite or Romantic, however, but purely 
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pragmatic. Dean herself has perhaps been too nostalgic in her own promotion of the 
significance of Occupy:  
 In dramatic contrast to communicative capitalism’s promise of easy action, of a 
 politics of pointing and clicking and linking and forwarding, Occupy Wall Street 
 says No! It’s not so easy. You can’t change the world isolated behind your screen. 
 You have to show up, work together, and collectively confront the capitalist class. 
 Protest requires living bodies in the streets. (Dean, 2012) 
The People’s Mic indeed challenges the ubiquitous narcissism that defines iGadget 
culture, for it required interlocutors to set aside their unique personalities, to sacrifice 
their individual voices momentarily to the larger channel, which King (2012) also points 
out. This is not a rejection of networking or of digitality per se, however, but a living 
dream of a different way of being networked. Just as the Hootenanny reimagined the acts 
of singing and listening in the 1940s, the transductive People’s Mic reimagines what it 
could mean to become digital. 
 A final connection to the revival’s utopianism I would like to highlight is the 
negotiation of difference. For, plugged into the People’s Mic, one could disagree. There 
is room for difference in the sense that one can signal dissatisfaction through the Mic’s 
hand gestures. But the contributor who disagrees is for the moment expected to 
nonetheless remain conjoined with the channel (Smule flutists, on the other hand, would 
perhaps just move on to the next song or performer or app). This feature too rubs up 
against practices under communicative capitalism, and the self-sacrificial conjoining 
performed by those People’s Microphone contributors momentarily in disagreement also 
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hearkens back to the Hootenanny. The folk forum was to be inclusive of performers of all 
types: seasoned vets, amateurish beginners, comedians, those singing serious political 
anthems and didactic protest songs but also everything in between. You might have to 
sing along, or publish (in the case of Broadside), songs you do not like. But struggling 
through differences is made into a common cause: the establishment of channels that are 
able to transmit difference is envisioned as a collective and durational project.  
5.8 Conclusion 
 This chapter has explored the echoes of one particular performance model, the 
Hootenanny, in contemporary digital culture. The dream of a non-hierarchical space in 
which each voice maintains its individual integrity but is simultaneously able to meld as 
one with the whole remains a potent one in the twenty-first century. And yet, we can see 
its articulation take on varying forms, with varying kinds of baggage. Apple iPhones, and 
Smule apps in particular, borrow many of the aesthetic features of the Hootenany. Pete 
Seeger’s (1972) claim that “our planet is full of singing people” (p. 149) is perhaps the 
central theme of these devices. The question of solidarity, however, is cast aside in this 
most recent round of DIY revivalism, and these instruments even seem to make passivity 
and narcissism a part of their very design and aesthetic. The People’s Microphone 
phenomenon, on the other hand, a focal point of the Occupy Movement, offers perhaps 
another example of the Hootenany’s continued relevance. Pete Seeger (who seems to 
show up everywhere) even stopped by Zuccotti to take a turn. After he prodded the 
People’s Mic to collectively hush itself, he fed into it “The River that Runs Both Ways,” 
an environmentalist song but also perhaps a metaphor for participatory media. Running 
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“both ways” like Seeger’s river, singers and speakers plugged their voices together in 
Zuccoti Park and around the world, melding distinctions between self and other at the 
same time that they lent their selves to the hybrid transmission of dissent, which has a 















Chapter 6 – Conclusion: Authenticity, Utopia, and a 
Mediatized Folk 
6.1 Introduction 
 The reverberations moving across the histories of American folk music, digital 
culture, and media theory particularly congeal in a few of the iconic moments that have 
appeared above: Dylan going electric, Alan Lomax plugging in his soon-to-be-forgotten 
“Global Jukebox” for the first time, Woody and Seeger casting their seeds, and thousands 
plugging into themselves as the “People’s Microphone.” In these “dialectical images,” to 
borrow a term from the Frankfurt School (see Benjamin, 1999), conflicting desires and 
anxieties, tendencies and contingencies, have played out. What is authentic mediation and 
how can one attempt it, despite all the noise in capital’s various channels? How can one 
plug “the folk” (or “the nomad,” as tactical media artists inspired by Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari have preferred to put it) into the network? What kinds of utopian visions 
might such a connection evoke? How can we deploy voices—whether conceived as 
fleshy, grainy instruments or mediated pseudo-events or elegant algorithms—against the 
“unopposed rule of money over human beings” (Peter Lamborn Wilson quoted in Garcia 
& Lovink, 2003, p. 108) and for peace and non-captive creativity? Lomax, Seeger, 
Dylan, and Guthrie all took a stab at answering these questions. 
 Yet, authenticity and utopia have often been dismissed as simplistically Romantic 
concepts. The mid-sixties critique of the folk revival offers an excellent example of how 
such criticisms can become intertwined. When Pete Seeger allegedly tried to swing an 
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axe through Bob Dylan’s electric guitar cable at the 1965 Newport Folk Festival, he 
seemed to sum up for his critics the totalitarian tendencies of both utopia and 
authenticity. Whose utopia? Whose authenticity? The concepts, it increasingly seemed, 
are necessarily tainted with power or with a totalitarian desire for a centre, as Jacques 
Derrida (1976) and Michel Foucault (1986) would put it in their own respective critiques. 
Paradigms within which authenticity and utopia make sense do not have sufficiently 
sophisticated understandings of discourse, textuality, or mediation, it was becoming 
increasingly apparent to many. Thus Bob Dylan was and is celebrated by non- and anti-
folkies alike (e.g. by the influential rock critic Greil Marcus, or by the New Sandy 
Review’s Paul Williams) for resisting puritanical “Old Left” obligations and for going his 
own technologized and performative ways, when he turned to distortion and rock music 
(see Miller, 2012).   
 And yet, narratives such as the one of Dylan’s electric “emancipation”—from 
“authentic” but totalitarian solidarity and towards individualized, de-territorialized 
performativity—leave out the subtle understanding of media, utopia and authenticity that 
can be extracted from the writings and performances of Lomax, Seeger, Dylan, or the 
recent phenomenon of the “People’s Microphone” of the Occupy movement. As I have 
tried to show, authenticity and utopia were always already plugged in. By using the 
theoretical foundations of tactical media to revisit organic communication theorists like 
Lomax, Seeger, and Dylan, we have come closer to a more productive and sympathetic 
understanding of what may be the most valuable concepts we could yet try to re-imagine: 
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authenticity (the ideal of being or becoming what we “really” are) and utopia (a better 
place which does not exist but which might yet).62 
 In this concluding chapter, then, it seems an opportune moment to take stock of 
these concepts. Although authenticity and utopia fell out of favour with the ascendancy of 
postmodernism in the eighties and nineties, they have resurfaced in critical and activist 
discourses as of late. After briefly sketching out the recent histories of authenticity and 
utopia, I will examine a theoretical approach, “Autonomist” Marxism, whose reimagining 
of these concepts has also involved a medium-theoretical angle. Although the aesthetic 
that emerges from neo-Marxist thinkers like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Nick 
Dyer-Witheford, and Franco “Bifo” Berardi might seem to be best applied within cultural 
fields like cyberpunk literature, hacktivism, video games, or new media and web art, we 
will discover that aspects of their theories have all along been anticipated by the strange 
work of certain folk revivalists.  
6.2 Understanding Utopia and Authenticity 
 “Utopia” was coined by Thomas More (2011), whose sixteenth-century text 
Utopia (a novelistic prototype) explored what must have seemed in many ways to be a 
“good” model for English society. More fused two theretofore distinct concepts in his 
novel term: outopia (good place) and eutopia (no place) became a pun denoting “a good 
place which does not exist” (Sargent, 1994, p. 5). Might utopia one day exist? Is it 
                                                
62 My understanding of utopia is greatly informed by Zygmunt Bauman (1976), Ernst Bloch (1986), and 
Ruth Levitas (1990), and my understanding of authenticity by Charles Taylor (1992), all who we will 
explore in more detail below.  
173 
 
perfect, or just better than the society within which the reader currently toils? These 
questions are ultimately left unanswered by many utopias. Utopias merely offer a virtual 
mirror through which present and future possibilities can be imaginatively worked out 
(Bloch, 1986).  
 However, utopia does come to mean “static, perfect place” over the course of the 
twentieth century (Bauman, 1976, p. 10). This pejorative re-orientation of utopia was 
effected from both the Left and the Right. Indeed, Engels (1978) even played a part here, 
lambasting Fourier, Owen, and other utopians for their undialectical attempts to escape 
the reach of industrial capitalism. And yet, utopia is both “good” and not (yet) existent; it 
is not necessarily perfect, nor is it necessarily static. In his attempt to salvage utopia from 
the dustbin of history, Zygmunt Bauman (1976) outlines four unique functions of the 
concept. It is an image of a future and better world that is:  
 (1) felt as still unfulfilled and requiring an additional effort to be brought about; 
 (2) perceived as desirable, as a world not so much bound to come as one which 
 should come;         
 (3) critical of the existing society; in fact a system of ideas remains utopian and 
 thus able to boost human activity only in so far as it is perceived as representing a 
 system essentially different from, if not antithetical to, the existing one;   
 (4) involving a measure of hazard; for an image of the future to possess the 
 qualities of utopia, it must be ascertained that it will not come to pass unless 
 fostered by a deliberate collective action. (p. 17) 
In Bauman’s description, we see both the functionality of utopia and its location within 
the structure of the present; utopia is constituted by the collaboration of desire, will, 
creativity, and collective action. Similarly, Ruth Levitas (1990) defines utopia (and here 
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we begin to see the importance of authenticity within recent articulations of utopia) 
simply as “the expression of the desire for a better way of being” (p. 8). Utopian 
dreaming is about filling in the lacks of the present’s version of the future with the potent 
virtualities of the “Now” (Bloch, 1986).   
 Both Bauman and Levitas perhaps owe much to Ernst Bloch, one of the first to 
point out that utopia is not just a fanciful vision of an impossible place, but a lack 
paradoxically constituted by the plenitude of the present as it explodes towards a future: 
 Thinking means venturing beyond. But in such a way that what already exists is 
 not kept under or skated over. Not in its deprivation, let alone in moving out of it. 
 Not in the causes of deprivation, let alone in the first signs of the change which is 
 ripening within it. That is why real venturing beyond never goes into the mere 
 vacuum of an In-Front-of-Us, merely visualizing abstractions. Instead, it grasps 
 the New as something that is mediated in what exists and is in motion, although to 
 be revealed the New demands the most extreme effort of will. (Bloch, 1986, p. 4)   
Utopia for Bloch is not a fanciful realm of impossibility. To be a utopian is just to be a 
thinking, desiring being. Further, as Bloch highlights, to fully embrace the potentialities 
of the utopian, we need to attempt authenticity, as “the New demands the most extreme 
effort of will.” Bauman, Levitas, and Bloch all return to More’s originally ambiguous 
term. Utopia is not impossible or necessarily static; it is a critical and immanent way of 
engaging with the future insofar as it exists within the present.   
 Like utopia, early articulations of authenticity begin to emerge in the West in the 
sixteenth century. Yet, as Lionel Trilling has pointed out, Polonius’s advice to Laertes in 
Hamlet, for instance—“to thine own self be true”—is not yet an example of authenticity 
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but of sincerity; Laertes should be true to himself so that he cannot be false to anyone 
else (Trilling, 1971, p. 3). Authenticity, on the other hand, avoids such instrumentality; to 
strive for authenticity, to be or become what one is, is by definition its own end (Trilling, 
1971). Authenticity proper begins to germinate in the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
perhaps fully flowering in the Romanticism of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and 
Friedrich Hölderlin, on through to existentialists like Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus. 
Yet, as Charles Guignon (2004) has shown, though Romantic conceptions of authenticity 
have been pervasive and influential, the concept has had a much wider reach. Martin 
Heidegger and even postmodernists such as Richard Rorty work with various 
permutations of authenticity, even if at the same time certain features of modernist 
authenticity are problematized by postmodernist assumptions (Guignon, 2004).  
 Like utopia, authenticity is not a single, natural, or ideal essence, according to 
Charles Taylor (1992). Taylor argues that the project of authenticity is best approached as 
a centuries-long discussion about what it means to be “fully, really” human. Authenticity 
is a process and a struggle, and (like utopia) authenticity involves asking critical 
questions about present ways of being (Taylor, 1992). According to Taylor, we need to 
reconsider the rich dialectical history of the concept:  
 What we ought to be doing is fighting over the meaning of authenticity, and from 
 the standpoint developed here, we ought to be trying to persuade people that self-
 fulfillment, so far from excluding unconditional relationships and moral demands 
 beyond the self, actually requires these in some form. The struggle ought not to be 
 over authenticity, for or against, but about it, defining its proper meaning. We 
 ought to be trying to lift the culture [of authenticity] back up, closer to its 
 motivating ideal. (1992, pp. 72-3) 
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Authenticity, like utopia as articulated by Bauman or Bloch, might involve any way of 
being. Yet it is precisely the activity of collaboratively discussing and attempting 
authenticity in which Taylor is primarily interested. Taylor himself is perhaps too 
committed to holding on to the “rational,” discrete self, but nonetheless we could 
translate his argument onto a more rhizomatic ontology. The “motivating ideal” of 
authenticity described by Taylor might push us past the need to “fulfill” individual selves 
as such.  
6.3 No Authenticity, No Utopia, No Future 
 How are we to become ourselves together, and what might it look like on a 
broader social scale when we get closer to it than we are now? Authenticity is a utopian 
concept, and vice versa. In cultural studies, however, authenticity has more often been an 
object of critique than utopia. From Bloch and Walter Benjamin (1999) to Richard Dyer 
(2002) to Frederic Jameson (2005), the pleasures deriving from the numerous non-places 
of phantasmagoric consumer culture have been sympathetically considered as important 
features of everyday life, and as potentially transformative sites. On the other hand, 
“authenticity” has been considered primarily as an essentialization of human being, 
which generations of scholars, Marxists and postmodernists alike, have been taught to 
avoid. To posit an essential human nature is unscientific and ideological (Althusser, 
2003) or a violent quest for a “centre” (Derrida, 1976).   
 To be clear, literary and cultural studies’ critiques of various articulations of 
authenticity, in particular racialized articulations, remain extremely valuable (e.g. Gilroy, 
1987; Hall, 1997; Miller, 2010). By wanting to reimagine the concept, I am not 
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suggesting that John Lomax’s idea, for instance, that black prisoners were more authentic 
than the rest of the African American population because they were closer to their pre-
modern roots (as prisoners!) is worth dusting off.63 As well, the sociological and star 
studies traditions that have followed from Erving Goffman (1959, 1974), or gender 
studies stemming from Judith Butler (1999), still ask and explore urgent questions. Our 
identities are indeed made in the processes of interaction and performance, and celebrity 
and star culture’s promotion of the Romantic notion of authenticity, for example, is 
worthy of critical and historically-grounded scrutiny.64 Adorno (1973) too has critiqued 
authenticity, the existentialist variety, for its undialectical shrinking from the broader 
social totality, and his remains an indispensable starting point:  
 No elevation of the concept of Man has any power in the face of his actual 
 degradation into a bundle of functions. The only help lies in changing the 
 conditions which brought the state of affairs to this point—conditions which 
 uninterruptedly reproduce themselves on a larger scale. (p. 69) 
Many authenticities, like many utopias, deserve to be dismantled.   
 However, the work of magazine editor and Philosophy Ph.D. Andrew Potter 
illuminates some of the pitfalls of wholesale rejections of authenticity (and utopia). 
Potter’s first bestseller, The Rebel Sell (Heath & Potter, 2004), was co-authored with 
Joseph Heath, and the book takes aim at Adbusters, Naomi Klein, and the broader “anti-
globalization” movement of the late nineties. Heath and Potter see in the idea of 
                                                
63 For a highly critical reading of Alan’s father John Lomax’s racialized understanding of authenticity on 
these grounds, see Miller, 2010. 
64 I have even tried to contribute to these discussions in my own work on Method acting and country rock 
(see Svec, 2010, 2012). 
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counterculture (a label for them which encapsulates an epic range of “leftist” cultural 
practices and political theories) a means of distinguishing oneself from others. Taking 
their cue from Thorstein Veblen, Potter and Heath explore notions like “ideology” and 
“repressive tolerance” as nonsensical weapons with which educated Marxists have tried 
to chastise the working peoples of the world who, according to Potter and Heath, may 
have very much enjoyed industrial capitalism (the enclosure movement is not mentioned 
by the authors) and consumer culture. 
 Potter mobilizes a similar critique in The Authenticity Hoax (2010). Going back 
further than the sixties this time, back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the eighteenth 
century, he explores how Western culture’s pervasive and insatiable desire for “real,” 
“homespun,” and “authentic” goods and experiences is fundamentally misguided and 
even violent. Again drawing on Veblen, Potter claims that authenticity and its pursuit is a 
sham, a means of distinguishing oneself from other consumers. The free market is a 
benevolent force that authenticity-seekers have tried to pretend to avoid, all the while 
looking to the market for the solution to their ailments (whether the solution be jeans, 
rock music, or anti-globalization magazines). According to Potter, our problem is not the 
alienating social system we live in but our very desire to escape from it through the 
mirage known as “authenticity.”  
 Heath and Potter point to important shortcomings in certain strands of leftist 
thought (in particular the notion that oppression is so totalizing that any movement for 
reform must be looked at with suspicion), and they demonstrate a keen, critical eye in 
their readings of the logical contradictions within the more rarefied and “highbrow” strata 
of Western consumer culture. Yet, both The Rebel Sell and The Authenticity Hoax tend to 
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flatten important categories and to avoid what are crucial distinctions (not to mention the 
authors’ superficial readings of Marx and critical theory). Authenticity is only considered 
as a relational signifier:  
 Absent from our lives is any sense of the world as a place of intrinsic value, 
 within which each of us can lead a purposeful existence. And so we seek the 
 authentic in a multitude of ways, looking for a connection to something deeper in 
 the jeans we buy, the food we eat, the vacations we take, the music we listen to, 
 and the politicians we elect. In each case, we are trying to find at least one sliver 
 of the world, one fragment of experience, that is innocent, spontaneous, genuine, 
 and creative, and not tainted by commercialization, calculation, and self-interest 
 (Potter, 2010, p. 264).   
Potter is only willing to see authenticity within the structures and systems of distinction 
that mark consumer culture. But, with respect to the difficult task of collaboratively 
discussing the potentialities of Becoming, are blue jeans and “getaway” vacations the 
best we can come up with? Although it is true that many communes in the sixties did not 
last, and that “authenticity” has been evoked by many ressentiment-filled angry young 
people and corporations alike (Frank, 1997), there are richer traditions of utopianism (e.g. 
Bloch, 1986; Adorno, 1984; Levitas, 1990), and richer engagements with authenticity 
(e.g. Heidegger, 1977; Kierkegaard, 1987; Marx, 1961), that go entirely ignored by 
Potter. We now turn to one particular body of thought that has dared to think our social 




6.4 Multitude, Species-Being, and the Conjunction of 
Authenticity and Utopia 
  In contemporary articulations of “Autonomist” Marxism—we will look in 
particular at the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri and Nick Dyer-Witheford—
authenticity and utopia are resurgent and understood in relation to media. In Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri’s “Empire” trilogy (2000, 2005, 2009), we find a Marxian-
Deleuzian synthesis; the authors posit history as a dance between the immanent and 
constitutive powers of “multitude” and the various structures and disciplinary orders that 
have sought to capture its energies, from transcendent absolutism to modernist 
colonialism and industrial discipline through to the contemporary, global system they 
term “Empire” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, 2009). The multitude is defined by its simultaneous 
negotiation of alterity and solidarity: “[The plural multitude’s productive, creative 
subjectivities] are in perpetual motion and they form constellations of singularities and 
events that impose continual global reconfigurations on the system” (2000, p. 60). The 
(non-dialectical) battle between human potential and the various structures of 
transcendence that have attempted to capture its productive capacities posits a resistant, 
networked subject that is always already outside, and in opposition to, power. Contra 
Althusser’s (1971) analysis of interpellation, then, whereby subjects are hailed by 
disciplinary institutions before they even enter the world, Hardt and Negri emphasize the 
necessity of struggle by recourse to a network of autonomous desiring-production.  
 Hardt and Negri’s multitude is no natural nation or folk. They distinguish between 
the various levels of organization by which the multitude has been constructed and 
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negotiated—in a manner recalling Benedict Anderson’s (1983) suggestion that modern 
nation-states have been “imagined”—and technology is a key component of these 
processes. It is the convergence of the workers of the world with informational 
technologies that has calibrated and armed the multitude for conflict with its newest 
opponent, the imperial capitalist order: “In the passage to the informational economy, the 
assembly line has been replaced by the network as the organizational model of 
production, transforming the forms of cooperation and communication within each 
productive site and among productive sites” (2000, p. 295). The transition to immaterial 
labour as the paradigmatic sector of capitalist production has put creativity, 
communication, and knowledge at the centre of exploitation, which has been made 
possible by high-speed networks and digital media (Hardt & Negri, 2000). Yet, this 
machinic territorialization has simultaneously planted the seeds of a mobile, “hydra-
headed,” global smart mob of sorts.65 Recalling McLuhan, they describe tools as “poietic 
prostheses” (2000, p. 217)—integral components of our being and our creative capacities.  
 Hardt and Negri do not use the word “authenticity” in their descriptions of 
“multitude,” but their concept nonetheless explores the potentiality of humanity to 
redirect its creative energies towards that which it “really” is: “The flesh of the multitude 
is pure potential, an unformed life force, and in this sense an element of social being, 
aimed constantly at the fullness of life” (2004, p. 192). The multitude constitutes 
authenticity in motion: a becoming-autonomous that is already here. Similarly, Hardt and 
                                                
65 “Smart mob” is a term coined by Howard Rheingold (2002), who views technology from more of a 
liberal perspective. Still, the concept somewhat similarly tries to grasp the relationship between embodied 
struggle and mobile, digital media.  
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Negri do not seem much concerned with the reclamation of the word “utopia” per se. The 
social productivity of the multitude is not an impossible elsewhere to be aimed at but 
rather an immanent fact. Still, if we remember Ruth Levitas’s (1990) understanding of 
utopia as “a desire for a better way of being,” we can easily consider Hardt and Negri as 
theorists of utopia, which appears as an immanent, wired, already-authentic elsewhere 
that is more like a virtual potency lying within the structure of Bloch’s “Not-Yet.”  
 Working along lines parallel to Hardt and Negri is Nick Dyer-Witheford, who has 
managed a more detailed and empirical account of laboring subjects in relation to digital 
media. Dyer-Witheford’s Cyber-Marx (1999) explores the potentialities latent within the 
media networks of high-technology, post-Fordist capitalism. Taking to task a wide range 
of thinkers on the postmodern condition, from celebrators of “post-industrial” society 
(such as Daniel Bell) to cynics who emphasize the overbearing hegemony of global 
media conglomerates (such as Herbert Schiller), Dyer-Witheford explores how 
contemporary media technologies are both dominating as well as potentially liberating. 
This strategy considers Marx’s oeuvre as a conflicted, dialectical whole, as technologies 
both embody dominating social relations and, because the substance of labour power 
precedes and is in opposition to capital, offer the working class channels of resistance.
 Cyber-Marx’s analysis parallels Bloch’s attempt to locate utopia within the 
structure of the present. A chapter on “Alternatives” unabashedly introduces the category 
of utopia into sociological and media analysis. Dyer-Witheford sketches a utopian 
“commonwealth” which is in many ways similar to the glimpse of utopia found in The 
German Ideology (Marx & Engels, 1998), or to Morris’s News from Nowhere (1995), 
albeit within a high-technological and postmodern horizon. The difference is that Dyer-
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Witheford’s proposals are not yet post-capitalist. They are virtual utopias that are already 
here in the present.   
 Dyer-Witheford puts forth four proposals which are attainable possibilities: “the 
institution of a guaranteed annual income, the creation of universal communications 
networks, the use of these networks in decentralized, participatory counterplanning, and 
the democratic control of decisions about technoscientific development” (1999, p. 193). 
In his description of each of these utopian proposals, the self- and society-creating 
powers of human beings are seen re-calibrated away from capital’s law of exchange and 
toward socially-directed means. The guaranteed annual income might dismantle the 
stratification of waged and non-waged forms of labour; it might also allow for more 
satisfying modes of life (Dyer-Witheford, 1999). As well, uncommodified and 
universally accessible media channels would help to create a communicative commons 
where the society’s fate could be planned and organized by those who constitute it (Dyer-
Witheford, 1999). This would make utopian discussion a very fabric of the proposed 
utopia: a utopia that yet desires utopia.    
 The actualizable configuration sketched by Dyer-Witheford is one made possible 
by the remarkable technologies and practical knowledges engendered by late capitalism 
(and indeed the focus is the technological); but it is also made possible by the immanent 
creative capacities of human life, which can be distinguished from capital’s power over 
it. Indeed, there is a profound tension throughout Cyber-Marx between the ways in which 
capital has directed labour and the immanent (and potentially “authentic”) capacities of 
the working class:  
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 Capital attempts to incorporate labour as an object, a component in its cycle of 
 value extraction, so much labour power. But this inclusion is always partial, never 
 fully achieved. Labouring subjects resist capital’s reduction. Labour is for capital 
 always a problematic “other” that must constantly be controlled and subdued, and 
 that, as persistently, circumvents or challenges this command. Rather than being 
 organized by capital, workers struggle against it. It is this struggle that constitutes 
 the working class. (1999, p. 65)  
The working class, although always struggling to realize its freedom, is directed away 
from its self-creating substance by capital. And yet, even if the working class loses itself, 
it always and already has the ability to rediscover its locus as the source of value. 
Rediscovering and acting within its self-constituting powers would mean that labouring 
humanity has become what it “really” is—that it has become authentic.   
 At the background of this discussion is young Marx’s articulation of “species-
being,” which is referred to in Cyber-Marx, and which Dyer-Witheford has given more 
explicit attention in recent work (see 2010). Species-being, Feuerbach’s concept which 
Marx deploys in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts (1961), is a dialectical 
version of authenticity. The power to transform is estranged from humans under capital, 
but it is a power that persists, latent: “[T]he proposition that man’s species nature is 
estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other, as each of them is 
from man’s essential nature. The estrangement of man, and in fact every relationship in 
which man stands to himself, is first realized and expressed in the relationship in which a 
man stands to other men” (Marx, 1961, pp. 77-8). Although Romanticism may have 
influenced Marx in his articulation of “species-being,” alienation and authenticity for 
Marx are strictly relational: vectors of struggle. Humans create themselves, their 
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relationships, and their world, but they can create them in a myriad of ways. Under 
capitalism, however, where creativity is alienated, humans are not. Under exploitative 
social relations, humanity is deprived of the ability to direct its own essence (the 
capability which is its “essence”).  
 In a more recent discussion of “species-being,” Dyer-Witheford via Marx 
emphasizes this paradoxically unessential essence of humanity (the essence to make its 
own essence): “In the Manuscripts, its discussion is cryptic, fugitive, tantalizing. It is, 
however, clear that Marx did not mean simply human existence as a biologically 
reproductive group. Species-being is rather the capacity to collectively transform this 
natural basis” (2010, p. 485). Species-being thus has little to do with heroic individuals 
getting in touch with their inner natures. “To be authentic,” from this point of view, is to 
be against structures of power and domination which contradict or divert the creative 
energies of labour: “[Species-being] might really better termed ‘species-becoming,’ the 
activity of a species whose only ‘essence’ is its historical plasticity. It has no eternal, 
universal content, but it is in opposition to both the laws of exchange and to instrumental 
efficiency” (2010, p. 487). The utopian dimension of “species-being” points towards the 
reclamation of both “the self”—considered inter-subjectively—and productive life. The 
authenticity aimed for exists not apart from but within and along the media ecologies 
humans have made for and with themselves.     
6.5 Species-Being and The Folk 
 Of all the folkies covered in this dissertation, Lomax was probably the closest we 
get to a scholar. He studied philosophy as an undergraduate at the University of Texas, 
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his favourite thinkers being Plato and Hegel, and he did pursue graduate work in 
anthropology at Columbia University, though he would not finish a degree (Szwed, 
2010). For their part, the Almanac Singers did have an academic come to their house for 
weekly lessons on dialectical materialism, but it remains uncertain what and how much 
they read (see Cunningham & Friesen, 1999). It is safe to say that the concept of 
“species-being” is not explicitly referenced in many of the folksongs I have heard.66 
Although the folk revivalists were not primarily philosophers or historians or political 
economists, however, they put their ideas into motion by building, doing, and singing. 
And by looking at the post-humanist tendencies and medium-specific tactics of the 
American folk revival, which this dissertation has tried to do, we also see a fascinating 
articulation of young Marx’s species-being, in spirit if not in letter.   
 We can turn back to Pete Seeger for a terse crystallization of this disposition. 
Seeger liked to quote “Big” Bill Broonzy’s famous saying: “All songs is folk songs: I 
ain’t never heard a horse sing one.” “Folk” has no inner essence here, as it merely the 
open process by which people come together and sing. The folk might sing (or make) 
anything, and they might do it in collaboration with any number of other machinic 
organisms. Via Broonzy, Seeger nods to the infinite and immanent potentiality of “the 
folk.” Elsewhere in his writings, however, we are often reminded that, though all songs 
can be folk songs, it is possible for people to stop singing altogether, or to have this 
capacity captured. As young Marx approached labour, so Seeger sees in our faculty for 
                                                
66 I thank Nick Dyer-Witheford for drawing my attention to the experimental rock band Species Being, 
however, who will perhaps be explored in future research.  
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sharing songs the condition of our species in a nutshell (the condition whereby we make 
our own condition), which can be diverted or atrophied.  
 In Lomax’s work with technology, too, we see a hybrid folk in process. The 
authentic locus of folksinging was both out in the field and inside the apparatus—the 
object of Lomax’s anthropological quests was bound up with the very tools he was 
supposed to have been mastering. The Global Jukebox he built in the late eighties and 
early nineties was a particularly dialectic crystallization of his folk-becoming. The 
archive would make accessible the totality of his and others’ recordings amassed over the 
twentieth century. Yet this was not a stable archive, a mere copy of the folk. Users would 
be able to upload and to contribute to the database: folklore-in-motion.  
 In the folkies’ persistent if fragmentary conceptualizations of media-machines, 
and in their simultaneous insistence on the concepts of both utopia and authenticity, we 
see perhaps one response to Martin Heidegger’s (1977) suggestion that a renewal of our 
relationship to technology would offer a “saving power.” At its best, tactical media and 
media theory more broadly has also managed this tripartite negotiation between 
authenticity, utopia, and media. The Invisible Committee, for instance, recently 
encouraged would-be revolutionaries to “attach yourself to what you feel to be true. 
Begin there” (2009, p. 97). Yet, it has taken tactical media theorists almost a decade of 
disembodied cyber-rhetoric to return to the body and to time, when all along there was an 
archive of American folk revivalism at their fingertips, some of it surprisingly well suited 
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